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1 Introduction
1.1 The Motivation
Rising health expenditure is a major concern of most industrialized countries. As
illustrated in Figure 1.1, not only nominal health expenditure per capita but also
health expenditure as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) have risen steadily
over the last decades in G7-countries. Among various reasons, this development
can be traced back to four factors, that provide the basis for the following analyses.
The first and probably most prominent reason is the aging of societies due to the
demographic change in industrialized countries. Second, technological progress
increases health expenditure. Third, there are trends in awareness for certain dis-
eases that may induce higher health expenditure. And last but not least, inefficient
health insurance markets can increase the amount spent on health care and insur-
ances.
Figure 1.1: Development of Health Expenditure in G7 – Countries
(a) Total Health Expenditure per Capita in G7-
countries (USD-PPP)
(b) Total Health Expenditure as % of GDP in G7-
countries
Own diagram based on data from OECD (2015).
The problems of the demographic change are twofold: (i) In an aging society there
are less persons in working age that contribute to social pay-as-you-go insurance
systems. This decreases the financial base of social insurances while (ii) the share
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of non-working (older and retired) persons, who do not contribute but benefit
from social insurances, increases. Proceeding on the assumption that health ex-
penditure and age are closely interrelated, aging is often claimed to be of great
importance when analyzing rising health expenditure. That is, both, revenue and
expenditure side of social insurances is affected by demographic aging.
Although, the direct connection between age and health expenditure and the rel-
ative importance of age as determinant of health expenditure is subject to debate
in economics (e.g. Zweifel et al., 1999; Felder et al., 2000; Werblow et al., 2007;
Felder et al., 2010; Wong et al., 2011; Payne et al., 2007; Karlsson and Klohn, 2014),
total health expenditure, which also include expenditure for long-term care facil-
ities and infrastructure for the elderly, are connected to age. The probability of
being in need of care increases sharply with age. The German Federal Ministry
of Health states that the probability to be in need of care rises from 4.2% for per-
sons aged 60 – 80 to 28.8% for persons older than 80 years1(Bundesministerium für
Gesundheit, 2014). A large share of health expenditure is spent for elderly persons
in need of care. Based on the aforementioned probabilities, the German Federal
Ministry of Health predicts the share of persons older than 80 years to be around
14.8% in 2050, which translates to 4.23 million care recipients in 2050 compared
to roughly 2.5 million today (Bundesministerium für Gesundheit, 2014). Along
with this demographic development, the amount spent for professional care and
nursing facilities will increase further. While this instantly increases the direct ex-
penditure for professional care, there is also an indirect effect. Already today, the
relatively largest part of care recipients is cared for at home by informal caregivers
alone or in cooperation with professional mobile nursing services. In recent years,
the relative importance of this type of care provision has even slightly increased,
as shown by figure 1.2. Although, from a fiscal point of view, this solution is
preferred and politically promoted, it disregards potential hidden costs in form of
adverse health effects for the caregiver and possible adjustments of labor supply
(e.g. Schmitz and Stroka, 2013; Schmitz and Westphal, 2013; Heger, 2014). Reduc-
ing labor supply in turn of starting care provision not only worsens the individual
income situation of caregivers but also of social insurers and may even affect pro-
ductivity and competitiveness of the economy.
Informal caregivers are typically family members, who take on the burden of car-
ing for a loved person. Especially in the light of the demographic change and a
resulting shortage of skilled labor, the pressure (or higher opportunity costs) im-
posed on informal caregivers increases. In this situation many potential caregivers
1Note, as the share of persons close to death is obviously higher among the oldest old, health
expenditure in an aging society may rise independently of whether age or proximity to death
is the major determinant.
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Figure 1.2: Care Expenditure, Social Care Insurance in Germany
Own diagram based on data from Bundesministerium für Gesundheit (2014).
decide to take on the double burden of caregiving and full-time-work. An inves-
tigation of potential health effects of this double burden can reveal these deterio-
rating health effects and help to approach the true costs of informal caregiving.
A second factor that is often claimed to be a major driver of health expenditure is
technological progress in medicine. Not only is the development and assessment
of new medical procedures very costly but also the usage of new technologies cer-
tainly does increase the range of diagnostics and enables to treat diseases, which
would have been either not diagnosed before or could not be treated (Newhouse,
1992; Okunade and Murthy, 2002; Meropol and Schulman, 2007). As with the de-
mographic change, also technological progress may accommodate some hidden
costs which go beyond the direct costs for expensive R&D, assessment procedures
and the potentially higher range of diagnosed and treated diseases. New tech-
nologies, which are currently in the approval process, or even research activities
and rumors may raise hope in patients that their disease might be cured at some
point in the future (Philipson et al., 2010). This potentially increases the present
demand for medical services and even for risky and marginally effective treat-
ments, as patients hope for a sufficiently long prolongation of life to benefit from
a new technology. Such an option value of technological progress may increase
health expenditure indirectly via higher demand for medical services.
However, technological progress and demographic change are not the only factors
to determine rising health expenditure. Also factors like changes in the aware-
ness for diseases can have a direct impact on health expenditure. These trends
in diagnostic strategies are in a sense comparable to technological progress. Just
as technological progress allows to diagnose previously undetected diseases and
3
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therefore increases diagnosed number of cases, a change in awareness for diseases
may increase the number of diagnoses. In recent years the awareness for mental
diseases, be it induced by supply or demand side, drastically increased, directly
raising health expenditure (Jacobi, 2009). While the total health expenditure per
person has risen by 17% from e2,650 in 2002 to e3,100 in 2008, the figures for
mental diseases have increased by 25% from e280 to e350 in the same time pe-
riod (Gesundheitsberichterstattung des Bundes, 2015). As shown in a very recent
publication by a large German insurance company, not only the direct expendi-
ture for treatments are immense but also indirect consequences. The study states
that the number of absent days from work due to depression has drastically in-
creased since 2000. They carefully and conservatively estimate the resulting costs
of absence to be around 4 billion Euros in 2013. Note, this estimate does not even
include productivity loss at work of those who are affected but not absent (Grobe
and Steinmann, 2015). The increasing share of expenditure and productivity loss
induced by mental diseases calls for investigations of the mechanisms and factors
that lead to deteriorating mental health. One such factor that is believed to have an
influence on the mental well-being of individuals is their work-environment, as it
plays an important role for a person’s financial and social stability. There is a large
strand of literature claiming that unemployment may have effects on a number
of fields of a person’s life, such as life satisfaction or long-term labor market out-
comes (Clark et al., 2001; Knabe and Rätzel, 2011; Winkelmann and Winkelmann,
1998; Kassenböhmer and Haisken-DeNew, 2009). Although there are some stud-
ies analyzing the presence of negative health consequences of unemployment, the
results of these studies are ambiguous (e.g. Korpi, 1997; Björklund and Eriksson,
1998; Green, 2011; Browning et al., 2006; Böckerman and Ilmakunnas, 2009; Salm,
2009; Schmitz, 2011). Also the fear of becoming unemployed is believed to nega-
tively affect health. That is potential negative health effects arise even before an
actual unemployment spell, which offers a possible explanation for the ambigu-
ous findings on health effects of actual unemployment (Reichert and Tauchmann,
2011). In this connection it is interesting whether these negative effects are found
for the persons directly affected only or whether they spill over to persons in the
close environment. Such spillover effects would reveal hidden costs of (potential)
unemployment or suboptimal employment arrangements that again may increase
health expenditure.
A further driving force of health expenditure may be found in inefficiencies on
health insurance markets. It is often claimed, that the German health insurance
market suffers from an insufficient level of competition. Reform efforts have been
made to increase the competition between insurers by trying to encourage the
4
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switching behavior of consumers. Yet, if the insurants are reluctant to switch in-
surances for whatever reason, enhancing competition is hardly possible. There-
fore, evaluating preferences and types of consumers is important to help con-
structing markets which encourage switching behavior and therefore help to in-
crease efficiency in health insurance markets and reduce expenditures which do
not reflect preferences but can be traced back to market inefficiencies.
In this dissertation, I identify and analyze the potential reasons for rising health
expenditure explained above, using a wide range of empirical methods.
1.2 The Studies
This cumulative dissertation comprises four distinct studies, each of which sheds
light on at least one of the aforementioned factors of rising health expenditure.
The first study deals with informal caregiving, an issue that does not only gain im-
portance due to demographic change but that is also connected to mental health.
The second study analyzes hidden costs of technological progress which can be
found in increased demand for marginally effective treatments. As third study, I
introduce a paper that investigates mental spillover effects of the fear of unem-
ployment. An analysis of heterogeneity in preferences and types of consumers of
health insurance is undertaken in the fourth study.
While each of these studies analyzes factors that potentially increase health expen-
diture, they are on distinct topics and make use of different methods. The pool
of methods in economics ranges from modern econometric techniques applied
on observational data to laboratory experiments, which evolved only recently in
economics. Modern econometric techniques are capable of disentangling effects,
dealing with endogeneity issues and establish causal links to arrive at reliable es-
timates. They are, however, often very data demanding and rely on sophisticated
methods, which try to replicate ideal experimental conditions to allow causal in-
ferences. On the other hand, experimental economics test hypotheses in a labo-
ratory environment by working with individuals, directly manipulating variables
of interest and controlling for factors that influence explaining variables in a con-
trolled environment. Therefore, the experimental approach tries to keep selection
issues out of the data right from the start which renders complicated econometric
methods obsolete. However, laboratory experiments are often limited to a very
small number of observations and the controlled and artificial environments may
raise doubts about the external validity of results.
Which approach is to be preferred cannot be resolved in general. Each of the meth-
ods has its advantages and disadvantages and relies on a number of assumptions.
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A broad discussion of methodology is beyond the scope of this introductory chap-
ter, however as a short note: deciding for one or the other method crucially de-
pends on what question is being analyzed. Therefore, both economic methods
should be seen as complements rather than substitutes. To give an example, think
of analyzing health effects of unemployment. It is hardly possible (and would be
certainly unethical) to manipulate subjects’ employment status in the laboratory
and observe health outcomes in the long run. However, applying microecono-
metric techniques to administrative or survey panel data allows disentangling ef-
fects to receive reliable estimates of health effects caused by unemployment. Con-
versely, it is hardly possible to analyze the relative importance of preferences for
contract attributes in hypothetical settings using administrative or panel data as
it simply does not exist. The questions of how people would behave cannot be
answered by analyzing data on revealed preferences but depends on stated pref-
erence methods.
Hence, both approaches complement each other to better understand, test and de-
velop economic theory.
In the following, I will give a short summary on each of the four studies, also in-
cluding the choice of method.
Reconsidering Reconciling: Health Effects of the Double Burden of Caregiving
and Full-time Work
Meeting the challenges of longevity is one of the primary political issues of most
industrialized countries. Already today there are more than 2.5 million care recipi-
ents in Germany, the majority of whom is cared for at home by informal caregivers
alone or in cooperation with mobile nursing services (Statistisches Bundesamt,
2013). For full-time working informal care providers this either means reducing
labor supply or taking on the double burden of providing care and working full-
time. Taking on the double burden may impose considerable strain on caregivers
which probably adversely affects their health state.
To identify health effects of the double burden of working full-time and providing
informal care, a multinomial endogenous treatment model is applied to represen-
tative survey data provided in the German Socio-Economic Panel. The outcome
variables are mental and physical component summary scales. The model ac-
counts for endogenous selection into four different states of care and labor provi-
sion by estimating treatment and selection effects. Exclusion restrictions are used
to identify treatment effects of the four different states. Potential reverse causality
issues are minimized by applying a lagged dependent variable approach.
Considerable negative health effects of taking on the double burden are found for
6
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both, mental and physical outcome variables. The negative effects for females are
found to be larger than for males.
The double burden seems to induce hidden costs in form of adverse mental health
effects for caregivers. Counting against its savings potential and also considering
the high expenditure and awareness for mental diseases, it therefore may have the
potential to raise health expenditure indirectly.
Risk-Loving in the End? The Role of Option Values in Choosing Risky and
Marginally Effective Treatments
A substantial share of health expenditure is induced in the last year of a patient’s
life. The high demand for marginally effective treatments in terminal care strongly
raises health care expenditure and thus is a common target in the health political
debate about prioritization in medical care. Literature indicates that technological
progress may induce an option value that could lead to risk loving behavior in
treatment choice and thus induce high demand for risky terminal care (Philipson
et al., 2010). Therefore, the option value, which can be induced by investment in
R&D, seeing a new technology entering approval or simply by rumors about fu-
ture breakthroughs, may not only lead to risk-loving choices but also to increasing
health expenditure.
In this paper I analyze the option value as possible reason for stronger preferences
for risky and marginally effective end-of-life treatments and risk-loving behavior
with respect to remaining life time. I use a discrete choice experiment to evalu-
ate treatment choice behavior in the presence of option values. Subjects are asked
to choose between different marginally effective treatments with varying survival
distributions. By including an attribute in the questionnaire that describes a new
technology, which is potentially being administered to patients at some point in
the future, the option value is introduced into the decision scenario.
Results indicate that the option value of a future cure has the potential to lead
to higher risk acceptance and preference for risky treatments even for initially
risk-averse persons. That is, the option value increases demand for risky and
marginally effective treatments and by this raises health expenditure.
Fear of Unemployment and its Effect on the Mental Health of Spouses
As already outlined earlier, there is a rich literature on negative effects of unem-
ployment on various fields of a person’s life, while the literature on health effects
of unemployment on the unemployed is not so clear. There are studies that do
find negative health effects, while other studies do not. However, it has been
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shown that not only the unemployed themselves are affected by an actual unem-
ployment spell but a negative effect also spills over to their spouses and family
members (Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1995; Siedler, 2011; Kind and Haisken-
DeNew, 2012; Marcus, 2013). Reichert and Tauchmann (2011) analyze if even the
fear of losing a job affects individuals negatively.
Against this background, chapter 4 analyzes the effect of individual job worries
on their spouses’ mental health. Therefore, representative survey data from the
German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) is used to estimate the effect on the men-
tal component summary scale. Possible problems that arise from endogeneity are
accounted for by applying panel models. Further exploiting exogenous variation
using staff reductions as a proxy for job worries helps to confirm the direction of
effects.
The results show that the fear of job loss has considerable negative effects on
spouses’ mental health, suggesting that adverse health effects may even emerge
before an actual unemployment spell. Effects are largest for women whose partner
is afraid of losing his job, which may be accredited to classic societal role models in
which men are the main income earners. The spillover effect of the fear of unem-
ployment uncovers hidden costs that are connected to (potential) unemployment
and suboptimal work conditions. As expenditure for mental diseases accounts for
a large and rising share of total health expenditure, detecting such negative men-
tal health consequences is considered important.
How Do Consumers Choose Health Insurance? An Experiment on Heterogene-
ity in Attribute Tastes and Risk Preferences
Recent health policy reforms try to stimulate switching behavior of consumers in
the health insurance market to increase competition among insurance companies.
As none of the reforms was particularly successful in setting effective incentives to
sustainably stimulate switching it is worthwhile to elicit consumers’ preferences.
This study uses a laboratory experiment to analyze consumers’ tastes in typical
contract attributes of health insurances and to investigate their relationship with
individual risk preferences. First, subjects make consecutive insurance choices in
situations varying in the number and types of contracts offered. Then, individual
risk preferences according to cumulative prospect theory are elicited. Applying a
latent class model to the choice data reveals five classes of consumers with consid-
erable heterogeneity in tastes for contract attributes. From this, distinct behavioral
strategies for each class are inferred.
The majority of subjects use minimax-type strategies focusing on contract attributes
rather than evaluating probabilities in order to maximize expected payoffs. More-
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over, it is shown that using these strategies helps consumers to choose contracts,
which are in line with their individual risk preferences. Results reveal valuable
insights for policy makers of how to achieve more efficient consumer choice. Find-
ing a way of accounting for the trade-off between acknowledgment of individual
taste heterogeneity and the resulting complexity on health insurance markets is
advisable.
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2 Reconsidering Reconciling: Health
Effects of the Double Burden of
Caregiving and Full-time Work
2.1 Introduction
Meeting the challenges of longevity is one of the primary issues of most indus-
trialized countries. The problems arising from the rectangularization of the sur-
vival curve are not only of direct financial or fiscal nature as brought about by
increasing pension obligations, but also have consequences with respect to secur-
ing health services, especially for the elderly. In Germany, for instance, there are
more than 2.5 million care recipients already today, the majority of whom is cared
for at home by informal caregivers alone or in cooperation with formal ambula-
tory care by mobile nursing services (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2013). The number
of care recipients will increase further in the future and thereby, ceteris paribus,
also the demand for informal caregivers.
Informal care provision has two possible consequences for full-time working indi-
viduals: (i) they either reduce their labor supply in turn of providing informal care
or (ii) they take on the double burden of working full-time and providing care. In
the light of demographic aging, reducing labor market participation increases the
fiscal challenge of longevity in countries with pay-as-you-go schemes to finance
their social insurance system. Moreover, less supply of skilled work can decrease
productivity and competitiveness of economies. Therefore, raising labor market
participation is a major goal of economic policy1 and increasing numbers of full-
time working individuals who also provide formal care can be seen as killing two
birds with one stone: they decrease fiscal expenditures for professional care and
simultaneously increase social insurance contributions by their labor market par-
This paper is joint work with Hendrik Schmitz. We thank Dörte Heger and Matthias West-
phal for helpful comments. All remaining errors are our own. Financial support by the Fritz
Thyssen Stiftung is gratefully acknowledged. Further, we are thankful to the RWI for providing
neighborhood-project data.
1In Europe, for instance, the European Employment Strategy set up by the European Council in
2000 aims at increasing the labor-force participation, particularly of women.
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ticipation. Apart from fiscal issues, informal care is, in general, also preferred by
care recipients who may benefit from staying in their familiar environment.
On the other hand, however, care provision is a challenging task and reconciling
working and caregiving, that is, taking on a double burden might overstrain care-
givers, possibly inducing adverse health effects. Whether or not this is the case is
an empirical question and is analyzed in this study.
The literature usually only finds small effects of informal caregiving on labor mar-
ket outcomes (Bolin et al., 2008; Carmichael and Charles, 1998, 2003; Ciani, 2012;
Heitmueller, 2007; Meng, 2013; Nguyen and Connelly, 2014; Lilly et al., 2010; Geyer
and Korfhage, 2014). That is, most people tend not to react to a care provision pe-
riod by adjusting their labor supply. It seems that the consequences of resigning
or reducing hours are too severe to justify this step for most individuals especially
facing the uncertainty about the duration of the double burden status.
Although the economic literature on health effects of informal caregiving is less
comprehensive, there have recently been some studies published in this field.
Bobinac et al. (2010) find detrimental effects of informal care provision on indi-
vidual well-being. In line with that, Coe and Van Houtven (2009) find negative
effects on mental health, especially of female care providers, while they do not
find negative effects on single physical indications, such as blood pressure. Using
SHARE data on European women aged 50-70, Heger (2014) finds negative mental
health effects of providing care to parents, while the results for physical health
measures are mixed. Schmitz and Westphal (2013) find a detrimental short-term
effect of caregiving for females, which, however, fades out over a five year time
period. Finally, Do et al. (2015) report negative effects on health of providing in-
formal care for South Korean females who care for their parents-in-law.
This study focusses on the double burden of working full-time and providing care
at the same time and to the best of our knowledge, there is only one existing study
that explicitly looks at its health effects. Schmitz and Stroka (2013) use a data set
from the largest German health insurance company to analyze the effect of the
double burden on drug prescriptions for mental and physical diseases. They find
an increased use of antidepressants with female caregivers who take on the double
burden, indicating a worse mental health status but do not find significant results
for drug intake for physical diseases.
We use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) of the years 2002 –
2010 and composite measures of physical and mental health from the SOEP ver-
sion of the SF12v2-questionnaire. In estimating health effects of care provision
there is an endogeneity problem of care. The decision to provide care is most likely
correlated with other unobserved time varying and time invariant factors that also
11
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affect health. Examples could be the general frailty or a health shock of the care-
giver. We apply the multinomial treatment model developed by Deb and Trivedi
(2006a) and exclusion restrictions to account for this endogeneity problem. Thus,
our approach differs from the one applied by Schmitz and Stroka (2013) whose
administrative dataset does not include many socio-economic variables which po-
tentially would serve as instruments. Thus, their analysis relies on fixed effects
methods that only account for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity.
Our results suggest, that taking on the double burden impairs individual’s physi-
cal and mental health state. This result holds for the pooled sample as well as sub-
samples of men and women (except for physical effects for males). Additionally,
also caring only while not being employed full-time seems to worsen the mental
health state of females. The results are found to be robust against changes in the
definition of caregiving, dependent variables and exclusion restrictions. We find
the detrimental effects of the double burden to be in line with Schmitz and Stroka
(2013).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 starts out by describing the empiri-
cal strategy. Section 2.3 describes the dataset and important variables used in the
estimation stage. The results are reported in Section 2.4. In Section 2.5 we evaluate
the robustness of results against changes in definitions and specifications before
Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Empirical Strategy
We assign individuals into four mutually exclusive states, depending on their
choices to work in the labor market and to provide care as shown in Figure 2.1.
We call this the Caregiving and Labor Status (CLS), for simplicity.
Figure 2.1: Caregiving and Labor Status
Care Provision
No Yes
Fu
ll-
ti
m
e
W
or
k
No No Work, No Care Care Only
Yes Work Only Double Burden
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Transforming this multinomial variable into mutually exclusive dummy variables,
a benchmark linear estimation model to analyze the research question reads
Healthit = β0 + β1CareOnlyit + β2WorkOnlyit + β3DoubleBurdenit + x′itγ+ εit
(2.1)
where Healthit is a health measure (to be specified in Section 2.3) of individual i
in wave t, CareOnlyit equals 1 if the CLS is care but no full-time work, WorkOnlyit
indicates working full-time only and DoubleBurdenit working full-time and addi-
tionally providing care. No full-time work and no care provision serves as refer-
ence category. As the potential health effects of DoubleBurden are supposed to run
via stress imposed on the carer we explicitly focus on full-time workers. That is,
NoWorkNoCare and CareOnly also include part-time employed persons. Further
socio-economic characteristics are included in the vector xit.
This model can be estimated by OLS. However, most likely the assignment of indi-
viduals into one or the other CLS is endogenous, rendering estimated coefficients
from OLS inconsistent. To account for this, we apply a multinomial treatment
model suggested by Deb and Trivedi (2006a,b). In this model we can jointly es-
timate the parameters determining the CLS and those of the outcome equation
where both equations are linked by common latent factors.
For the “treatment” (that is, the CLS), the following multinomial logit model is
specified
Pr(CLSij|zi, li) =
exp(z′iαj + δjl
j
i )
1 +∑Jk=1 exp(z
′
iαk + δkl
k
i )
(2.2)
where CLSij is the CLS j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} of individual i.2 From Equation (2.2), the
probability of belonging to a certain CLS is determined by observable variables
included in zi and unobserved individual characteristics, that affect outcome and
treatment choice, as captured by the latent factors l ji .
The outcome equation (2.3) specifies the expected value of the health status as
linear function of a set of socio-economic controls in xi, binary indicators for the
CLS and the latent factors (l ji ).
Healthi(CLSi, xi, li) = β0 + β1CareOnlyi + β2WorkOnlyi + β3DoubleBurdeni
+ λ1l
CareOnly
i + λ2l
WorkOnly
i + λ3l
DoubleBurden
i + x
′
iγ+ εi
(2.3)
2We drop the time indicator t for simplicity in the following.
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The latent factors are assumed to follow a standard normal distribution and cap-
ture unobserved heterogeneity. That is, based on unobserved characteristics and
relative to the respective base status, a positive and significant factor loading λ
for some status suggests positive selection of healthier individuals into this CLS.
As such, the λs are interpreted as selection terms. Identification is via exclusion
restrictions as the vector zi in Equation 2.2 includes all variables in xi and some
more (the instruments).
We apply the Stata routine mtreatreg (Deb and Trivedi, 2006a), which conducts
a maximum simulated likelihood estimation of the joint model based on Halton
sequences.3 See (Deb and Trivedi, 2006b) for a more formal derivation and the
general form of the log-likelihood function that is maximized.
Control variables and instruments
The vector of observable variables xi includes standard controls such as age, edu-
cational level, marital status, a binary indicator of children in the household, na-
tionality, living in a rural area, and dummies for the 16 federal states. In order to
reduce concerns of selection of healthy individuals into care, full-time work and,
especially, the combination of both, it also includes the lagged health status.
Exogenous variation is exploited to improve identification by using variables in zi
that influence the choice of treatment but apart from that do not have direct health
effects or correlations with unobserved factors. The set of variables assumed to
fulfill the exclusion restriction contains
- dismissal due to plant closure in the two previous years
- the number of siblings
- regional unemployment rates
- regional number of nursing home places per person
- the personnel employed in the professional care sector in a region per person
Plant closure has been argued to offer exogenous variation in labor force par-
ticipation and, consequently, has been widely used in related fields of research
(Schmitz, 2011; Salm, 2009; Browning et al., 2006). Thus, we assume plant closures
to be exogenous events with no direct influence on health (that goes beyond the
3Deb and Trivedi (2006a) suggest choosing the number of Halton draws to be at least as large as
the square root of observations to eliminate simulation bias. Hence, we use 400 draws which is
ample for roughly 36,000 observations in the pooled sample.
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one through the CLS). However, being dismissed from your job might well af-
fect the probability of being assigned to a specific CLS. For example, belonging to
work only is directly negatively affected by exogenous entry into unemployment
caused by a close-down of the employer.
The number of siblings that are alive is believed to influence the probability to care
for elderly individuals, as a sibling might take over the burden of caring for their
parents. Apart from underlying genetic factors, which cannot be completely ruled
out, we believe this variable also fulfills the requirements to offer exogenous varia-
tion.4 The remaining three instruments (regional unemployment rates, number of
nursing home places per person and the personnel employed in the professional
care sector per person) all offer the benefit of regional variation on county level.
As there might be consequences of regional unemployment rates with respect to
health which run over channels apart from own unemployment, this aspect needs
consideration. There is a rich literature on neighborhood effects on health (see
Diez Roux and Mair, 2010 for an overview). Typical factors that are argued to in-
fluence health are infrastructure, surrounding, social composition or the density
of population. We approach this issue by including federal state dummies to con-
trol for regional differences. Further we use a binary indicator of rural areas to
account for potential structural differences arising from population-based charac-
teristics and in turn also controlling for surrounding and infrastructural aspects.
Therefore the exclusion restriction is believed to hold as the potential channels
over which health might be influenced should be captured by the regional dum-
mies.
The number of employees in the long-term care sector and the number of nursing
home places reflect the supply of formal care in the county. This might affect
the likelihood to provide care as there is a well established substitution between
formal and informal care (Bonsang, 2009). On the other hand we do not believe
these variables to have an own effect on the caregiver’s health. At best one might
be afraid that these variables capture other regional characteristics such as the
income level. Again, however, this should be captured by federal state dummies.
2.3 Data
We use representative panel data provided in the German Socio-Economic Panel
(SOEP). The longitudinal German survey entails comprehensive individual- and
household-level data on an annual basis. In particular, data for a large set of so-
4We find our results to be robust against not employing this instrument. However, as siblings
contribute to explain treatment choice for subsamples, we stick to this approach as preferred
specification. For details see Section 2.5.
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cioeconomic characteristics, such as working, financial or health conditions can be
found for all members of a representative set of households aged at least 17. The
first wave of the SOEP was conducted in 1984 and subsequently refreshed and
enlarged several times. In 2013 (SOEPv29), the panel comprises information on
more than 20,000 individuals (DIW, 2014). The data are merged with regional un-
employment rates at zip-code level and nursing home places at the county level.
Care and labor force status
We restrict the sample to working age individuals between 25 and 64 years, as
65 is the statutory retirement age in Germany. The definition of care provision
and labor market status is based on time-use questions provided in the SOEP.
Respondents are asked the following question: "What is a typical weekday like
for you? How many hours per normal workday do you spend on the following
activities?". Among the eight possible answers are: "Care and support of persons
in need of care" as well as "Work/apprenticeship". All persons that state to spend
at least one hour a day on providing care to people in need of care are defined
as informal caregivers.5 Unfortunately, the panel does neither provide us with
the relationship between caregiver and care recipient, nor with the intensity of
caring efforts in terms of the level of caring needs of the recipient. Hence, we
can only approximate intensity by the number of hours devoted to caregiving per
day. With respect to working status, individuals are defined as full-time workers
if their time-use for paid work exceeds seven hours a day. That is, a minimum
working time per week of 35 hours, which is the currently observed lower bound
for full-time-work in Germany.6
Table 2.1 provides an overview over the four CLS. The largest category is WorkOnly
which comprises 55.69% of all observations, while 38.15% neither work nor pro-
vide care. The group of those who provide care only make 3.73% of the sample.
The remaining 2.43% take on the double burden. There is a large difference in
CLS-composition with respect to gender. Females tend to work less on full-time
contracts while providing more informal care. When it comes to taking on the
double burden, there is no large discrepancy found between sexes.
5This question does not refer to child care which is a separate category in the time use question-
naire. The results are robust to choosing two hours of care to define care provision instead of
one (see Section 2.5).
6The mean of weekly hours for full-time-workers in Germany is around 42h/week in 2012.
In some large industries like metal and electronics, employess work for 35h/week. See
www.destatis.de for details. Again, results are robust to choosing six or eight hours of work to
define full-time work (see Section 2.5).
16
Chapter 2: Reconsidering Reconciling
Table 2.1: Sizes of Caregiving and Labor Statuses
Pooled Female Male
No work, No Care 13,728 (38.15%) 10,246 (54.25%) 3,482 (20.37%)
Care Only 1,342 (3.73%) 1,079 (5.71%) 263 (1.54%)
Work Only 20,039 (55.69%) 7,087 (37.53%) 12,952 (75.76%)
Double Burden 873 (2.43%) 473 (2.50%) 400 (2.34%)
Total 35,982 (100.00%) 18,885 (100.00%) 17,097 (100.00%)
Note: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP for the years 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010.
Absolute and relative sizes of CLS based on caring at least 1h/day and working at least
7h/day.
Table 2.2 inspects the dynamics of the CLS. We show year-to-year-transitions be-
tween the CLS.7 The first column shows that among all who take on the dou-
ble burden in year t + 1, 550 had already shouldered it in year t. Among those
who newly reconcile working and caring, 81% (=509/(509+70+50)) had worked
full-time only before. Only small numbers start their double burden by adding
full-time work to an ongoing caregiving episode (6%) or even start both working
and caregiving at the same time (4%). This fits to the notion of most of the pre-
vious literature: upon caregiving episodes the vast majority keeps their job while
also providing care. Thus, our main interest shall lie in the different effects of
WorkOnly and DoubleBurden.
Table 2.2: Dynamics of Caregiving and Labor Statuses
t + 1→
t ↓ Double burden Only Work Only Care No Work, Total
No Care
Double burden 550 440 88 63 1,141
Only Work 509 25,627 93 2,524 28,753
Only Care 70 71 1,081 559 1,781
No Work, No Care 50 2,331 588 15,991 18,960
Total 1,179 28,469 1,850 19,137 50,635
Note: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP for the years 2001–2011.
7Note that this is a different sample than the one for the main analysis. To increase the numbers
of observations we do not only stick to every second wave where the outcome measures are
available. Transitions between two years show similar patterns, however.
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Health status
To get a complete picture of individuals’ health, we use two health measures pro-
vided in the SOEP. The first one is the mental component summary scale (MCS),
which measures the current mental health status of a respondent. The second
measure is the physical component summary scale (PCS), which is the physical
equivalent of the MCS. Both variables are created by explorative factor analysis of
six questions each. The questions are based on the SOEP version of the SF12v2-
questionnaire, which is biennially included in SOEP since 2002.8 The score ranges
from 0 to 100, with a mean at 50 and a standard deviation of 10 for the survey
year 2004 (Andersen et al., 2007). For both, MCS and PCS, a higher value indi-
cates better health. Component summary scales are widely used in health eco-
nomics applications (Schmitz, 2011; Marcus, 2013; Schmitz and Westphal, 2013).
Recent research provide some evidence for MCS being a good measure of individ-
ual mental health conditions (Gill et al., 2007; Salyers et al., 2000).
Due to the biennial character of the dependent variables and the inclusion of
lagged variables we use outcome variables from the waves 2004, 2006, 2008 and
2010. After dropping observations with missing values (in particular in the re-
gional variables due to restricted availability of the regional indicator in the SOEP
we use 35,982 person-year observations stemming from 10,100 individuals in the
final estimation sample.
Table 2.3 reports means in outcomes by the four CLS groups. We see that indi-
viduals who work full-time only have the best health status, while those who care
only have the worst in the full sample. No work and no care as well as individu-
als taking on the double burden are in between. These results change if we restrict
the sample to men or women. It is hard, however, to interpret these unconditional
means as they probably capture many different effects (effects of CLS on health
and vice versa, correlations with observed and unobserved effects). It is the goal
of the regression analysis to disentangle these effects.
The control variables and instruments used in the regression were mentioned in
Section 2.2 already. Table A2.2 in the Appendix reports descriptive statistics of
these variables.
8The SF-12v2 questionnaire is shown in Table A2.1 the Appendix.
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Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics
MCS PCS
Pooled sample
Care Only 47.78 47.12
Work Only 50.50 52.48
Double Burden 48.07 49.63
No Work, No Care 49.41 49.34
Females
Care Only 47.39 47.81
Work Only 49.16 52.15
Double Burden 47.05 49.55
No Work, No Care 49.29 50.12
Males
Care Only 49.38 44.27
Work Only 51.24 52.66
Double Burden 49.27 49.73
No Work, No Care 49.76 47.07
Note: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP for the
years 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010. Unconditional means
for dependent variables by subgroups.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 OLS as a Benchmark
As a benchmark, we estimate a simple OLS model of Equation (1) assuming exo-
geneity of labor supply and care provision and report the results in Table 2.4. We
see that DoubleBurden and CareOnly both have a significantly negative coefficient
of similar size for the pooled sample. That is, both are found to be correlated with a
lower mental health status of care providers. This is also found for the subsample
of females whereas the relationship is negative but insignificant for males. Work-
ing only has a significantly positive coefficient in the pooled sample and for males.
All in all, the coefficients are as expected. Those for care provision might be un-
derestimated if there is a selection of more healthy individuals into care provision
which is not accounted for by OLS.
The results for PCS are slightly different. While we find negative point estimates
for caring only throughout all subsamples and positive ones for work only (both
as in the case of MCS), there are positive point estimates for the double burden.
Again, these results should not be interpreted as causal, however, and might be
induced by selection into and out of care provision not accounted for by OLS. We
therefore address the endogeneity by applying the multinomial treatment model.
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Table 2.4: OLS
Pooled Female Male
Dependent Variable: MCS
Care Only −1.264∗∗∗ −1.605∗∗∗ −0.159
(0.261) (0.286) (0.641)
Work Only 0.397∗∗∗ 0.157 1.061∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.149) (0.185)
Double Burden −1.182∗∗∗ −1.466∗∗∗ −0.459
(0.298) (0.416) (0.436)
MCSt−1 0.494∗∗∗ 0.487∗∗∗ 0.499∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009)
Constant 73.390∗∗∗ 70.300∗∗∗ 76.169∗∗∗
(0.646) (0.914) (0.851)
Socio-Economic Controls YES YES YES
Federal State Dummies YES YES YES
Year Dummies YES YES YES
Dependent Variable: PCS
Care Only −0.319 −0.371 −0.375
(0.215) (0.244) (0.460)
Work Only 0.903∗∗∗ 0.486∗∗∗ 1.789∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.115) (0.156)
Double Burden 0.508 0.123 1.439∗∗∗
(0.247) (0.352) (0.350)
PCSt−1 0.582∗∗∗ 0.576∗∗∗ 0.579∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009)
Constant 79.370∗∗∗ 77.713∗∗∗ 80.484∗∗∗
(0.512) (0.692) (0.749)
Socio-Economic Controls YES YES YES
Federal State Dummies YES YES YES
Year Dummies YES YES YES
N 35,982 18,885 17,097
Note: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP for the years 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010. ∗∗∗ p<0.01; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗
p<0.1. Standard errors (clustered on individual level) in parentheses.
2.4.2 Multinomial treatment model
Choice Equation
We start by briefly discussing the results of the choice equation. These results do
not differ much between both outcome variables. Moreover, as we prefer to report
marginal effects instead of coefficients, we show, for simplicity, marginal effects
of the separately estimated choice equation without latent factors. The results are
reported in Table 2.5. Coefficients are reported in A2.3 in the Appendix. By com-
paring them with the coefficients of the choice equation in the jointly estimated
model (Table A2.4), we see that the differences are negligibly small.
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Table 2.5: Marginal Effects of Choice Equation (pooled sample)
Pr(NoWorkNoCare) Pr(CareOnly) Pr(WorkOnly) Pr(DoubleBurden)
Instruments
Plant Closure 0.300∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ −0.307∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.007) (0.022) (0.003)
Number of Siblings 0.002 −0.000 −0.001 −0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Unempl. rate (Female) 0.006∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Unempl. rate (Male) −0.001 −0.001∗∗ 0.002 −0.001
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
Nursing Care Places 0.003 −0.002∗∗ 0.000 −0.001
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Employees in Care 0.002 0.002∗∗ −0.007∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
Other controls
Age: 35-44 −0.075∗∗∗ 0.007 0.045∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.004) (0.011) (0.006)
Age: 45-54 −0.039∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.006) (0.013) (0.007)
Age: 55-64 0.238∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ −0.347∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.010) (0.013) (0.007)
Marital Status 0.037∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002)
Children in HH 0.183∗∗∗ 0.003 −0.174∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002)
Education: General −0.074∗∗ −0.005 0.086∗∗ −0.007
(0.035) (0.007) (0.038) (0.007)
Education:Middle −0.144∗∗∗ −0.007 0.158∗∗∗ −0.007
(0.036) (0.007) (0.038) (0.009)
Education:voc. train. −0.216∗∗∗ −0.006 0.223∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.026) (0.007) (0.030) (0.009)
Education: University −0.291∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗ 0.312∗∗∗ −0.002
(0.027) (0.005) (0.029) (0.008)
Education:High Sch. −0.180∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.029) (0.005) (0.032) (0.009)
Foreign 0.051∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.028∗ −0.012∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.003) (0.017) (0.003)
Rural Area 0.002 0.004 −0.009 0.003
(0.012) (0.003) (0.012) (0.003)
2006 −0.028∗∗∗ −0.003 0.032∗∗∗ −0.000
(0.008) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002)
2008 −0.027∗∗∗ −0.003 0.029∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.010) (0.002) (0.010) (0.003)
2010 −0.024∗∗ −0.004∗ 0.030∗∗∗ −0.002
(0.010) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002)
Female 0.373∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ −0.413∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.007) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002)
Note: These are marginal effects after a single equation multinomial logit estimation of CLS on controls. ∗∗∗ p<0.01;
∗∗ p<0.05; ∗ p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. N=35,982. Federal state dummies not shown. Coefficients of the
estimation reported in Table A2.3 in the Appendix.
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The results suggest that middle-agers have an increased probability to give care
and also to shoulder the double burden, which is in line with expectations, consid-
ering the age of parents in need of care. With respect to gender, we find women to
be more likely to belong to the care-only group while they are less likely working
full-time. This does not come as a surprise as most informal care in Germany is
provided by women in the age of 35 to 65 and, moreover, women are more likely
to work part-time than men. More education goes along with increased probabil-
ity of working only and decreased probability of not working and not providing
care. Those with highest education levels are less likely to provide care.
The instruments show the expected direction of marginal effects, that is, being
laid off due to plant closure in the previous two years significantly decreases the
probability to work and therefore also to take on the double burden. Higher re-
gional unemployment rates for females have a negative coefficient for the work-
only class, while male unemployment rates lead to a lower probability of provid-
ing care only. This might be accredited to a strained situation on the labor market
and presumably traditional gender roles with regard to house- and paid work in
many families. The number of regional nursing care places per person reasonably
decreases the probability of giving care only. However, the personnel employed
in the professional care sector per person in a region has a significantly positive
coefficient for care only as well as the double burden and decreases the probability
to work only. This might seem contradicting at first glance but seems reasonable
if we consider what is actually captured here. The personnel employed in care
includes mobile nursing services, utilization of which usually does not render fur-
ther informal care obsolete as stationary care does. According to official German
data, more than 20% of all care recipients are cared for at home with some help
from mobile nursing services (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2013). Overall, we find
the marginal effects of the exclusion restrictions to point in a reasonable direction
and explain the endogenous decisions to work and provide care to a considerable
amount. Only the number of siblings does not seem to play a role statistically.
Outcome Equation
The multinomial treatment choice model accounts for endogenous selection and
estimates treatment effects on health status. The treatment effects can directly
be interpreted as in a standard linear model relative to the reference category
NoWork, NoCare. Table 2.6 shows the results for mental health.9 For the pooled
sample, we find a significant effect of the double burden. That is, an individual (as
good as) randomly assigned to the double burden would experience a decrease in
MCS by 4.946 points compared to a person assigned to the reference category. This
9Here, we focus on the most relevant coefficients. Full estimation results are reported in Tables
A2.4 – A2.9 in the Appendix.
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effect is of considerable size as it accounts for roughly 50% of a standard deviation
of MCS. As we suspect differences in sensitivity between genders, we re-estimate
the model for female and male subsamples. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2.6 present
the results for the sex-split samples. We find a large detrimental effect of the dou-
ble burden for both sexes (-5.777 or 58% of a SD for females and -3.897 or 39% of a
SD for males). As pointed out by the descriptive dynamics in Section 2.3 the most
Table 2.6: MCS – Treatment and Selection Effects
Pooled Female Male
Care Only −0.744 −3.243∗∗∗ 1.543∗
(0.653) (0.985) (0.902)
Work Only 1.101∗∗∗ 1.113∗∗∗ 1.884∗∗∗
(0.403) (0.432) (0.560)
Double Burden −4.946∗∗∗ −5.777∗∗∗ −3.897∗∗∗
(0.501) (0.668) (0.655)
No Work, No Care Reference Category
MCSt−1 0.494∗∗∗ 0.486∗∗∗ 0.499∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009)
Constant 22.989∗∗∗ 21.705∗∗∗ 23.501∗∗∗
(0.604) (0.735) (0.835)
Socio-Economic Controls YES YES YES
Federal State Dummies YES YES YES
Year Dummies YES YES YES
lnalpha 1.988∗∗∗ 1.945∗∗∗ 1.932∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.043) (0.044)
λCareOnly −0.552 1.812∗ −1.786∗∗∗
(0.656) (1.042) (0.664)
λWorkOnly −0.881∗ −1.202∗∗∗ −1.018
(0.468) (0.475) (0.640)
λDoubleBurden 4.020∗∗∗ 4.658∗∗∗ 3.663∗∗∗
(0.438) (0.566) (0.524)
N 35,982 18,885 17,097
Note: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP for the years 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010. ∗∗∗ p<0.01; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗
p<0.1. Standard errors (clustered on individual level) in parentheses. Full estimation results reported in Tables A2.4
- A2.6 in the Appendix.
relevant comparison may be between those who work only and those who take
on the double burden as most observations that enter the double burden worked
only in the previous period. For the pooled sample we find that taking on the dou-
ble burden compared to working only has an effect of around -6.0 points (-4.946 -
1.101) on the MCS-scale. For females the respective effect on MCS is -6.89 while it
is again smaller for males with -5.78.
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For the physical health effects of double burden (Table 2.7), the results are simi-
lar to the MCS results but smaller in magnitude. We find a detrimental effect in
the pooled sample of -2.143 which, however, accounts for roughly 21% of a stan-
dard deviation of PCS. The double burden is also found to decrease the physical
health of women significantly. The effect is again smaller than for MCS (-2.327)
but of relevant size – especially considering that the effect is believed to mainly
work over the channel of stress imposed on the carer, which only indirectly affects
physical health outcomes. While the point estimate for the male subsample loses
significance, the sign remains unchanged.
We find the effect of taking on the double burden compared to working only ac-
counting to -3.7 PCS-points for the pooled sample and -4.135 for females. As men-
tioned before we do not find a statistically significant effect for the double burden
for males.
Table 2.7: PCS – Treatment and Selection Effects
Pooled Female Male
Care Only 0.258 −0.063 −0.650
(0.361) (0.600) (1.021)
Work Only 1.552∗∗∗ 1.808∗∗∗ 2.581∗∗∗
(0.413) (0.490) (0.586)
Double Burden −2.143∗∗∗ −2.327∗∗∗ −1.016
(0.475) (0.673) (0.772)
No Work, No Care Reference Category
PCSt−1 0.581∗∗∗ 0.576∗∗∗ 0.579∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009)
Constant 20.783∗∗∗ 20.229∗∗∗ 21.530∗∗∗
(0.539) (0.620) (0.774)
Socio-Economic Controls YES YES YES
Federal State Dummies YES YES YES
Year Dummies YES YES YES
lnalpha 1.809∗∗∗ 1.832∗∗∗ 1.786∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.049) (0.067)
λCareOnly −0.611∗∗ −0.452 0.294
(0.310) (0.609) (0.963)
λWorkOnly −0.801∗ −1.592∗∗∗ −0.990
(0.485) (0.558) (0.696)
λDoubleBurden 2.838∗∗∗ 2.659∗∗∗ 2.631∗∗∗
(0.443) (0.620) (0.765)
N 35,982 18,885 17,097
Note: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP for the years 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010. ∗∗∗ p<0.01; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗
p<0.1. Standard errors (clustered on individual level) in parentheses. Full estimation results reported in Tables A2.7
- A2.9 in the Appendix.
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The coefficients estimated from the multinomial treatment choice model point to-
wards a larger detrimental effect of taking on the double burden on health than
OLS as it accounts for endogenous selection. The λDoubleBurden shows the selection
into double burden on unobservables that affect the outcome variable. The pa-
rameter of 4.020 in the MCS equation (2.838 in PCS) shows that an individual that
is more likely to choose to care and work simultaneously has a higher MCS (PCS)
compared to a person that is more likely to belong to the reference group. That
is, we find significant and large positive selection of healthy individuals into the
double burden of working full-time and providing informal care. This selection
effect is found to be of similar size across all subsamples.
We now briefly turn to the other CLSs in Tables 2.6 and 2.7. For CareOnly, we
do not find significant effects in the pooled samples for neither of the two health
measures. However, there exists a considerable negative effect of providing care
compared to neither full-time work nor care provision on MCS (-3.243) for females,
which is close in magnitude to what Schmitz and Westphal (2013) find as short-
term effects. Finally, there seems to be a positive effect of working full-time only
throughout all subsamples on both, MCS and PCS.
The negative effects of both, DoubleBurden and CareOnly, on health are larger
for females than for males. Although health effects are supposed to mainly work
through the channel of strain imposed on the carer, there is room for parallel chan-
nels. The difference in effects might be explained by gender role models. One
might suspect a detrimental effect of sympathizing with the care recipient to work
along with the imposed stress (the “family effect”). This becomes especially ap-
parent if we compare the effects across specifications. We find the harming effect
of double burden to be larger for women. Further, we cannot identify a physical
effect for care only across all subsamples, while the effects for MCS is negative and
large for women and positive for men. This strong effect with respect to mental
health for women does not spill over to worsen physical conditions. Men could
benefit from being useful in terms of mental health while for women, the sympa-
thizing or family effect largely prevails. As the family effect presumably plays a
less important role in PCS, this gives a hint that a family effect might play a role in
gender differences. Unfortunately, the data does not allow for disentangling fam-
ily effects from stress effects – see Bobinac et al. (2010) for a closer consideration of
these effects.
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2.5 Robustness Checks
We aim at enhancing credibility of our findings by running several robustness
checks. The results are reported in Table 2.8 for changes on the right hand side of
the model and Table 2.9 for changes on the left hand side.
2.5.1 Changes in the Explanatory Variables
The number of siblings – although frequently used in the previous literature as
instruments – might comprise some underlying genetic and family factors which
may threaten its validity as an instrument. Moreover, we do not find large ex-
planatory power of the exclusion restriction for treatment choice in the pooled
as well as in the female sample. We therefore re-estimate the model without the
number of siblings in the list of instrumental variables. The results are reported
in Table 2.8, column (2).10 The coefficients only change marginally. We therefore
conclude that our results are robust against using the number of siblings as an
instrument. We, nevertheless, prefer inclusion of the variable in our main speci-
fication as it significantly contributes to explaining treatment choice for the male
subsample (results not reported but available upon request).
As the SOEP does not provide us with direct measures of care intensity, we ap-
proximate intensity by increasing the time threshold in the definition of caregivers.
We now consider individuals as informal caregivers if their time use for providing
care is at least two hours a day. This obviously decreases the number of observa-
tions for those CLSs that count caregivers, i.e. care only and double burden, while
it enlarges the two remaining CLSs. The group of those that take on the double
burden shrinks from 873 to only 277 when applying the new threshold. Unfortu-
nately, this change in treatment group sizes comes at the cost of not being able to
estimate effects for the sex-split samples, as the maximum simulated likelihood es-
timation of our model does not achieve convergence within a reasonable number
of iterations. Results are shown in Table 2.8, column (3). The effects for MCS sup-
port our result from the preferred specifications. We find similar effects for taking
on the double burden. For PCS, the the coefficient of DoubleBurden is estimated
less precisely but points into the same direction. As such, the results can be seen
as indicator of robustness against changes in definition of informal caregiver sta-
tus. Increasing the threshold for being a caregiver further is not reasonable as the
treatment group sizes become too small for the CLSs, which include caregivers.
While the preferred specification uses the threshold of 7h/day as it is a reasonable
fit to German legislation we also use 6h and 8h a day to check the robustness
10Column (1) repeats the results from the baseline specification.
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of our results, shown in columns (4) and (5). Based on the suspicion, that strain
drives the results, the coefficients show the expected direction of effects. That is,
for 6 hours of daily work the deteriorating effect of the double burden is slightly
smaller, while the corresponding effect is larger in case of 8 hours of daily time
devoted to paid work.
Finally, column (6) presents results of a specification omitting the lagged depen-
dent variable. In this case, the coefficients of the double burden strongly increase
in magnitude.
2.5.2 Changing the Dependent Variable
Table 2.9: Robustness Check – Health-Satisfaction
Pooled Female Male
Care Only 0.170∗∗ −0.102 0.012
(0.082) (0.132) (0.134)
Work Only 0.410∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗ 0.575∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.093) (0.087)
Double Burden −0.697∗∗∗ −0.913∗∗∗ −0.428∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.095) (0.124)
No Work, No Care Reference Category
Health Satisfactiont−1 0.591∗∗∗ 0.579∗∗∗ 0.600∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Constant 8.197∗∗∗ 8.132∗∗∗ 8.351∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.102) (0.104)
Socio-Economic Controls YES YES YES
Federal State Dummies YES YES YES
Year Dummies YES YES YES
lnalpha 0.327∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.035) (0.042)
λCareOnly −0.255∗∗∗ 0.007 −0.043
(0.079) (0.136) (0.105)
λWorkOnly −0.300∗∗∗ −0.248∗∗ −0.341∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.107) (0.101)
λDoubleBurden 0.775∗∗∗ 0.935∗∗∗ 0.655∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.076) (0.112)
N 70,043 36,818 33,225
Note: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP for the years 2004 - 2010. ∗∗∗ p<0.01; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗ p<0.1. Standard
errors (clustered on individual level) in parentheses.
MCS and PCS measure different dimensions of individual health and as such are
not closely interrelated (Correlation: -0.004). There is another variable provided
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in SOEP which collapses both dimensions into one variable: health satisfaction.
In our case, it has the advantage of being included in SOEP annually, which al-
lows us to nearly double the sample size. This in turn comes at the cost of being a
more subjective variable compared to the component summary scales (which are
sometimes labeled "quasi-objective") and of being categorical. The focus of this
variable is to gather information about the individual satisfaction with health. Re-
spondents are directly asked "How satisfied are you with your health?". Answers
are on an 11-point scale, ranging from 0 – completely dissatisfied to 10 – completely
satisfied. Health satisfaction is found to be correlated with both, MCS (Correlation:
0.328) and PCS (Correlation: 0.624) in our data. The mean of health satisfaction in
our sample is 6.731 with a standard deviation of 2.097. We use this variable to sup-
port our findings concerning both outcomes. The results show significant negative
effects for the double burden of relevant size for both, men and women (33.2% of
a standard deviation for the pooled sample, 20.4% for men 43.5% for women). Al-
though health satisfaction probably does not capture the same underlying health
state as the component summary scales, results support the detrimental health
effect of the double burden found from our preferred outcome measure.
2.6 Conclusion
In this study we analyze health effects of the double burden of informal care
provision and full-time employment. We apply a multinomial endogenous treat-
ment model developed by Deb and Trivedi (2006b) with four possible treatments,
i.e. different combinations of caregiving and labor supply. The empirical model
jointly estimates treatment and selection effects and by this corrects for selection
into one or the other caregiving and labor status. Using German Socio-Economic
Panel data allows us to measure comprehensive mental and physical health states
along with further characteristics of caregivers.
Our results suggest that taking on the double burden significantly decreases phys-
ical and mental health. We find worsening effects across all specifications with the
exception of physical effects for men. Furthermore, there is evidence that females
react more strongly to informal care provision than men do. That is, not only is the
effect of the double burden considerably larger but also caregiving alone seems to
affect the mental health state of women negatively.
Some reforms are already under way, such as a the "income replacement benefit
for a ten-day absence" from work, which is planned to be introduced in Germany
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in 2015.11 This measure, however, focuses on mitigation of short term effects to
help to adapt to the new situation of long-term care provision after e.g. a stroke of
a parent. Beyond that, plans also intend to increase expenditures in mobile nurs-
ing services, which might help organising informal care at home. Even though
this seems to point into the right direction to improve the situation of informal
caregivers, evaluation of reforms and their effects remains necessary in the future.
Higher expenditures for mobile nursing services, for example, might well lead to
more people taking on the double burden and hence more persons being adversely
affected. Unfortunately, we cannot distinguish between informal caregivers, who
provide care solely on their own and those who are supported by mobile nursing
services in this study. There might be differences in that mobile nursing services
may take over the most intense tasks, which impose highest strain, for example.
Analyzing the differences in health effects of these two groups would be interest-
ing, especially in the light of current reform efforts.
This study cannot perform an analysis of whether formal care is preferable over
informal care. However, results suggest that the indirect costs of informal care
should somehow enter a possible cost-benefit analysis when considering further
reforms. Another limitation of this study is that we are only able to analyze the
contemporaneous effect of the double burden on health. Schmitz and Westphal
(2013) only find short-run negative mental health effects of careprovision while
the medium-term effect is fairly small. This might well be the case for the double
burden, too. Given, however, that the short-term effect of both working and caring
is considerably larger than the one of just caring, it is not unlikely that this effect
is longer lasting. Yet, this is left for future research.
11See http://www.bmg.bund.de/ministerium/presse/english-version/long-term-care/first-act-
to-strengthen-long-term-care.html for a description of reform efforts, Date of access: 10/3/2014
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2.7 Appendix
Table A2.1: SF-12v2 questionnaire in the SOEP
Very
Good
Good Satis-
factory
Poor Bad
How would you describe your current health?
Greatly Slightly Not at all – –
When you ascend stairs, i.e. go up several floors on
foot: Does your state of health affect you greatly,
slightly or not at all?
And what about having to cope with other tiring
everyday tasks, i.e. where one has to lift something
heavy or where one requires agility: Does your state
of health affect you greatly, slightly or not at all?
Please think about the last four weeks. Always Often Some- Almost Never
How often did it occur within this period of time,
. . .
times never
 that you felt rushed or pressed for time?
 that you felt run-down and melancholy?
 that you felt relaxed and well-balanced?
 that you used up a lot of energy?
 that you had strong physical pains?
 that due to physical health problems
. . . you achieved less than you wanted to
at work or in everyday tasks?
. . . you were limited in some form
at work or in everyday tasks?
 that due to mental health or emotional problems
. . . you achieved less than you wanted to
at work or in everyday tasks?
. . . you carried out your work or everyday tasks
less thoroughly than usual?
 that due to physical or mental health problems
you were limited socially, i.e. in contact with
friends, acquaintances or relatives?
Note. Source: SOEP Individual question form. Available at http://panel.gsoep.de/soepinfo2008/.
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Table A2.2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable No Work, No Care Care Only Work Only Double Burden
Pooled
Age 46.662 52.043 43.803 49.258
Female 0.746 0.804 0.354 0.542
Married 0.726 0.812 0.637 0.751
Children in HH 0.416 0.247 0.346 0.220
Full-time 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Education: Inadequate 0.026 0.016 0.010 0.011
Education: General 0.151 0.128 0.080 0.078
Education: Middle 0.529 0.539 0.445 0.431
Education: High School 0.070 0.048 0.072 0.066
Education: Voc. Training 0.064 0.093 0.091 0.102
Education: University 0.160 0.175 0.302 0.312
Foreign 0.103 0.047 0.066 0.025
Rural Area 0.261 0.294 0.253 0.339
Females
Age 45.794 51.233 43.093 48.795
Married 0.767 0.824 0.538 0.729
Children in HH 0.487 0.283 0.247 0.169
Full-time 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Education: Inadequate 0.025 0.015 0.011 0.006
Education: General 0.158 0.137 0.076 0.072
Education: Middle 0.520 0.542 0.428 0.436
Education: High School 0.077 0.055 0.095 0.085
Education: Voc. Training 0.064 0.090 0.075 0.059
Education: University 0.156 0.161 0.316 0.342
Foreign 0.100 0.044 0.060 0.032
Rural Area 0.252 0.292 0.259 0.326
Males
Age 49.213 55.369 44.191 49.805
Married 0.604 0.764 0.691 0.778
Children in HH 0.207 0.103 0.400 0.280
Full-time 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Education: Inadequate 0.030 0.023 0.009 0.018
Education: General 0.130 0.091 0.083 0.085
Education: Middle 0.554 0.529 0.454 0.425
Education: High School 0.051 0.019 0.060 0.045
Education: Voc. Training 0.064 0.106 0.099 0.153
Education: University 0.171 0.232 0.294 0.275
Foreign 0.110 0.061 0.071 0.018
Rural Area 0.285 0.300 0.250 0.355
Note: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP for the years 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010. Uncondi-
tional means for dependent and independent variables.
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Table A2.3: MCS – Multinomial Logit for CLS-Choice – Coefficients
Controls Care Only Work Only Double Burden
Plant Closure −0.055 −1.335∗∗∗ −1.365∗∗∗
(0.173) (0.108) (0.327)
Number of Siblings −0.020 −0.008 −0.043
(0.022) (0.011) (0.030)
Unemployment Rate (Female) 0.030 −0.032∗∗∗ 0.009
(0.020) (0.010) (0.025)
Unemployment Rate (Male) −0.042∗∗ 0.005 −0.023
(0.020) (0.009) (0.024)
Nursing Care Places −0.074∗∗ −0.006 −0.062∗
(0.030) (0.015) (0.036)
Employees in Care 0.075∗∗ −0.018 0.116∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.017) (0.042)
Age: 35-44 0.476∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 1.067∗∗∗
(0.162) (0.047) (0.192)
Age: 45-54 1.170∗∗∗ 0.039 1.495∗∗∗
(0.156) (0.053) (0.188)
Age: 55-64 1.240∗∗∗ −1.319∗∗∗ 0.400∗
(0.156) (0.061) (0.204)
Marital Status 0.384∗∗∗ −0.193∗∗∗ 0.173
(0.096) (0.044) (0.113)
Children in HH −0.341∗∗∗ −0.788∗∗∗ −1.085∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.042) (0.122)
Education: General −0.009 0.361∗∗ −0.128
(0.302) (0.172) (0.453)
Education: Middle 0.103 0.670∗∗∗ 0.086
(0.295) (0.166) (0.431)
Education: High School −0.036 0.932∗∗∗ 0.608
(0.343) (0.177) (0.464)
Education: voc. Train. 0.564∗ 1.150∗∗∗ 0.761∗
(0.318) (0.175) (0.449)
Education: University 0.110 1.527∗∗∗ 0.921∗∗
(0.303) (0.169) (0.435)
Foreign −0.625∗∗∗ −0.179∗∗ −0.911∗∗∗
(0.192) (0.070) (0.298)
Rural Area 0.130 −0.022 0.138
(0.111) (0.052) (0.127)
2006 −0.046 0.132∗∗∗ 0.063
(0.084) (0.036) (0.105)
2008 −0.044 0.124∗∗∗ 0.103
(0.098) (0.043) (0.123)
2010 −0.106 0.116∗∗∗ −0.022
(0.098) (0.043) (0.125)
Female 0.432∗∗∗ −1.849∗∗∗ −1.005∗∗∗
(0.093) (0.039) (0.094)
Constant −3.813∗∗∗ 1.623∗∗∗ −3.727∗∗∗
(0.418) (0.202) (0.576)
Federal State Dummies YES YES YES
Note: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP for the years 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010. ∗∗∗ p<0.01; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗ p<0.1.
Standard errors (clustered on individual level) in parentheses. N=35,982.
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Table A2.4: Output - Multinomial Treatment Model - MCS
Choice Equation Outcome Equation
Care Only Work Only Double Burden MCS
Treatment Effects
Care Only – – – -0.744
– – – (0.653)
Work Only – – – 1.101∗∗∗
– – – (0.403)
Double Burden – – – -4.946∗∗∗
– – – (0.501)
No Work, No Care Reference Category
Instruments
Plant Closure -0.037 -1.547∗∗∗ -1.395∗∗∗ –
(0.186) (0.124) (0.339) –
Number of Siblings -0.021 -0.008 -0.046 –
(0.024) (0.013) (0.032) –
Unempl. Rate (Female) 0.032 -0.038∗∗∗ 0.005 –
(0.022) (0.011) (0.026) –
Unempl. Rate (Male) -0.045∗∗ 0.006 -0.019 –
(0.021) (0.011) (0.026) –
Nursing Care Places -0.077∗∗ -0.005 -0.067∗ –
(0.032) (0.017) (0.039) –
Empl. in Care 0.080∗∗ -0.025 0.122∗∗∗ –
(0.037) (0.020) (0.045) –
Further Covariates
Age: 35-44 0.482∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗ 1.102∗∗∗ 0.055
(0.167) (0.056) (0.198) (0.134)
Age: 45-54 1.220∗∗∗ 0.035 1.531∗∗∗ 0.363∗∗∗
(0.162) (0.062) (0.195) (0.139)
Age: 55-64 1.340∗∗∗ -1.542∗∗∗ 0.408∗ 1.578∗∗∗
(0.163) (0.070) (0.211) (0.188)
Marital Status 0.406∗∗∗ -0.219∗∗∗ 0.220∗ 0.682∗∗∗
(0.102) (0.051) (0.120) (0.114)
Children in HH -0.344∗∗∗ -0.898∗∗∗ -1.092∗∗∗ 0.097
(0.105) (0.049) (0.128) (0.120)
Education: General -0.017 0.414∗∗ -0.084 0.485
(0.323) (0.198) (0.473) (0.414)
Education: Middle 0.103 0.774∗∗∗ 0.140 0.937∗∗
(0.315) (0.191) (0.450) (0.403)
Education: High Sch. -0.051 1.077∗∗∗ 0.679 0.768∗
(0.366) (0.205) (0.484) (0.433)
Education: voc. Train. 0.574∗ 1.336∗∗∗ 0.837∗ 0.818∗
(0.340) (0.202) (0.469) (0.433)
Education: University 0.088 1.783∗∗∗ 1.018∗∗ 1.079∗∗∗
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(0.323) (0.195) (0.455) (0.419)
Foreign -0.662∗∗∗ -0.203∗∗ -0.946∗∗∗ -0.255
(0.203) (0.082) (0.304) (0.176)
Rural Area 0.138 -0.031 0.154 0.030
(0.119) (0.061) (0.133) (0.126)
2006 -0.050 0.156∗∗∗ 0.072 0.045
(0.090) (0.042) (0.109) (0.128)
2008 -0.052 0.144∗∗∗ 0.119 0.127
(0.105) (0.050) (0.129) (0.118)
2010 -0.118 0.138∗∗∗ -0.016 -0.402∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.051) (0.131) (0.127)
Female 0.514∗∗∗ -2.173∗∗∗ -1.018∗∗∗ -0.415∗∗
(0.097) (0.045) (0.099) (0.175)
Constant -4.368∗∗∗ 1.891∗∗∗ -4.313∗∗∗ 22.989∗∗∗
(0.443) (0.234) (0.600) (0.604)
MCSt−1 – – – 0.494∗∗∗
– – – (0.006)
Federal State Dummies YES YES YES YES
Selection Effects
lnalpha – – – 1.988∗∗∗
– – – (0.033)
λ Care Only – – – -0.552
– – – (0.656)
λ Work Only – – – -0.881∗
– – – (0.468)
λ Double Burden – – – 4.020∗∗∗
– – – (0.438)
N 35,982 35,982 35,982 35,982
Note: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP for the years 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.5; * p<0.1.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A2.5: Output - Multinomial Treatment Model - MCS-Female
Choice Equation Outcome Equation
Care Only Work Only Double Burden MCS
Treatment Effects
Care Only – – – -3.243∗∗∗
– – – (0.985)
Work Only – – – 1.113∗∗
– – – (0.432)
Double Burden – – – -5.777∗∗∗
– – – (0.668)
No Work, No Care Reference Category
Instruments
Plant Closure 0.094 -1.083∗∗∗ -1.720∗∗∗ –
(0.233) (0.176) (0.601) –
Number of Siblings -0.006 -0.011 -0.045 –
(0.028) (0.018) (0.042) –
Unempl. Rate (Female) 0.031 -0.046∗∗∗ 0.013 –
(0.025) (0.015) (0.034) –
Unempl. Rate (Male) -0.041∗ 0.026∗ -0.015 –
(0.024) (0.015) (0.033) –
Nursing Care Places -0.102∗∗∗ -0.018 -0.033 –
(0.037) (0.024) (0.051) –
Empl. in Care 0.105∗∗ -0.016 0.084 –
(0.043) (0.028) (0.062) –
Further Covariates
Age: 35-44 0.516∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 1.238∗∗∗ 0.181
(0.183) (0.074) (0.274) (0.189)
Age: 45-54 1.212∗∗∗ -0.246∗∗∗ 1.455∗∗∗ 0.973∗∗∗
(0.180) (0.084) (0.266) (0.197)
Age: 55-64 1.333∗∗∗ -1.656∗∗∗ 0.358 2.043∗∗∗
(0.186) (0.092) (0.286) (0.258)
Marital Status 0.310∗∗∗ -0.842∗∗∗ -0.110 1.075∗∗∗
(0.116) (0.063) (0.155) (0.169)
Children in HH -0.388∗∗∗ -1.832∗∗∗ -1.745∗∗∗ 0.423∗∗
(0.120) (0.070) (0.186) (0.202)
Education: General 0.063 0.146 0.453 1.053∗
(0.365) (0.270) (0.827) (0.557)
Education: Middle 0.159 0.600∗∗ 0.846 1.827∗∗∗
(0.355) (0.258) (0.796) (0.544)
Education: High Sch. 0.087 1.031∗∗∗ 1.560∗ 1.487∗∗
(0.407) (0.273) (0.830) (0.585)
Education: voc. Train. 0.640∗ 1.087∗∗∗ 1.129 1.828∗∗∗
(0.386) (0.276) (0.827) (0.589)
Education: University 0.101 1.598∗∗∗ 1.777∗∗ 1.941∗∗∗
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(0.366) (0.263) (0.799) (0.562)
Foreign -0.722∗∗∗ -0.089 -0.526 -0.235
(0.230) (0.123) (0.392) (0.254)
Rural Area 0.116 -0.043 -0.067 0.089
(0.137) (0.083) (0.172) (0.176)
2006 0.013 0.173∗∗∗ 0.053 -0.039
(0.101) (0.056) (0.143) (0.182)
2008 0.045 0.253∗∗∗ 0.032 0.074
(0.118) (0.069) (0.173) (0.169)
2010 -0.054 0.195∗∗∗ -0.007 -0.531∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.069) (0.176) (0.183)
Constant -3.970∗∗∗ 0.430 -5.883∗∗∗ 21.705∗∗∗
(0.487) (0.317) (1.012) (0.735)
MCSt−1 – – – 0.486∗∗∗
– – – (0.008)
Federal State Dummies YES YES YES YES
Selection Effects
lnalpha – – – 1.945∗∗∗
– – – (0.043)
λ Care Only – – – 1.812∗
– – – (1.042)
λ Work Only – – – -1.202∗∗∗
– – – (0.475)
λ Double Burden – – – 4.658∗∗∗
– – – (0.566)
N 18,885 18,885 18,885 18,885
Note: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP for the years 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.5; * p<0.1.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A2.6: Output - Multinomial Treatment Model - MCS - Male
Choice Equation Outcome Equation
Care Only Work Only Double Burden MCS
Treatment Effects
Care Only – – – 1.543∗
– – – (0.902)
Work Only – – – 1.884∗∗∗
– – – (0.560)
Double Burden – – – -3.897∗∗∗
– – – (0.655)
No Work, No Care Reference Category
Instruments
Plant Closure -0.367 -2.026∗∗∗ -1.425∗∗∗ –
(0.325) (0.154) (0.419) –
Number of Siblings -0.082∗ -0.027 -0.063 –
(0.045) (0.019) (0.048) –
Unempl. Rate (Female) 0.044 -0.025 0.001 –
(0.044) (0.017) (0.039) –
Unempl. Rate (Male) -0.064 -0.025 -0.036 –
(0.044) (0.015) (0.039) –
Nursing Care Places 0.019 0.014 -0.096 –
(0.062) (0.027) (0.059) –
Empl. in Care -0.013 -0.043 0.152∗∗ –
(0.066) (0.030) (0.065) –
Further Covariates
Age: 35-44 0.080 0.537∗∗∗ 1.035∗∗∗ -0.102
(0.431) (0.094) (0.289) (0.189)
Age: 45-54 1.133∗∗∗ 0.121 1.466∗∗∗ -0.072
(0.365) (0.098) (0.289) (0.197)
Age: 55-64 1.194∗∗∗ -1.596∗∗∗ 0.298 1.615∗∗∗
(0.338) (0.100) (0.314) (0.265)
Marital Status 0.515∗∗ 0.599∗∗∗ 0.766∗∗∗ 0.274
(0.206) (0.079) (0.190) (0.168)
Children in HH -0.521∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.029 -0.075
(0.281) (0.083) (0.184) (0.156)
Education: General -0.426 0.721∗∗ -0.370 -0.269
(0.677) (0.304) (0.621) (0.606)
Education: Middle -0.120 1.013∗∗∗ -0.306 -0.268
(0.661) (0.292) (0.586) (0.588)
Education: High Sch. -0.864 1.143∗∗∗ -0.065 -0.194
(0.906) (0.317) (0.650) (0.635)
Education: voc. Train. 0.285 1.627∗∗∗ 0.687 -0.437
(0.699) (0.313) (0.613) (0.628)
Education: University -0.011 1.934∗∗∗ 0.432 -0.124
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(0.669) (0.299) (0.600) (0.607)
Foreign -0.377 -0.471∗∗∗ -1.675∗∗∗ -0.257
(0.405) (0.123) (0.422) (0.247)
Rural Area 0.179 0.058 0.423∗∗ -0.039
(0.245) (0.097) (0.206) (0.177)
2006 -0.331 0.126∗ 0.080 0.164
(0.202) (0.068) (0.171) (0.180)
2008 -0.420∗ 0.004 0.177 0.208
(0.235) (0.080) (0.197) (0.163)
2010 -0.339 0.051 -0.049 -0.247
(0.230) (0.082) (0.202) (0.174)
Constant -3.585∗∗∗ 1.429∗∗∗ -3.772∗∗∗ 23.501∗∗∗
(0.896) (0.349) (0.773) (0.835)
MCSt−1 – – – 0.499∗∗∗
– – – (0.009)
Federal State Dummies YES YES YES YES
Selection Effects
lnalpha – – – 1.932∗∗∗
– – – (0.044)
λ Care Only – – – -1.786∗∗∗
– – – (0.664)
λ Work Only – – – -1.018
– – – (0.640)
λ Double Burden – – – 3.663∗∗∗
– – – (0.524)
N 17,097 17,097 17,097 17,097
Note: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP for the years 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.5; * p<0.1.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A2.7: Output - Multinomial Treatment Model - PCS
Choice Equation Outcome Equation
Care Only Work Only Double Burden MCS
Treatment Effects
Care Only – – – 0.258
– – – (0.361)
Work Only – – – 1.552∗∗∗
– – – (0.413)
Double Burden – – – -2.143∗∗∗
– – – (0.475)
No Work, No Care Reference Category
Instruments
Plant Closure -0.045 -1.550∗∗∗ -1.373∗∗∗ –
(0.187) (0.124) (0.332) –
Number of Siblings -0.021 -0.009 -0.046 –
(0.024) (0.013) (0.032) –
Unempl. Rate (Female) 0.032 -0.038∗∗∗ 0.011 –
(0.022) (0.011) (0.026) –
Unempl. Rate (Male) -0.044∗∗ 0.007 -0.025 –
(0.021) (0.011) (0.026) –
Nursing Care Places -0.076∗∗ -0.004 -0.069∗ –
(0.033) (0.017) (0.039) –
Empl. in Care 0.079∗∗ -0.026 0.127∗∗∗ –
(0.037) (0.020) (0.044) –
Further Covariates
Age: 35-44 0.483∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗ 1.103∗∗∗ -1.087∗∗∗
(0.166) (0.056) (0.198) (0.101)
Age: 45-54 1.219∗∗∗ 0.034 1.535∗∗∗ -2.055∗∗∗
(0.162) (0.062) (0.195) (0.106)
Age: 55-64 1.341∗∗∗ -1.543∗∗∗ 0.400∗ -3.049∗∗∗
(0.163) (0.070) (0.212) (0.163)
Marital Status 0.407∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗ 0.203∗ -0.231∗∗∗
(0.102) (0.051) (0.120) (0.089)
Children in HH -0.343∗∗∗ -0.898∗∗∗ -1.099∗∗∗ 0.752∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.049) (0.128) (0.100)
Education: General -0.021 0.412∗∗ -0.096 0.198
(0.325) (0.198) (0.472) (0.308)
Education: Middle 0.102 0.772∗∗∗ 0.118 1.043∗∗∗
(0.318) (0.191) (0.448) (0.299)
Education: High Sch. -0.054 1.074∗∗∗ 0.653 1.340∗∗∗
(0.368) (0.205) (0.483) (0.321)
Education: voc. Train. 0.568∗ 1.333∗∗∗ 0.826∗ 1.012∗∗∗
(0.342) (0.202) (0.467) (0.324)
Education: University 0.086 1.780∗∗∗ 0.998∗∗ 1.957∗∗∗
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(0.326) (0.195) (0.453) (0.319)
Foreign -0.664∗∗∗ -0.203∗∗ -0.956∗∗∗ -0.334∗∗
(0.203) (0.082) (0.304) (0.141)
Rural Area 0.138 -0.029 0.150 -0.359∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.061) (0.134) (0.100)
2006 -0.051 0.158∗∗∗ 0.072 -0.431∗∗∗
(0.090) (0.042) (0.110) (0.105)
2008 -0.050 0.148∗∗∗ 0.105 -0.234∗∗
(0.105) (0.050) (0.130) (0.097)
2010 -0.116 0.140∗∗∗ -0.024 -0.461∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.051) (0.131) (0.103)
Female 0.516∗∗∗ -2.172∗∗∗ -1.010∗∗∗ 0.418∗∗
(0.097) (0.045) (0.099) (0.163)
Constant -4.364∗∗∗ 1.898∗∗∗ -4.300∗∗∗ 20.783∗∗∗
(0.447) (0.234) (0.597) (0.539)
PCSt−1 – – – 0.581∗∗∗
– – – (0.006)
Federal State Dummies YES YES YES YES
Selection Effects
lnalpha – – – 1.809∗∗∗
– – – (0.039)
λ Care Only – – – -0.611∗∗
– – – (0.310)
λ Work Only – – – -0.801∗
– – – (0.485)
λ Double Burden – – – 2.838∗∗∗
– – – (0.443)
N 35,982 35,982 35,982 35,982
Note: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP for the years 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.5; * p<0.1.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A2.8: Output - Multinomial Treatment Model - PCS-Female
Choice Equation Outcome Equation
Care Only Work Only Double Burden MCS
Treatment Effects
Care Only – – – 0.063
– – – (0.600)
Work Only – – – 1.808∗∗∗
– – – (0.490)
Double Burden – – – -2.327∗∗∗
– – – (0.673)
No Work, No Care Reference Category
Instruments
Plant Closure 0.090 -1.094∗∗∗ -1.705∗∗∗ –
(0.232) (0.179) (0.572) –
Number of Siblings -0.006 -0.013 -0.045 –
(0.028) (0.018) (0.043) –
Unempl. Rate (Female) 0.029 -0.046∗∗∗ 0.012 –
(0.025) (0.015) (0.035) –
Unempl. Rate (Male) -0.040∗ 0.027∗ -0.016 –
(0.024) (0.015) (0.034) –
Nursing Care Places -0.100∗∗∗ -0.014 -0.044 –
(0.038) (0.024) (0.052) –
Empl. in Care 0.103∗∗ -0.021 0.096 –
(0.044) (0.028) (0.062) –
Further Covariates
Age: 35-44 0.516∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 1.257∗∗∗ -0.963∗∗∗
(0.183) (0.074) (0.275) (0.140)
Age: 45-54 1.213∗∗∗ -0.244∗∗∗ 1.459∗∗∗ -1.773∗∗∗
(0.180) (0.084) (0.268) (0.156)
Age: 55-64 1.333∗∗∗ -1.655∗∗∗ 0.361 -2.656∗∗∗
(0.186) (0.092) (0.288) (0.240)
Marital Status 0.305∗∗∗ -0.842∗∗∗ -0.136 -0.040
(0.116) (0.063) (0.155) (0.141)
Children in HH -0.392∗∗∗ -1.832∗∗∗ -1.757∗∗∗ 1.297∗∗∗
(0.120) (0.070) (0.186) (0.190)
Education: General 0.067 0.141 0.475 0.696∗
(0.364) (0.269) (0.837) (0.388)
Education: Middle 0.163 0.592∗∗ 0.852 1.796∗∗∗
(0.354) (0.257) (0.806) (0.377)
Education: High Sch. 0.091 1.022∗∗∗ 1.565∗ 1.919∗∗∗
(0.407) (0.272) (0.841) (0.408)
Education: voc. Train. 0.646∗ 1.079∗∗∗ 1.129 1.417∗∗∗
(0.385) (0.275) (0.836) (0.417)
Education: University 0.103 1.590∗∗∗ 1.782∗∗ 2.332∗∗∗
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(0.365) (0.261) (0.808) (0.400)
Foreign -0.726∗∗∗ -0.091 -0.506 -0.301
(0.231) (0.123) (0.392) (0.197)
Rural Area 0.118 -0.041 -0.050 -0.260∗
(0.137) (0.083) (0.173) (0.140)
2006 0.025 0.177∗∗∗ 0.057 -0.384∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.056) (0.145) (0.149)
2008 0.052 0.258∗∗∗ 0.033 -0.259∗
(0.119) (0.069) (0.174) (0.137)
2010 -0.051 0.201∗∗∗ -0.017 -0.349∗∗
(0.119) (0.070) (0.176) (0.147)
Constant -3.967∗∗∗ 0.442 -5.897∗∗∗ 20.229∗∗∗
(0.488) (0.315) (1.022) (0.638)
PCSt−1 – – – 0.576∗∗∗
– – – (0.008)
Federal State Dummies YES YES YES YES
Selection Effects
lnalpha – – – 1.832∗∗∗
– – – (0.049)
λ Care Only – – – -0.452
– – – (0.609)
λ Work Only – – – -1.592∗∗∗
– – – (0.558)
λ Double Burden – – – 2.659∗∗∗
– – – (0.620)
N 18,885 18,885 18,885 18,885
Note: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP for the years 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.5; * p<0.1.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A2.9: Output - Multinomial Treatment Model - PCS - Male
Choice Equation Outcome Equation
Care Only Work Only Double Burden MCS
Treatment Effects
Care Only – – – -0.650
– – – (1.021)
Work Only – – – 2.581∗∗∗
– – – (0.586)
Double Burden – – – -1.016
– – – (0.772)
No Work, No Care Reference Category
Instruments
Plant Closure -0.353 -2.024∗∗∗ -1.387∗∗∗ –
(0.325) (0.154) (0.410) –
Number of Siblings -0.084∗ -0.028 -0.063 –
(0.045) (0.019) (0.048) –
Unempl. Rate (Female) 0.045 -0.028∗ 0.014 –
(0.044) (0.017) (0.039) –
Unempl. Rate (Male) -0.064 -0.022 -0.048 –
(0.044) (0.016) (0.039) –
Nursing Care Places 0.016 0.012 -0.091 –
(0.063) (0.027) (0.059) –
Empl. in Care -0.011 -0.043 0.149∗∗ –
(0.067) (0.030) (0.064) –
Further Covariates
Age: 35-44 0.093 0.536∗∗∗ 1.025∗∗∗ -1.334∗∗∗
(0.432) (0.094) (0.288) (0.146)
Age: 45-54 1.148∗∗∗ 0.120 1.476∗∗∗ -2.306∗∗∗
(0.365) (0.098) (0.287) (0.153)
Age: 55-64 1.205∗∗∗ -1.597∗∗∗ 0.277 -3.104∗∗∗
(0.338) (0.100) (0.315) (0.240)
Marital Status 0.498∗∗ 0.600∗∗∗ 0.759∗∗∗ -0.425∗∗∗
(0.206) (0.079) (0.190) (0.136)
Children in HH -0.515∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.016 0.281∗∗
(0.281) (0.083) (0.184) (0.131)
Education: General -0.438 0.720∗∗ -0.366 -0.619
(0.675) (0.303) (0.612) (0.502)
Education: Middle -0.148 1.010∗∗∗ -0.313 -0.109
(0.657) (0.291) (0.578) (0.484)
Education: High Sch. -0.891 1.139∗∗∗ -0.089 0.316
(0.905) (0.316) (0.642) (0.516)
Education: voc. Train. 0.246 1.621∗∗∗ 0.706 0.148
(0.694) (0.312) (0.604) (0.511)
Education: University -0.042 1.929∗∗∗ 0.437 1.094∗∗
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(0.665) (0.299) (0.590) (0.508)
Foreign -0.362 -0.471∗∗∗ -1.684∗∗∗ -0.200
(0.407) (0.123) (0.422) (0.202)
Rural Area 0.176 0.060 0.413∗∗ -0.493∗∗∗
(0.246) (0.097) (0.210) (0.143)
2006 -0.334∗ 0.133∗ 0.074 -0.501∗∗∗
(0.203) (0.069) (0.172) (0.149)
2008 -0.418∗ 0.011 0.161 -0.229∗
(0.237) (0.081) (0.198) (0.137)
2010 -0.337 0.055 -0.049 -0.620∗∗∗
(0.231) (0.082) (0.202) (0.143)
Constant -3.532∗∗∗ 1.447∗∗∗ -3.770∗∗∗ 21.530∗∗∗
(0.889) (0.349) (0.758) (0.774)
PCSt−1 – – – 0.579∗∗∗
– – – (0.009)
Federal State Dummies YES YES YES YES
Selection Effects
lnalpha – – – 1.786∗∗∗
– – – (0.067)
λ Care Only – – – 0.294
– – – (0.963)
λ Work Only – – – -0.990
– – – (0.696)
λ Double Burden – – – 2.631∗∗∗
– – – (0.765)
N 17,097 17,097 17,097 17,097
Note: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP for the years 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.5; * p<0.1.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A2.10: Robustness Check – MCS – No siblings as exclusion restrictions
Pooled Female Male
Care Only −0.734 −3.240∗∗∗ 1.553∗
(0.657) (0.981) (0.901)
Work Only 1.111∗∗∗ 1.119∗∗∗ 1.942∗∗∗
(0.402) (0.431) (0.580)
Double Burden −4.943∗∗∗ −5.778∗∗∗ −3.868∗∗∗
(0.502) (0.666) (0.662)
No Work, No Care Reference Category
MCSt−1 0.494∗∗∗ 0.486∗∗∗ 0.499∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009)
Constant 22.981∗∗∗ 21.701∗∗∗ 23.467∗∗∗
(0.603) (0.735) (0.840)
Socio-Economic Controls YES YES YES
Federal State Dummies YES YES YES
Year Dummies YES YES YES
lnalpha 1.988∗∗∗ 1.945∗∗∗ 1.933∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.043) (0.044)
λCareOnly −0.564 1.809∗ −1.794∗∗∗
(0.661) (1.038) (0.663)
λWorkOnly −0.894∗ −1.210∗∗ −1.088∗
(0.466) (0.473) (0.666)
λDoubleBurden 4.016∗∗∗ 4.657∗∗∗ 3.633∗∗∗
(0.439) (0.564) (0.537)
N 35,982 18,885 17,097
Note: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP for the years 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010. ∗∗∗ p<0.01; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗
p<0.1. Standard errors (clustered on individual level) in parentheses.
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Table A2.11: Robustness Check – PCS – No siblings as exclusion restrictions
Pooled Female Male
Care Only 0.242 −0.058 −0.636
(0.362) (0.590) (0.995)
Work Only 1.527∗∗∗ 1.762∗∗∗ 2.567∗∗∗
(0.415) (0.498) (0.598)
Double Burden −2.125∗∗∗ −2.318∗∗∗ −0.974
(0.482) (0.674) (0.820)
No Work, No Care Reference Category
PCSt−1 0.581∗∗∗ 0.576∗∗∗ 0.579∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009)
Constant 20.801∗∗∗ 20.254∗∗∗ 21.537∗∗∗
(0.540) (0.640) (0.778)
Socio-Economic Controls YES YES YES
Federal State Dummies YES YES YES
Year Dummies YES YES YES
lnalpha 1.812∗∗∗ 1.835∗∗∗ 1.789∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.049) (0.070)
λCareOnly −0.595∗ −0.448 0.279
(0.310) (0.597) (0.933)
λWorkOnly −0.771 −1.536∗∗∗ −0.972
(0.487) (0.568) (0.711)
λDoubleBurden 2.817∗∗∗ 2.646∗∗∗ 2.584∗∗∗
(0.451) (0.621) (0.823)
N 35,982 18,885 17,097
Note: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP for the years 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010. ∗∗∗ p<0.01; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗
p<0.1. Standard errors (clustered on individual level) in parentheses.
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Table A2.12: Robustness Check: Care Provision at least 2h per day
MCS PCS
Care Only −1.779∗∗ −0.013
(0.742) (0.403)
Work Only 0.542 0.902∗∗∗
(0.385) (0.322)
Double Burden −4.569∗∗∗ −1.294
(0.839) (0.889)
No Work, No Care Reference Category
Dependent Variablet−1 0.495∗∗∗ 0.582∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006)
Constant 23.371∗∗∗ 21.243∗∗∗
(0.591) (0.508)
Socio-Economic Controls YES YES
Federal State Dummies YES YES
Year Dummies YES YES
lnalpha 2.040∗∗∗ 1.894∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.025)
λCareOnly −0.162 −0.300
(0.700) (0.307)
λWorkOnly −0.227 0.010
(0.442) (0.370)
λDoubleBurden 3.320∗∗∗ 1.332
(0.655) (0.782)
N 35,982 35,982
Note: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP for the years 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010. ∗∗∗ p<0.01; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗
p<0.1. Standard errors (clustered on individual level) in parentheses. CLS-sizes: NoWorkNoCare 14,320; CareOnly
750; WorkOnly 20,635; DoubleBurden 277
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Table A2.13: Robustness Check: Full-time Work 6h/day
MCS PCS
Care Only −0.751 0.138
(0.782) (0.385)
Work Only 1.199∗∗∗ 1.311∗∗∗
(0.408) (0.391)
Double Burden −4.855∗∗∗ −2.001∗∗∗
(0.511) (0.548)
No Work, No Care Reference Category
Dependent Variablet−1 0.494∗∗∗ 0.582∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006)
Constant 22.957∗∗∗ 20.982∗∗∗
(0.599) (0.524)
Socio-Economic Controls YES YES
Federal State Dummies YES YES
Year Dummies YES YES
lnalpha 1.983∗∗∗ 1.822∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.043)
λCareOnly −0.549 −0.585∗
(0.787) (0.326)
λWorkOnly −0.919∗∗ −0.542
(0.476) (0.462)
λDoubleBurden 4.095∗∗∗ 2.729∗∗∗
(0.477) (0.549)
N 35,982 35,982
Note: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP for the years 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010. ∗∗∗ p<0.01; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗ p<0.1.
Standard errors (clustered on individual level) in parentheses.
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Table A2.14: Robustness Check: Full-time Work 8h/day
MCS PCS
Care Only −0.711 0.332
(0.633) (0.340)
Work Only 1.206∗∗∗ 1.576∗∗∗
(0.419) (0.405)
Double Burden −5.233∗∗∗ −2.297∗∗∗
(0.476) (0.457)
No Work, No Care Reference Category
Dependent Variablet−1 0.494∗∗∗ 0.583∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006)
Constant 22.920∗∗∗ 20.703∗∗∗
(0.612) (0.538)
Socio-Economic Controls YES YES
Federal State Dummies YES YES
Year Dummies YES YES
lnalpha 1.978∗∗∗ 1.805∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.038)
λCareOnly −0.539 −0.721∗∗
(0.631) (0.288)
λWorkOnly −1.100∗∗ −0.955∗∗
(0.487) (0.473)
λDoubleBurden 4.111∗∗∗ 2.829∗∗∗
(0.404) (0.421)
N 35,982 35,982
Note: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP for the years 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010. ∗∗∗ p<0.01; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗ p<0.1.
Standard errors (clustered on individual level) in parentheses.
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Table A2.15: Robustness Check – No Lagged Dependent Variable
MCS PCS
Care Only −0.907 −0.104
(0.705) (0.482)
Work Only 2.535∗∗∗ 3.122∗∗∗
(0.534) (0.616)
Double Burden −7.418∗∗∗ −3.691∗∗∗
(0.513) (0.556)
No Work, No Care Reference Category
Dep. Variablet−1 – –
– –
Constant 45.232∗∗∗ 50.136∗∗∗
(0.773) (0.731)
Socio-Economic Controls YES YES
Federal State Dummies YES YES
Year Dummies YES YES
lnalpha 1.955∗∗∗ 1.868∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.065)
λCareOnly −1.212∗ −0.642∗
(0.666) (0.345)
λWorkOnly −2.023∗∗∗ −1.172∗
(0.614) (0.720)
λDoubleBurden 6.194∗∗∗ 5.036∗∗∗
(0.362) (0.480)
N 35,982 35,982
Note: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP for the years 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010. ∗∗∗ p<0.01; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗
p<0.1. Standard errors (clustered on individual level) in parentheses.
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3 Risk-Loving in the End? The Role
of Option Values in Choosing
Risky and Marginally Effective
Treatments
3.1 Introduction
Health economics literature indicates that a substantial part of health care expen-
diture is induced in the last year of the patients’ lives (Ginzberg, 1980; Scitovsky,
1984; Lubitz and Riley, 1993; Felder et al., 2000; Hogan et al., 2001; Riley and Lu-
bitz, 2010) and the proximity to death is found to be a relevant determinant of
health care expenditures ((see e.g. Werblow et al., 2007; Felder et al., 2010; Wong
et al., 2011); for an overview of literature on the relationship between time to
death, aging and health care expenditures see Payne et al. (2007)). Apart from
expensive long-term care, the reason for this pattern may to a large extent be ac-
credited to two factors: Intensive care after injuries and end-of-life treatments of
fatal diseases. While the former is usually the consequence of sudden impacts
such as accidents, there is no deliberate decision-making of patients involved. The
latter, however, involves a process of choosing between different treatment op-
tions. End-of-life treatments are usually not only (very) expensive but frequently
involve high risk. Moreover they are often only marginally effective. Marginal
effectiveness has more than one dimension. First, a treatment can be seen as being
marginally effective, if its response rate is low. That is, for a single patient, the
treatment might well improve medical conditions, but the overall effect across all
treated patients is small. Second, a treatment is marginally effective if it per se
I am the sole author of this paper. I thank Stefan Felder, Hans van Kippersluis, Andreas Schmid
and Jan Kleibrink as well as the participants at 1st CINCH Academy and Economics of Dis-
ease Conference 2013, Darmstadt, IHEA-Conference 2014, Dublin and DGGÖ Conference 2014,
Munich for helpful comments. I am also grateful to Markus Kempe for providing IT–support.
I gratefully acknowledge financial support by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (FOR655).
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52
Chapter 3: Risk-loving in the End?
has only very small effects in terms of prolonging the terminally ill patients’ lives.
Both dimensions are highly relevant in terms of cost effectiveness: For the first
one, few successful cases have to be counted against many unsuccessful ones; for
the second one, even successful treatments have only marginal effects.
As a useful example, one might think of chemotherapies, which often not only
prolong the patient’s life for a short period but also have a rather low response
rate (e.g. Shepherd et al., 2005). This shows, that both dimensions can hardly be
disentangled, as treatments may well accommodate both dimensions. However,
a majority of cancer patients is treated by chemotherapy at some stage (see e.g.
Deutsche Krebshilfe e.V., 2011). This increases health care expenditures as not
only the single treatments are very expensive, but also the prevalence of cancer in
western societies is high (American Cancer Society, 2011, 2014). Besides the fact
that many of those treatments are administered, technical and medical progress in
diagnosing and treating diseases increases the spending for terminal care further.
That is, the new treatments increase expenses by providing new possibilities to
treat diseases which could not have been treated before and by having high inno-
vation costs (Newhouse, 1992; Okunade and Murthy, 2002; Meropol and Schul-
man, 2007). There might even be a further channel over which medical progress
raises health care expenditures even before its approval, by inducing an option
value for terminally ill patients which stimulates demand for marginally effective
treatments.
Philipson et al. (2010) claim that "factors that increase the rate of future innovation
will also increase the demand for terminal care" and further "the option value of
future cures may also lead one to predict a risk-loving behavior when deciding
between treatments with different survival distributions". In the light of this state-
ment and the observation of rising health care expenditures, it is crucial to have
rules of how to allocate limited resources. Against this background, marginally
effective treatments are targeted as offering large savings potential for social in-
surers and as such should be used as a criterion to posteriorize. The reasoning
behind that is - from an ethical point of view - it might be preferable, to accept
rather small sacrifices from a large group of patients than large sacrifices from a
few small groups (Buyx et al., 2009). Hence, expensive treatments which offer only
small benefits, in any of the two dimensions, might be a point of vantage.
From a health economics perspective, it is interesting to investigate the preferences
that drive the demand for marginally effective treatments in end-of-life situations
to contribute to the prioritization debate. As in countries with full statutory health
insurance, costs play a minor role for the patients themselves other factors must
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influence demand. Here, risk preferences may be crucial factors for the assessment
of different treatment options.
Personal perceptions about future treatments and about potential research break-
throughs might become important when it comes to assessing treatments with dif-
ferent survival distributions. This makes it crucial not only to understand patients’
willingness to pay but also their willingness to dare. Why are people willing to
take health-risks at the end of their lives? What are the consequences for health
policy and prioritization in health care?
Based on related work by Philipson et al. (2010), I analyse the treatment choice
behavior by employing a Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) featuring two mutu-
ally exclusive treatment alternatives with varying survival distributions. Further,
I introduce an attribute that creates an option value of future cures. By this ap-
proach, it can be investigated whether the option value of a potential future cure
shifts preferences towards risky and marginally effective treatments. The results
suggest that individuals are risk-averse with respect to remaining lifetime, ceteris
paribus. In the presence of option values of future cures, however, the preferences
shift towards higher risk acceptance. That is, individuals take a high risk of im-
mediate death, if there is a prospect of prolongation of life by benefiting from a
potential future cure. This result even holds for a subsample of persons identified
as risk-averse by a Holt and Laury (2002)-type lottery approach.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 shortly explains the general frame-
work of DCEs and the empirical model employed in the estimation. In section
3.3, I describe the DCE used in the analysis of treatment choice behavior before I
present the results in section 3.4. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 DCE Framework and Empirical Strategy
Discrete choice experiments are a stated choice method that is based on the under-
standing, "that it is the properties or characteristics of the goods, from which utility
is derived" (Lancaster, 1966). In a DCE, the participants are repeatedly asked to de-
cide for one of at least two competing alternatives. The alternatives are described
by attributes which characteristics vary across certain levels along the experiment.
The researcher exploits this variation by applying econometric techniques in or-
der to gain insights about an underlying utility function. This approach has the
advantage of only subtly eliciting the preference ordering of individuals, which
decreases the assumptions about the cognitive abilities of participants (Louviere
et al., 2000). As such, DCEs are widely applied in various fields of economic re-
search such as transportation (Hensher, 1994), environmental (Hoyos, 2010) and
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health economics (for an overview see de Bekker-Grob et al. (2012)). As random
utility theory (Thurstone, 1927; McFadden, 1974) serves as basis , DCEs start from
the assumption, that the utility of an alternative i for an individual n (Uin)can be
described by an observable part (Vin) and an unobservable part (ein) which are
additive and independent:
Uin = Vin + ein (3.1)
The observable component is a function of the vector including all combinations
of attribute levels Vin = Vin(xin). Most often it is seen as being a linear function of
the weighted attributes entering the utility function:
Vin = β0i + β1i f (x1in) + β2i f (x2in) + β3i f (x3in) + ... + βKi f (xKin) (3.2)
βki is the weight for the alternative i and the attribute k.
β0i is the alternative-specific constant, representing unobservable sources of utility.
To construct a choice model, one needs to assume rational and utility maximizing
individuals. Respondents compare utilities of each alternative and choose the one
yielding the highest personal utility. Hence, the probability that one alternative
has the highest utility equals the probability that the respective alternative is the
chosen one (Louviere et al., 2000). Hereby, both parts of utilitiy Vin and ein play a
role in decision making. As a consequence, the actual choices of respondents can
be explained as probabilities since ein is subject to chance from the point of view
of a researcher. The probability that a subject n chooses the alternative i then is:
Probin = Prob(Uin ≥ Ujn)∀j ∈ j = 1, ..., J; i 6 6= j (3.3)
Probin = Prob
[
(Vin + ein) ≥ (Vjn + ejn)∀j ∈ j = 1, ..., J; i 6 6= j
]
Probin = Prob
[
(ejn − ein) ≤ (Vin −Vjn)∀j ∈ j = 1, ..., J; i 6 6= j
]
The multinomial logit model (MNL) has become the most commonly used method
in analyzing DCEs (de Bekker-Grob et al., 2012; Hensher et al., 2005; Louviere
et al., 2000). As it ignores preference heterogeneity across respondents and im-
poses the crucial independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption, more so-
phisticated models recently gain importance in analysing choice data. As I sus-
pect heterogeneity in preferences, I allow parameters to vary across respondents
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by fitting a mixed logit model.1 The mixed logit model has become increasingly
popular as it does not impose the restrictive independence of irrelevant alterna-
tives assumption and accounts for preference heterogeneity (de Bekker-Grob et al.,
2012). To capture the heterogeneity in preferences ηn is included in the observable
part of utility. ηn accounts for individual deviations from the estimated mean
(Revelt and Train, 1998).
Uin = (β+ ηn)xin + ein (3.4)
I use the mixlogit stata routine to estimate the following mixed logit model (Hole,
2007b):
Probin(i|θ) =
∫ exp(Vin)
∑Jj=1 exp(Vjn)
f (βn|θ)d(βn) ∀j ∈ j = 1, ..., J; i 6= j, (3.5)
where θ stands for the estimated coefficients and their standard deviations and
f (βn|θ) describes the density functions of the vector of parameters which enter
the indirect utility functions.
3.3 Methods
The aim of the study is to investigate risk preferences of individuals when choos-
ing marginally effective treatments in the presence of an option value, which po-
tentially induce hidden costs. A DCE is conducted to investigate the preference
structure of respondents that choose between treatments with different survival
distributions.
3.3.1 Setting
This study draws upon a paper by Philipson et al. (2010) in which the authors
claim that patients might exhibit risk-loving behavior in treatment choice when
near death. They argue that information on new medical therapies, which are
about to be introduced at some point in the future, will not only lead to risk-loving
behavior when choosing therapies but also increase the demand for terminal care
that already is available. The argument is that the sole prospect of possible future
cures might induce a positive option value for patients today. The option value
1Note, following the reasoning in Train (2000) I fix the co-payment parameters. This approach
resolves distributional issues of estimated willingness to pay and problems of instability of
mixed logit models when all parameters are allowed to vary.
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increases, if factors that positively influence the probability or quality of future
cures increase. Especially the option value might increase in factors such as drugs
entering the final phase of approval or high investments in technology.2 However,
an increase in the option value is based on personal perceptions and as such might
also well be based on rumors, insufficient information or vague media reports
and need not necessarily to be scientifically grounded. Such an option value may
induce patients to prefer risky treatments that offer the insecure chance to live for
longer time span, over safe treatments with identical expected values. In line with
the argument of Philipson et al. (2010), the hypothesis is that patients in end-of-life
situations might become risk-loving if they perceive a chance to benefit from the
future cure by choosing a risky first-line treatment. In consequence, the demand
for such first-line therapies should also increase even though it might involve risk.
In this respect, the main aim of this DCE-study is to investigate whether individu-
als actually exhibit risk-loving behavior and high demand for marginally effective
end-of-life treatments when there is an option value.
I design the DCE to include two competing alternatives which are labeled First-
Line Treatment and No Treatment. Each of the two alternatives is described by four
attributes with varying levels. The respondents are asked to imagine a scenario
in which they suffer from cancer and are offered a first-line treatment. Further,
they are given the information that there might be a new therapy introduced at
some point in the future. Terminal cancer serves to frame the hypothetical setting,
as cancer is a widespread disease which causes high costs to society (American
Cancer Society, 2014). Most respondents are believed to know someone in their
wider social environment who suffers from cancer. Thus, the choice of cancer as an
example might help respondents to put themselves into the hypothetical position
of a patient and relate to such a severe situation.3 In the further description of
the experiment, they are informed about all attributes: co-payments, side effects,
probability for 12 month survival and expected introduction of a new cure4.
2For example, the American Cancer Society publishes current funding and investment in research
online: www.cancer.org.
3Because of ethical considerations, it is refrained from interviewing actual cancer patients al-
though this may be the preferred approach. Admittedly, imagining being in such a severe
situation might still be kind of a cognitive burden for the respondents. However, as I will argue
later, this should not be a major problem for the purpose of this study.
4Note, the expected remaining lifetime with first-line treatment is calculated as: Psurvival · 12 +
(1− Psurvival) · 0, i.e. if the first-line treatment fails, survival time is negligible due to severe
lethal complications.
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3.3.2 Attributes and Levels
As indicated in the previous section, the DCE features two alternatives, each de-
scribed by four attributes. Co-payment for the first-line treatment is the first attribute.
Denoting prices as co-payment allows to remain within an insurance environment
but yet set prices which directly affect decision-making. The levels of this at-
tribute are set around the actual direct costs of Erlotinib5 and come as 0e, 1500e,
3000eand 4500eper month. This cost attribute is useful to obtain willingness to
pay values for different attributes and situations.
Table 3.1: Attribute Levels
Attribute Description Levels
Co-payment for the The co-payment which is ♦ 0e
First-Line Treatment to be paid by the patient ♦ 1500e
on a monthly basis. ♦ 3000e
♦ 4500e
Side Effects of the Side effects ♦ None: No side effects
First-Line Treatment induced by the ♦ Low: Rash; Nausea;
first-line treatment. Diarrhoea
♦ High: Rash; Nausea;
Diarrhoea; Vomiting;
Hair Loss; Changes
in the Blood Count
Probability for 12 Months Survival/ The probability to Safe remaining lifetime:
Remaining Lifetime survive 12 months ♦ 6 months safe
or a safe remaining lifetime. Probabilities to survive:
♦ 25% for 12 months
♦ 50% for 12 months
♦ 75% for 12 months
♦ 100% for 12 months
Introduction of a new The expected time span ♦ 3 months
Follow-Up Therapy until the new follow-up ♦ 6 months
therapy will be introduced. ♦ 9 months
♦ 12 months
5Erlotinib is an agent which is used in treating non-small cell lung cancer and which has been
authorized for the first-line treatment of patients suffering from advanced or metastatic non-
small cell lung cancer by the Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use European
Medicines Agency (2011).
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When it comes to treatment choice, it seems reasonable to pay attention to possible
side effects. The trade-off between quality and quantity of life is believed to be of
major importance. Hence, side effects are assumed to have an important influence
when deciding for end-of-life treatments and as such enter as second attribute.
The attribute is described by three levels, i.e. none, low and high. Each of the
levels is explained to respondents in detail. To get a useful interpretation of this
attribute, I base this description on actual side effects observed for Erlotinib. This
helps to get as close to a real decision situation as possible.
The third attribute is Probability for 12 months survival/Remaining life time. This at-
tribute allows analyzing risk preferences ceteris paribus. By confronting the sub-
jects with the decision to (1) choose a safe remaining life time or (2) a chance to
live for a specified and longer period but also being exposed to the risk of sudden
death, one can draw conclusions about their risk preferences with respect to re-
maining lifetime. The attribute is determined to have four equidistant levels and
one safe remaining lifetime which serves as reference category: 25%, 50%, 75%
and 100% for living 12 months and 6 months safe. Both, equidistance and 25%
steps, help to ensure a clear understanding of the probabilities and to avoid the
possible overweighting of small probabilities when assessing this attribute.
The fourth attribute introduces the option value. It is labeled Introduction of a New
Follow-Up Therapy and describes the expected duration until a new cure may be
ready for the market. There is no further information about the effectiveness of
the cure. It comes in four equidistant levels, i.e. 3, 6, 9 and 12 months. The levels
of the attributes are described in table 3.1.
All levels vary for first-line treatment. The alternative no treatment can be inter-
preted as a kind of opt out choice as there are neither co-payments nor side effects.
Also the level of Probability for 12 months survival/Remaining Lifetime is chosen to be
fixed at 6 months safe. As this attribute-level serves as reference category it allows
a clear interpretation of part-worth utilities of the offered treatments with differ-
ent survival distributions relative to the threshold at 6 months remaining lifetime.
It is crucial to model such a clear cutting point, as it not only allows interpret-
ing part-worth utilities relative to this margin but also using it when calculating
willingness to pay (WTP) for certain situations to make a statement about risk
preferences and the option value: An introduction of a new therapy later than six
months from now can only be reached by choosing the first-line treatment, which
entails the risk of immediate death. Hence, at equal objective expected values,
choosing the risky first-line treatment unveils risk-loving behavior. The introduc-
tion of a new follow-up therapy enters alternative-specific and varies along the
choice sets for both alternatives as it does not depend on whether a single patient
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chooses first-line treatment or not. As I investigate the effect of the option value, I
refrain from interpreting coefficients for side effects, which rather reflect the trade-
off between quantity and quality of life. That is I calculate WTPs while fixing side
effects, to obtain comparable situations across both alternatives.6
3.3.3 Presentation of Choice Sets
Table 3.2: Choice Sets
First-Line Treatment No Treatment
Co-Payment for the 1500e/month 0e/month
First-line Treatment
Side effects of the Low None
First-line Treatment
Probability to Survive / 75% for 12 months 6 months safe
Remaining Lifetime 25% for 0 months
Introduction of a new 9 months 12 months
Follow-up Therapy
I prefer:
I use a fractional factorial design consisting of 25 choice sets. Three rationality tests
are included to identify irrational answers. For this purpose I construct choice sets
which are composed of arbitrarily set levels. The crucial feature of non-satiation
rationality tests is that they include one dominant alternative (Miguel et al., 2005).
To improve the questionnaire and to get information about the usability of the pro-
cedure, I test a pen and paper version of the DCE with 65 students in bachelor and
master programs at the University of Duisburg-Essen. The questionnaire starts by
introducing the purpose of the experiment followed by a detailed description of
the hypothetical decision situation and the explanation of the attributes and their
levels. Furthermore, subjects are informed that there is the option to see the in-
structions again at any point of the experiment. Table 3.2 shows a typical choice
set.
3.3.4 Data Collection and Sample
I cooperate with a German market research institute which provides access to a
representative online panel. The estimation sample is created via quota sampling
6Obviously, side effects play a crucial role in treatment decisions. I will come back to this aspect
later.
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to be representative of the German population with respect to age, sex, state of
residence and education. The respondents are invited by e-mail and receive a link
to the questionnaire. All participants are incentivized by an internal rewarding
system in which they earn points which are to be redeemed in the institute’s online
shop. The reward is paid only in case that the respondents pass all rationality tests
to ensure that the results are valid and not just the product of random clicks.
Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics
N(sample) %(sample) %(Germ.pop.∗) ∆%
Sex
Female 106 51.0 51.0 −0.09
Residency
Baden-Wurttemberg 22 10.6 13.2 2.6
Bavaria 34 16.3 15.3 −1.0
Berlin 8 3.9 4.2 0.3
Brandenburg 6 2.9 3.1 0.2
Bremen 2 1.0 0.8 −0.2
Hamburg 6 2.9 2.2 −0.7
Hesse 15 7.2 7.4 0.2
Mecklenburg-Western
Pomerania
6 2.9 2.00 −0.9
Lower Saxony 20 9.6 9.7 0.1
Northrhine-Westphalia 43 20.7 21.8 1.1
Rhineland-Palatinate 12 5.8 4.9 −0.9
Saarland 2 1.0 1.2 0.2
Saxony 13 6.3 5.1 −1.2
Saxony-Anhalt 6 2.9 2.9 −0.0
Schleswig Holstein 7 3.4 3.5 0.1
Thuringia 6 2.9 2.7 −0.2
Age
<18 0 0.0 16.3 16.3
18-39 71 34.1 26.3 −7.8
40-59 75 36.1 31.1 −5.0
≥ 60 62 29.8 26.3 −3.5
Education
Still in School 3 1.4 3.8 2.4
Cert. of Secondary Education 64 30.8 36.3 5.5
Gen. Cert. of Sec. Education 68 32.7 28.8 −3.9
Gen. Qual. for Univ. Entrance 62 29.8 26.6 −3.2
No School Leaving Certificate 1 0.5 3.8 3.3
Not Specified 10 4.8 0.2 −4.6
*Own calculations based on data from the German Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2012)
Overall 495 individuals are invited in several waves to improve representativity
with respect to age, gender, education and residency in Germany. 260 respon-
dents fully answered the questionnaire, leading to a response rate of 53%. As
indicated above, those respondents who do not pass all three rationality tests are
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excluded from further analysis, as I assume that they do not answer wholeheart-
edly or might have lost concentration.7 In this sample, that means dropping data
of 52 individuals or exactly 20%. In total, 208 individuals are included in the anal-
ysis yielding 10,400 (208·(28-3)·2=10400) observations for the first specification, as
each of the 25 choice sets consists of two distinct alternatives.
The questionnaire features 4 parts: The introduction, the 28 choice sets, a lottery
approach to identify risk preferences and some socio-economic questions. The in-
troduction explains the purpose of the experiment, the hypothetical framing and
the attributes as well as the choice task itself. The information given in the in-
troduction is accessible for the complete duration of the experiment. The Lottery
approach draws upon the standard Holt and Laury (2002) procedure. It is mod-
ified to fit the framing in that respondents choose between lotteries with varying
survival distributions instead of monetary values. By determining a switching
point between a lottery with low variance and a lottery with high variance in sur-
vival time, I can state the risk preference with respect to remaining life time. This
determination of risk preference types can then be used to identify subgroups to
intensify the analysis of heterogeneity in the DCE.
Table 3.3 shows descriptive statistics of the final sample. The sample is found to be
close to the composition of the German population in the four characteristics that
are used for its construction. While there is no difference for gender and negligi-
ble difference for residency, there is some slight overrepresentation of general cer-
tificates of secondary education and general qualification for university entrance
going along with slight underrepresentation of no school leaving certificates and
certificates of secondary education. Further, the market research institute’s panel
does not include persons below 18 years of age. Hence, the sample exhibits a
deviation of sample shares from population shares in each of the age groups.
A further important aspect that should be addressed before starting the analysis
of the data is the respondents’ understanding of the task illustrated in table 3.4.
Respondents are asked whether they found it hard to understand the task and if it
was difficult to take a decision in the particular choice situations. A large majority
of 79% finds the task easy and very easy to understand. Only about 3% find it
very hard. Concerning the difficulties to take decisions gives a slightly different
picture. More than 50% find it hard or very hard to make decisions in the specific
choice sets. This might be due to two main reasons. Firstly, the hypothetical situ-
ation could have been a cognitive burden for some of the subjects. Secondly, the
attributes are chosen to be of high relevance for the situation. Hence, difficulties in
7As Lancsar and Louviere (2006) point out, ignoring respondents who failed rationality tests
might not be appropriate. In my analysis, including those who failed rationality tests does not
change mean coefficients qualitatively.
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decision-making could be attributed to the demanding task to trade off different
important attributes. Such difficulties in decision-making are intended to obtain
useful trade-off results.
Table 3.4: Understanding of Tasks and Decision Scenarios
Percentage
Difficulties Understanding the Task
Not Hard at All 21.15
Not Very Hard 57.69
Hard 18.27
Very Hard 2.88
Difficulties Making Decisions
Not Hard at All 3.85
Not Very Hard 43.27
Hard 45.67
Very Hard 7.21
Own calculations. N=208.
3.3.5 Data Analysis
The analysis is performed by estimating mixed logit models using the Stata rou-
tine mixlogit (Hole, 2007b). The dependent variable is a binary choice indicator,
which becomes 1 if an alternative is chosen. As base levels low side effects, a
life expectancy of 6 months safe and expected introduction of a new therapy in 6
months time are used. The co-payment attribute enters as the only non-random
parameter and with its respective EUR values. I estimate part-worth utilities for
each attribute level which enter the two distinct indirect utility functions for my
preferred specification.
Vin = β0in(Constant)
+ β1Co− Payment
+ β2,n25%Survival + β3,n50%Survival + β4,n75%Survival + β5,n100%Survival
+ β6,nNoSideE f f ects + β7,nStrongSideE f f ects
+ β8,nT : 3Monthsi + β9,nT : 9Monthsi + β10,nT : 12Monthsi
63
Chapter 3: Risk-loving in the End?
Vjn = β1Co− Payment
+ β6,nNoSideE f f ects
+ β11,nN : 3Monthsj + β12,nN : 9Monthsj + β13,nN : 12Monthsj
With :
Vin = First-Line Treatment
Vjn = No Treatment
Vin describes the utility function of first-line treatment, while Vjn indicates the re-
spective utility function of no treatment. To avoid problems concerning the inter-
pretation of the constant term when using dummy coding, effects coding is ap-
plied for all levels. That ensures a meaningful interpretation of the constant as the
effects of the levels are not confounded with the intercept. Thus the alternative
specific constant in Vin captures all unobserved sources of utility associated with
this alternative (Bech and Gyrd-Hansen, 2005). As the co-payment attribute enters
the analysis with its EUR value, I can calculate the marginal rate of substitution
between the attributes and co-payment, which reflects the willingness to pay for
an attribute. In principle, the part worth utilities can be used to calculate utility
values for all possible situations by adding up the corresponding coefficients di-
rectly. Based on those values, different situations can be compared and one can
draw conclusions about choice behavior and risk preferences. As it is more con-
venient to interpret, I use WTPs that reflect individual preferences in the analysis
of the option value.
3.4 Results
Ceteris Paribus Interpretation of Part-worth Utilities
Table 3.5 shows the results of the mixed logit estimation including all main effects
for the pooled sample. All coefficients in this model are highly significant except
for survival probability of 50% which is significant at 5% and the alternative spe-
cific constant which is not found to be statistically significant. The coefficients
show the expected signs, i.e. less side effects are preferred over more side effects
and higher chances of 12 months survival are preferred over smaller probabilities.
Further, a shorter expected time until introduction of a new cure is associated with
a higher part-worth utility than a longer expected time and higher costs are less
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Table 3.5: Mixed Logit Estimation - Pooled Sample
Pooled
Mean
Co-Payment −0.710∗∗∗ (0.052)
Constant 0.163 (0.124)
No Side Effects 0.317∗∗∗ (0.054)
Strong Side Effects −0.600∗∗∗ (0.070)
25% survival −1.128∗∗∗ (0.108)
50% survival −0.176∗∗ (0.075)
75% survival 0.262∗∗∗ (0.086)
100% survival 1.289∗∗∗ (0.098)
T: 3 months 0.570∗∗∗ (0.080)
T: 9 months −0.285∗∗∗ (0.089)
T: 12 months −0.579∗∗∗ (0.102)
N: 3 months 1.375∗∗∗ (0.118)
N: 9 months −0.840∗∗∗ (0.099)
N: 12 months −1.350∗∗∗ (0.091)
Standard Deviation
Constant 0.852∗∗∗ (0.130)
No Side Effects 0.038 (0.030)
Strong Side Effects 0.015 (0.063)
25% survival 0.495∗∗∗ (0.115)
50% survival 0.308∗∗∗ (0.094)
75% survival 0.526∗∗∗ (0.128)
100% survival 0.176 (0.146)
T: 3 months 0.029 (0.028)
T: 9 months 0.023 (0.051)
T: 12 months 0.057 (0.060)
N: 3 months 0.525∗∗∗ (0.100)
N: 9 months 0.389∗∗ (0.187)
N: 12 months 0.500∗∗∗ (0.171)
N 10,400
LRχ2 696.54
∗∗∗
Note: Mixed logit estimation. Standard errors (clustered on indi-
vidual level) in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p<0.01; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗ p<0.1
valued. While these results are not surprising in itself, the crucial aspect for the
evaluation of risk preferences is captured in the attribute 50% Survival. This at-
tribute estimates the part-worth utility of a 12 months survival probability of 50%
relative to the base category 6 months safe. As the expected remaining lifetime
is identical for both attributes, a negative coefficient exhibits risk-aversion, ceteris
paribus. The coefficient in the pooled mixed logit regression is negative and sig-
nificant, indicating that respondents prefer certainty about the remaining lifetime
compared to a lottery with the same expected value, i.e. they can be seen as being
risk-averse in the mean. However, there seems to be a considerable amount of
heterogeneity in the sample as can be found from the nonzero and significant esti-
mate for the standard deviation. As the mixed logit model estimates the complete
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distribution, it allows us to analyze heterogeneity in more detail. Therefore, I cal-
culate the percentage of the sample that would exhibit risk-loving behavior by re-
lating the estimated standard deviation to the estimated mean with 1−Φ(−βˆk/σˆk).
Roughly 28% of the sample rather prefer the lottery over the safe remaining life-
time.
To analyze the preference heterogeneity in more detail, I combine the DCE
Table 3.6: Mixed Logit Estimation - Subsamples
Risk-Averse Risk-Loving
Mean
Co-Payment −0.693∗∗∗ (0.067) −0.741∗∗∗ (0.079)
Constant −0.002 (0.186) 0.349∗∗ (0.157)
No Side Effects 0.359∗∗∗ (0.080) 0.302∗∗∗ (0.076)
Strong Side Effects −0.617∗∗∗ (0.104) −0.613∗∗∗ (0.103)
25% Survival −1.262∗∗∗ (0.184) −1.027∗∗∗ (0.144)
50% Survival −0.234∗∗ (0.110) −0.099 (0.102)
75% Survival 0.209∗ (0.125) 0.262∗∗ (0.121)
100% Survival 1.343∗∗∗ (0.148) 1.248∗∗∗ (0.144)
T: 3 Months 0.703∗∗∗ (0.111) 0.452∗∗∗ (0.111)
T: 9 Months −0.461∗∗∗ (0.132) −0.160 (0.127)
T: 12 Months −0.604∗∗∗ (0.154) −0.547∗∗∗ (0.133)
N: 3 Months 1.600∗∗∗ (0.156) 1.192∗∗∗ (0.181)
N: 9 Months −0.972∗∗∗ (0.129) −0.696∗∗∗ (0.148)
N: 12 Months −1.566∗∗∗ (0.136) −1.166∗∗∗ (0.113)
Standard Deviation
Constant 0.811∗∗∗ (0.184) 0.728∗∗∗ (0.108)
No Side Effects 0.009 (0.041) 0.043 (0.055)
Strong Side Effects 0.083 (0.124) 0.142 (0.173)
25% Survival 0.581∗∗ (0.291) 0.387∗∗∗ (0.140)
50% Survival 0.118 (0.356) 0.256∗∗∗ (0.096)
75% Survival 0.705∗∗∗ (0.178) 0.462∗∗∗ (0.121)
100% Survival 0.031 (0.105) 0.400∗∗∗ (0.151)
T: 3 Months 0.023 (0.044) 0.043 (0.043)
T: 9 Months 0.030 (0.051) 0.019 (0.063)
T: 12 Months 0.028 (0.084) 0.013 (0.095)
N: 3 Months 0.512∗∗∗ (0.180) 0.515∗∗∗ (0.176)
N: 9 Months 0.250 (0.206) 0.525∗ (0.279)
N: 12 Months 0.580∗∗∗ (0.175) 0.234 (0.402)
N 5,500 4,900
LRχ2 470.61
∗∗∗ 302.72∗∗∗
Note: Mixed logit estimation. Maximum simulated likelihood. Standard errors (clustered
on individual level) in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p<0.01; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗ p<0.1
with the lottery choice approach to perform a subgroup analysis as presented in
table 3.6. The subgroups are formed based on results from the Holt and Laury
(2002)-type approach. Therefore, the pooled sample is split into those who were
identified as risk-averse and those who showed risk-loving behavior in the lottery
choice approach.
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For the subsample of identified risk-averse persons in column 1, the point estimate
on 50% Survival increases in absolute size indicating a stronger preference for the
safe remaining lifetime. Further, the significant heterogeneity around the mean
of 50% Survival disappears. Column 2 presents the results for the corresponding
subsample of identified risk loving persons. The coefficient for 50% Survival is not
statistically different from zero. Note, as one rather expects a positive point esti-
Table 3.7: Interaction Model - Subsample: Risk-Loving
Interaction Model
Mean
Interaction: Exp. · Cons. −0.186∗ (0.113)
Co-Payment −0.740∗∗∗ (0.079)
Constant 0.331∗∗ (0.160)
No Side Effects 0.303∗∗∗ (0.075)
Strong Side Effects −0.609∗∗∗ (0.101)
25% Survival −1.023∗∗∗ (0.141)
50% Survival −0.100 (0.102)
75% Survival 0.260∗∗ (0.122)
100% Survival 1.247∗∗∗ (0.144)
T: 3 Months 0.454∗∗∗ (0.111)
T: 9 Months −0.156 (0.127)
T: 12 Months −0.552∗∗∗ (0.133)
N: 3 Months 1.188∗∗∗ (0.181)
N: 9 Months −0.694∗∗∗ (0.148)
N: 12 Months −1.165∗∗∗ (0.113)
Standard Deviation
Constant 0.736∗∗∗ (0.129)
No Side Effects 0.047 (0.045)
Strong Side Effects 0.151 (0.144)
25% Survival 0.352∗∗∗ (0.128)
50% Survival 0.273∗∗∗ (0.095)
75% Survival 0.464∗∗∗ (0.130)
100% Survival 0.370∗∗ (0.156)
T: 3 Months 0.043 (0.043)
T: 9 Months 0.024 (0.067)
T: 12 Months 0.021 (0.059)
N: 3 Months 0.515∗∗∗ (0.180)
N: 9 Months 0.499∗ (0.293)
N: 12 Months 0.270 (0.343)
N 4,900
LRχ2 311.86
∗∗∗
Note: Mixed logit estimation. Maximum simulated likelihood.
Standard errors (clustered on individual level) in parentheses.
∗∗∗ p<0.01; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗ p<0.1
mate, there might be a considerable misclassification error, which can also be seen
from the estimated standard deviation. Apparently, the identification of risk pref-
erences by the lottery approach does not perfectly coincide with the DCE. Some of
those identified as risk averse by the DCE might actually end up as risk-loving in
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the Holt and Laury (2002)-approach. Probably, different degrees in the complex-
ity of tasks of lottery choices and DCE decisions lead to different classifications of
individuals.8 This might be the reason that I do not find a positive coefficient for
50% Survival in the risk-loving sample. However, in contrast to the risk-averse
sample, the risk-loving subsample obtains some utility of the risky first-line treat-
ment from unobserved sources as can be seen from the positive and significant
coefficient for the alternative-specific constant. To further explore this finding, I
interact the constant with a binary indicator which becomes one if the respondent
has experiences with cancer in her closer family.9 I find a significantly negative co-
efficient for this interaction effect. Hence, based on unobserved sources of utility,
persons in the risk-loving subsample prefer first-line treatment less if they have
experiences with cancer in their closer family.
A Willingness to Pay Interpretation – Introducing the Option Value
Departing from the ceteris paribus analysis conducted so far, I proceed by calcu-
lating willingness to pay estimates for different situations to analyze the effect of
the option value. This allows a more intuitive interpretation of comprehensive
situations. As the discrete choice model is linear in parameters, the willingness
to pay estimates are obtained by calculating the marginal rate of substitution be-
tween an attribute and the cost attribute, which is measured in monetary units, i.e.
ŴTPi = βˆi/βˆco−payment. To obtain confidence intervals, I calculate the willingness to
pay estimates using stata’s wtp-plugin (Hole, 2007a). I again start by interpreting
the results for the pooled sample. To evaluate the influence of the option value
with respect to risk preferences, I calculate the willingness to pay for situations
with identical expected outcomes in remaining lifetime. That is, the general situ-
ation includes an expected remaining lifetime of 6 months and no side effects. I
then calculate the willingness to pay including the option value for two situations
in which the expected introduction of a new cure crosses the threshold of the ex-
pected remaining lifetime, disregarding the quality of life. The results are shown
in Table 3.9. For the situation in which a new cure is expected to be approved
within 3 months from now, one sees that the willingness to pay for not taking part
in a treatment exceeds the willingness to pay for treatment. That is, individuals
prefer the non-risky alternative if they expect a new cure to evolve within their
safe remaining lifetime. This is very much in line with findings from the ceteris
paribus analysis.
8I also have data on the standard approach (Holt and Laury, 2002) using monetary values. Results
are qualitatively identical when applying this approach. Hence, I stick to the initial measure.
9As I suspected experiences to probably influence decision making in the setting, this variable
was obtained by the socioeconomic questionnaire.
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Table 3.8: Willingness To Pay
Pooled Risk-Averse Risk-Loving
Constant 229.27 −2.29 470.76∗∗
No Side Effects 445.84∗∗ 518.27∗∗ 407.81∗∗
Strong Side Effects −844.52∗∗ −890.16∗∗ −827.19∗∗
25% survival −1589.33∗∗ −1821.39∗∗ −1386.46∗∗
50% survival −247.42∗∗ −337.81∗∗ −133.60
75% survival 369.55∗∗ 302.35 353.62∗∗
100% survival 1815.54∗∗ 1939.01∗∗ 1684.93∗∗
T: 3 months 802.53∗∗ 1014.81∗∗ 609.93∗∗
T: 9 months −401.83∗∗ −666.10∗∗ −216.02
T: 12 months −815.78∗∗ −871.76∗∗ −738.71∗∗
N: 3 months 1936.41∗∗ 2310.14∗∗ 1609.66∗∗
N: 9 months −1182.96∗∗ −1402.71∗∗ −939.31∗∗
N: 12 months −1901.99∗∗ −2260.83∗∗ −1574.08∗∗
WTP-estimates and confidence intervals obtained by the stata wtp-plugin (Hole, 2007a). All estimates multiplied by
1000 as attribute levels entered in 1000EUR. ∗∗ p<0.05.
Introducing an option value of today’s first-line treatment shifts the preferences.
Individuals prefer risky treatments in case they offer the chance of living to see a
new cure even if benefits are uncertain. One can infer this result from the higher
willingness to pay for treatment, if the new therapy is expected to be approved
beyond the threshold of 6 months. Individuals prefer accepting the high risk of
immediate death if they thereby obtain the chance to take part in a future therapy,
which success is unknown. That is, a higher preference for first-line treatments in
presence of the option value exists. As already indicated, the quality of
Table 3.9: WTP – Values for Specific Situations
Expected
introduction
First-line treatment No treatment
of a new therapy:
3 months 1230.24 2382.25
9 months 25.86 -737.12
WTP for a situation with an expected remaining life time of 6 months and no side effects.
Preferred options are shaded in gray.
life after treatment may play a decisive role in treatment choice. One can see from
the results that strong side effects have a large negative influence on the overall
utility. The results hold as long as no strong side effects are involved. Strong side
effects of treatments may overcompensate the effect of the option value leading to
a preference for no treatment. However, as I am interested in isolating the effect
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Table 3.10: WTP – Values for Specific Situations - Subsample: Risk-averse
Expected
introduction
First-line treatment No treatment
of a new therapy:
3 months 1192.98 2828.41
9 months -487.93 -884.44
WTP for a situation with an expected remaining life time of 6 months and no side effects.
Preferred options are shaded in gray.
of the option value on choice behavior, I refrain from interpreting the trade-off
between quality and quantity of life. Including this trade off into the analysis
would affect the comparability of alternatives. I acknowledge the importance of
side effects for treatment choice, which was the initial reason for incorporating it
into the experiment.
In order to analyze the heterogeneity in the sample in more detail, I perform the
same analysis for the risk-averse subsample. Results indicate, that even those
individuals identified as being risk-averse by the lottery approach tend to accept
the risk of the first-line treatment in presence of the option value. Even though
they have a stronger preference for the safe remaining lifetime ceteris paribus, they
accept taking the risk of immediate death if the option value is involved. That is,
results for the pooled sample are not driven by extreme risk-loving behavior of a
minority.
3.5 Conclusion
This study uses a DCE to analyse treatment choice behavior in end-of-life situa-
tions. The DCE features two mutually exclusive alternatives of treatment choices
which vary in their survival probabilities. As individuals are forced to decide for
one of the two provided alternatives, the DCE induces respondents to focus on the
opportunity costs of the alternatives which produces reasonable trade-off results. I
first elicit the part-worth utilities of the attributes by applying a mixed logit model.
Interpretation of the coefficients yields risk-aversion with respect to remaining life
time. Afterwards, I extend the analysis by introducing an option value and cal-
culating the mean willingness to pay for different situations. The analysis identi-
fies an influence of the option value of future therapies with unknown outcomes,
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which leads one to predict risky treatment choices. Hence, results suggest, that
the option value induces patients to choose risky, marginally effective treatments.
An option value can come up from many sources, be it by remarks of health care
personnel, seeing a drug entering the final stage of approval, media reports or
simply just rumors. All these sources may evolve some option value - or less tech-
nically speaking – raise hope. This hope is likely to be subjectively overwheighted
and rises risk acceptance with respect to remaining life time. Additionally, in-
surance cushions the financial consequences of treatment for patients, which po-
tentially increases demand even further. We therefore see terminally ill patients
applying for chemotherapies which promise only a marginal prolongation of life.
As an aside, apart from terminal situations a similar motive might explain the
trend towards using alternative treatments which do not meet the requirements
of evidence-based medicine. Many social insurances in Germany recently started
covering costs for alternative treatments such as acupuncture, homeopathy or os-
teopathy to meet the demand. Many of those treatments are not only offered to
treat minor ailments but also severe diseases. Overall, this suggests that personal
perceptions about the chance of being cured play a major role in patients’ treat-
ment demand.
Overweighting of small probabilities apparently plays a crucial role when it comes
to terminally ill patients. There probably exists a gap between subjective per-
ception of probabilities and objective chances of being cured. Prospect theory
approaches this phenomenon explicitly and predicts risk-loving behavior in the
domain of losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).
Whether individuals evaluate outcomes as gains or as losses depends on their in-
dividual reference point. As this study obtains results from a representative Ger-
man sample, the average reference point is likely not to coincide with that from
terminally ill patients as diagnosis and suffering from a disease probably shifts
the reference point. However, Rasiel et al. (2005) point out that the reference point
might change slowly, which explains risk-loving choices of terminally ill patients.
There is an ongoing debate about whose utility to measure when evaluating health
care measures (Ubel et al., 2000). It has been argued, that the general public should
be the focal point, as it is the society’s resources that are allocated among diseases
(Gold et al., 1996; Brazier, 2008). It is hence useful to analyze hypothetical pref-
erences, acknowledging the possible lack of external validity with respect to the
group of actual patients. However, financing decisions in social insurances are
typically not made by patients but by (usually) more healthy policymakers, which
could only put themselves in the hypothetical situation of a patient. This will
presumably not shift their actual reference point downwards.
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The high demand for marginally effective treatments negatively affects the finan-
cial state of the insurers and withdraws resources from other treatments (Baily,
2011). However, marginally effective treatments in terminal situations might have
a higher utility than can be measured directly by valuation of medical indicators
of the treatment itself. The hope for new therapies adds an additional value to
terminal care that is important to individuals and even leads to risky treatment
choice behavior. This hope is neglected in cost utility-assessment of treatments,
that explicitly focuses on the trade-off between quality and quantity of life. Even
though marginally effective treatments are widely discussed as possibly offering
opportunities to posteriorize or ration treatments, policy-makers should keep in
mind that the underlying utility of marginally effective treatments may be high.
That is, although many terminal care measures are only marginally effective the
option value needs to be acknowledged when conducting cost-utility analysis to
evaluate treatments.
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4 Fear of Unemployment and its
Effect on the Mental Health of
Spouses
4.1 Introduction
Losing one’s job is connected to numerous negative consequences. Besides the
obvious economic cut due to the loss of income1, previous economic research
has shown that unemployment influences individuals’ long-term labor market
prospects (Clark et al., 2001; Knabe and Rätzel, 2011). Besides these economic
losses, there are other fields of life affected as well. Among these non-monetary
consequences is a loss in life satisfaction (Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998;
Kassenböhmer and Haisken-DeNew, 2009) or even an influence on suicide prob-
ability (Ruhm, 2000). A central aspect of the research on non-monetary conse-
quences of job loss are health effects. While some authors have found adverse
mental health effects on the unemployed (Korpi, 1997; Björklund and Eriksson,
1998; Green, 2011), others have not found these effects (e.g. Browning et al., 2006;
Böckerman and Ilmakunnas, 2009; Salm, 2009; Schmitz, 2011).
The vast majority of studies on the consequences of job loss are concerned with the
treated individuals themselves. While there may be already severe negative effects
on unemployed individuals, the total effect is even larger as not only the unem-
ployed themselves are affected but also their families and spouses (Winkelmann
and Winkelmann, 1995; Siedler, 2011; Kind and Haisken-DeNew, 2012; Marcus,
2013). Financial losses are not only borne by individuals but all household mem-
bers. Considering monetary effects on the unemployed and their families might
This paper is joint work with Christian Bünnings and Jan Kleibrink. We are grateful for highly
useful comments and suggestions from Harald Tauchmann, Hendrik Schmitz and the partici-
pants of the 2nd CINCH Academy 2014, Essen. We are thankful for financial support from the
Federal Ministry of Education and Research. The paper has been submitted to Health Economics.
The editor invited us to revise and resubmit the paper.
1Transfer payments, e.g. unemployment benefits, partly offset the financial loss in many coun-
tries. However, while the generosity of benefit schemes varies substantially between countries,
a full compensation of previous earnings is hardly to be found, hence, financial losses are a sure
consequence of an unemployment spell.
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still not cover the devastating effect of unemployment to the full extent. Non-
monetary consequences can also be expected to spill over to families and spouses.
Besides the monetary and non-monetary effects of actual job loss on the unem-
ployed as well as their families, there is one more channel to be considered.
Not only the event of unemployment but also the fear of unemployment can be
expected to have negative effects. Job security2 is one of the central aspects of
satisfaction with a job (Knabe and Rätzel, 2010; Geishecker, 2009) and the fear of
unemployment has been shown to decrease mental health of individuals signif-
icantly (Burgard et al., 2009; Reichert and Tauchmann, 2011; Caroli and Godard,
2013).
Against the background of previous findings, this paper analyzes the impact of
the fear of unemployment on the mental health of spouses.3 Like the actual event
of unemployment, the fear of job loss can affect partners over different channels.
Firstly, there is an expected financial cut. While previous research has shown that
the non-monetary effects of unemployment are at least as important as the mone-
tary ones for treated individuals, the driving force behind the fear of losing one’s
job are most likely sorrows concerning the financial stability. These sorrows are
hardly borne by individuals in insecure jobs alone but also by their spouses –
especially, if the main income earner in a household is threatened by unemploy-
ment. Secondly, even if the financial situation remains stable, spouses might share
their partners’ concerns as feeling for a spouse and her sorrows and fears is a cen-
tral part of (most) relationships. Building on these considerations, we analyze the
question whether the fear of unemployment spills over to spouses empirically.
To our best knowledge, this study is the first one to identify spillover effects of
job insecurity. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), it can
be shown that there are considerable spillover effects of insecure job situations
on partners. The fear of job loss is a result of actual unemployment – in times
of full employment, it would hardly exist. In this light, the analysis shows the
the costs of unemployment are even higher than previously assumed. Further-
more, while perfectly disentangling the channels over which individuals suffer
from their spouses’ job insecurity is hardly possible, there is some indication that
it is not only financial fear but individuals also feel with their partners’ worries.
The paper is structured as follows: The empirical strategy is explained in Section
4.2, in Section 4.3, the data source is introduced and descriptive statistics of the
sample are presented and discussed. Results are presented and discussed in Sec-
tion 4.4. A conclusion can be found in Section 4.5.
2The terms job (in)security and fear of unemployment are used interchangeably in this paper.
3The terms spouse and partner are used interchangeably in this paper as all couples cohabit and
more than 80% are married.
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4.2 Empirical Strategy
The research question is whether individuals’ perceived job insecurity has effects
on the mental health of their partners. Hence, the dependent variable of our em-
pirical model is the Mental Component Summary Scale (MCS), which is reported
on a 0 - 100 scale and can be interpreted linearly. Due to the nature of the out-
come variable, we apply linear regression methods. More precisely, we set up the
following equation and apply OLS techniques:
MCS1it = FearUE
1
itη + FearUE
2
itβ+ X
1
itζ + X
2
itγ+ Hitδ+ θt + εit (4.1)
Individuals and periods are indicated by the subscripts i and t, respectively, the
superscripts 1 and 2 relate to partner 1 and partner 2, respectively. For each cou-
ple, we observe both partners. Partner 1 is always the outcome partner, the partner
whose MCS is explained. Partner 2 is the treatment partner, hence, the one whose
perceived job insecurity appears as right-hand side variable. The coefficient of
main interest is β, the spillover effect of fear of unemployment of partner 2 on
their spouse’s mental health. However, partner 1’s own fear of job loss is also in-
cluded because not accounting for it might results in an omitted variable bias – as
Reichert and Tauchmann (2011) show that the MCS is heavily affected by own job
insecurity. The vectors X1it and X
2
it contain socio-economic characteristics of both
partners. In addition, X2it includes a set of job characteristics of partner 2. Hit is
a vector of household characteristics that refer to both partners, and θt includes
a full set of calendar time dummies. εit represents the regression error term. To
account for correlations between observations of both partners, all models are es-
timated using standard errors that are clustered at the household level and allow
for arbitrary intra-cluster correlations.
MCS1it = FearUE
1
itη + FearUE
2
itβ+ X
1
itζ + X
2
itγ+ Hitδ+ θt + α
1
i + εit (4.2)
In a second step, we include a full set of individual fixed effects (α1i in Equation
4.2). Introducing fixed effects is an important step towards unbiased estimates
for at least two reasons. First, the MCS is a subjective measure of an individual’s
mental health. As Ferrer-i Carbonell and Frijters (2004) have shown, it is crucial
to account for individual fixed effects to get meaningful results from regressions
on subjective outcome variables. Second and equally important in the present
setting, individual fixed effects control for another potential source of bias: Assor-
tative mating. According to the theory of assortative mating (e.g. Kalmijn, 1994;
Pencavel, 1998), couples share some common characteristics such as beliefs and at-
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titudes. Hence, it is quite likely that in rather pessimistic couples, partner 1 scores
low on the MCS and their spouse reports rather low job security. Individual fixed
effects account for this as only the within-variation of individuals is exploited and
time-invariant differences do not account to the effects of explanatory variables.
Hence, a common negative attitude within a couple does not bias results as only
changes over time are considered. However, it is important to bear in mind that
individual fixed effects absorb only correlations that are time-invariant but cannot
deal with unobserved shocks that are time-variant.
There might also be concerns that the estimation results are affected by reverse
causality as subjective information from both individuals enter the model. To be
more precise, it might be conceivable that if partner 1 suffers from mental health
problems, this might also induce/ increase her own fear – or the spouse’s fear of
job loss. Concerning the own fear, it is likely that mental health problems might
lead to a more pessimistic evaluation of the own job situation. The intuition be-
hind the idea of reverse causality for the spouse’s fear of job loss is less direct.
Keeping the job might become more important for partner 2 – at least from a fi-
nancial perspective – when the partner gets severely ill and might not be able to
work (anymore).
To account for reverse causality, Reichert and Tauchmann (2011) use staff reduc-
tion at an individual’s employer in the previous year as an instrument for subjec-
tive job insecurity. However, in their analysis, the focus lies on the effects of fear
of unemployment for the affected individual, hence, it might well be the case that
more or less healthy individuals sort into more or less secure jobs. In this analysis,
the effect of job security of one individual on her spouse is of main interest, hence,
it can be argued that in the estimation of β, reverse causality should not play a
crucial role.
Nevertheless, it cannot be ruled out entirely for the estimation of β and the esti-
mation of η – the coefficient of the own fear of unemployment – is likely subject
to this source of bias. However, to be a valid instrument, staff reduction must be
sufficiently correlated with the fear of unemployment and simultaneously fulfill
the exclusion restriction. While the former condition is rather unproblematic, the
validity assumption might be violated, as we cannot rule out the possibility that
potential effects operate also through other channels than the fear of unemploy-
ment – e.g. when individual’s suffer from the loss of colleagues. As we lack a
valid instrument to account for reverse causality, we aim at reducing concerns by
estimating a model including a lagged dependent variable.
Finally, having subjective variables both on the left-, as well as on the right-hand
side of the equation might be an issue. Therefore, we choose not to use staff re-
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duction as an instrument but to exploit staff reduction as an objective measure
that directly enters the model as proxy for partner’s fear of unemployment. Ob-
viously, fear of unemployment and staff reduction in the company are no perfect
substitutes. First, respondents can feel their job to be insecure although there were
no layoffs during the last year and, second, they may know their job to be secure
although there were layoffs. Still, the two variables are significantly correlated
and therefore staff reduction can serve as a proxy for the fear of unemployment to
validate the direction of causation.
To sum up, the empirical strategy is conducted in four consecutive steps. First,
OLS regressions are applied to show the direction of correlations. To account for
the subjective nature of the outcome variable as well as assortative mating, in-
dividual fixed effects are controlled for. In the next step, we estimate a model
including the lagged dependent variable to reduce concerns about reverse causal-
ity and finally, we check the robustness of the findings by using staff reduction as
a proxy variable for the subjective fear of unemployment.
4.3 Data
The empirical analysis is based on representative panel data from the German
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP, v.29). The SOEP is a longitudinal German survey
and provides comprehensive information on both, individual and household level.
More precisely, all household members aged 17 and older are interviewed annu-
ally on a wide range of socio-economic characteristics, such as financial, work-
ing and health conditions. The SOEP started in 1984 and was subject to several
refreshments and enlargements resulting in a current panel of more than 20,000
individuals in 2013 (DIW, 2014).
The estimation sample is restricted to couples for which information on both part-
ners is provided. As the main interest lies on the effect of partner’s fear of unem-
ployment, we exclude observations if partner 2 is not employed. Further couple-
year observations are excluded if partner 2 is a civil servant because this group is
subject to very strict dismissal protection laws in Germany. In addition, we restrict
our sample to partners aged 65 and younger, since this is the statutory retirement
age in Germany and fear of unemployment usually does not apply beyond this
threshold. We end up with a final estimation sample of 27,081 person-year obser-
vations from 10,798 individuals.
The dependent variable in all regression models is the Mental Component Sum-
mary Scale (MCS), which is frequently used in health economics studies (e.g.
Schmitz, 2011; Marcus, 2013) and has been proven to be a good measure of in-
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dividual mental health (Gill et al., 2007; Salyers et al., 2000). The MCS is generated
from a battery of health-related quality of life indicators, which are part of the
SF-12 questionnaire. The SF-12 is a short version of the SF-36 and involves six
questions covering different fields of psychological conditions.4 The MCS ranges
from 0 to 100 and was standardized to have a mean of 50 and a standard devi-
ation of 10 in 2004. Higher MCS-values are associated with better mental health
conditions (Andersen et al., 2007). As the MCS was first obtained in 2002 and is
available biennially, the estimation sample is constructed from the six waves to
2012.
The key explanatory variable in the present analysis is a measure of partner’s per-
ceived job insecurity. SOEP participants are asked whether they are very concerned,
somewhat concerned, or not concerned at all about their current job situation. Follow-
ing the work of Reichert and Tauchmann (2011), we collapse the information of
the partner’s perceived job insecurity into a binary indicator that becomes 1 if the
partner reports at least some concerns about his employment status and zero oth-
erwise.5
As a robustness check, we use the objective measure staff reduction as proxy for
the subjective fear of unemployment. It takes the value 1 if the employer laid off
workers in the preceding year and zero otherwise.
The set of control variables can be categorized into three groups: Socio-economic
controls, partner-controls and household-controls. Socio-economic controls con-
tain the variables employment status, age, years of education and gross labor in-
come. Partner controls comprise age, years of education and gross labor income.
Beyond that, we let information on partner’s fulltime employment history and
tenure enter the set of partner controls. Household controls account for variables
that affect both partners and include an indicator for children living in the house-
hold, household size as well as an indicator of residency in East or West Germany.
In addition, we control for marital status of the couple, i.e. whether or not the cou-
ple is married. Finally, we include a full set of calendar time dummies to control
for the overall economic conditions that may affect both perceived job security and
mental health. Descriptive statistics of all variables used throughout the analysis
are presented in Table 4.1.
There are interesting differences between men and women that are important for
interpretation of the results from the subsequent empirical analysis. Given that
the respective partner is employed, women are far less likely to be employed than
4The remaining six questions refer to physical health conditions.
5As a robustness check, we do not collapse the variable into a binary regressor but let very con-
cerned and somewhat concerned enter the regression. Results are qualitatively unchanged, see
Table A4.7.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics
All Female Male
Variable Obs Mean S.D. Obs Mean S.D. Obs Mean S.D.
Mental Health (P1) 27,081 50.41 8.99 13,473 49.62 9.20 13,608 51.19 8.70
Fear of UE (P2) 27,081 0.58 0.49 13,473 0.61 0.49 13,608 0.56 0.50
Controls: Partner 1
Employed Y/N 27,081 1.00 0.00 13,473 1.00 0.00 13,608 1.00 0.00
Age 27,081 44.27 9.14 13,473 42.95 8.91 13,608 45.56 9.18
Education in Years 27,081 12.56 2.59 13,473 12.48 2.45 13,608 12.64 2.71
Gross Income 27,081 2,612.97 2,356.85 13,473 1,751.97 1,520.02 13,608 3465.44 2703.06
Fear of UE 27,081 0.58 0.49 13,473 0.55 0.50 13,608 0.60 0.49
Big Econ. Worries 27,071 0.19 0.42 13,468 0.19 0.40 13,603 0.19 0.40
Some Econ. Worries 27,071 0.57 0.50 13,468 0.58 0.49 13,603 0.55 0.50
Controls: Partner 2
Age 27,081 44.22 9.06 13,473 45.46 9.00 13,608 43.00 8.96
Education in Years 27,081 12.55 2.58 13,473 12.63 2.71 13,608 12.48 2.45
Gross Income 27,081 2,603.09 2,341.92 13,473 3,456.32 2,681.06 13,608 1758.32 1537.50
Fulltime Exp. 27,081 17.32 10.92 13,473 22.47 9.83 13,608 12.22 9.45
Tenure 27,081 11.21 9.39 13,473 12.56 9.97 13,608 9.88 8.56
Staff Reduction 21,976 0.23 0.42 10,927 0.25 0.43 11,049 0.21 0.41
Controls: Household
Children in HH
Y/N
27,081 0.46 0.50 13,473 0.47 0.50 13,608 0.46 0.50
# Persons in HH 27,081 3.12 1.05 13,473 3.13 1.05 13,608 3.12 1.05
Married Y/N 27,081 0.83 0.37 13,473 0.83 0.37 13,608 0.83 0.37
East Germany 27,081 0.25 0.43 13,473 0.25 0.43 13,608 0.25 0.43
Note: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP for the years 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012. P1 and P2 refer to
Partner 1 and 2, respectively.
men (76% vs 89%).6 Mean gross income of women is considerably lower than
men’s – this is also true when only considering employed individuals. This is
an indication that women may depend more on their partners’ income than men
do. Hence, women might be more affected by their partners’ job insecurity. This
descriptive difference is in line with the classical male breadwinner model. In this
model, men are the sole/ main income earner of a household.7 This concept is
important for labor market analyses in Germany as the country is well-known for
a rather weak female labor market participation – especially when considering
that the oldest cohorts in our sample are born in the 1930s/1940s.
4.4 Results
Beginning with the estimation results of the model specification as shown in Equa-
tion 4.1, this section proceeds by providing results of further specifications includ-
ing individual fixed effects, the lagged dependent variable and proxy the subjec-
tive insecurity by staff reductions in the company.
6Note, this finding is based on a sample including non-working spouses and cannot be seen from
table 4.1. The sample will be used in later regressions.
7For an overview of the development of this theory, see e.g. Lewis (2001).
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Table 4.2: MCS Regressions - Baseline OLS
OLS Pooled OLS Female OLS Male
Fear of UE Y/N -2.873∗∗∗ -2.715∗∗∗ -3.031∗∗∗
(0.133) (0.200) (0.187)
Partner: Fear of UE Y/N -1.029∗∗∗ -0.970∗∗∗ -1.051∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.205) (0.184)
Female -1.880∗∗∗ – –
(0.179)
Fulltime Y/N -0.832∗∗∗ -0.862∗∗∗ -0.760∗∗
(0.191) (0.250) (0.305)
Fulltime Experience 0.039∗∗∗ 0.031∗ 0.059∗∗
(0.014) (0.017) (0.029)
Tenure -0.018∗∗ -0.016 -0.022∗
(0.009) (0.015) (0.012)
SC Yes Yes Yes
SC Partner Yes Yes Yes
SC Household Yes Yes Yes
Years Yes Yes Yes
N 27081 13473 13608
Note: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP for the years 2002, 2004, 2008, 2010 and 2012. ∗∗∗
p<0.01; ∗∗ p<0.5; ∗ p<0.1. Standard errors (clustered on household-level) in parentheses. Full
regression output is presented in Table A4.6.
4.4.1 Main Results
Table 4.2 shows the baseline OLS results for the pooled as well as sex-split estima-
tions.
As can be seen from Column 1, the coefficient estimate of the own fear of unem-
ployment is large and statistically highly significant in the pooled sample. The
coefficient for the variable of main interest, partner’s fear of unemployment, ex-
hibits the expected negative sign and is highly significant as well, indicating that
partner’s perceived job insecurity has negative spillover effects on own mental
health. Comparing the coefficients of own fear of unemployment and one’s part-
ner’s fear of unemployment, the latter one is about two thirds smaller. Neverthe-
less, the coefficient is still considerably large with -1.029, which translates to more
than 10% of a standard deviation of the dependent variable. To obtain a more
comprehensive understanding of the underlying effects, Table 4.2 also reports the
estimation results for the sex-split samples. Columns 2 and 3, respectively, refer
to the subsamples of women and men whose spouse suffers from job insecurity.8
8Same-sex couples are not regarded here as their number is too low for a meaningful analysis in
our data.
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Table 4.3: Fixed Effects - Controlling for Own Fear of UE
FE Pooled FE Female FE Male
Fear of UE Y/N -1.145∗∗∗ -0.965∗∗∗ -1.351∗∗∗
(0.185) (0.260) (0.256)
Partner: Fear of UE Y/N -0.360∗∗ -0.463∗ -0.265
(0.183) (0.279) (0.242)
SC Yes Yes Yes
SC Partner Yes Yes Yes
SC Household Yes Yes Yes
Years Yes Yes Yes
N 27081 13473 13608
Note: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP for the years 2002, 2004, 2008, 2010 and 2012. ∗∗∗
p<0.01; ∗∗ p<0.5; ∗ p<0.1. Standard errors (clustered on household-level) in parentheses. Full
regression output is presented in Table A4.2.
Comparing the estimated coefficients across both subsamples reveals that in the
simple OLS specification, no considerable differences between the subsamples are
to be seen. The coefficients for the own fear of unemployment, as well as the part-
ner’s fear of unemployment are equally large across the pooled sample, as well as
the male and female subsamples.
OLS results are a first indication that individuals are influenced by their partner’s
job security. Nonetheless, these results can hardly show more than the direction of
correlations. To derive unbiased estimates, individual fixed effects are accounted
for in the next step.
Table 4.3 shows the results of the fixed effects regressions. As to be expected, the
coefficients for both, the own as well as the partner’s fear of unemployment be-
come considerably smaller. The point estimates for the own fear of unemployment
are about two thirds smaller than in the simple OLS case, for the partner’s fear of
unemployment, the coefficients are about half the size compared to the previous
estimates. For the own fear of unemployment, the point estimate for the female
subsample is smaller than for the male subsample (-0.965 and -1.351, respectively).
While the difference between the two coefficients is not statistically significant, it
is a further indication that the breadwinner model might be of some importance
when interpreting the results. As the own fear of unemployment enters the es-
timation, all individuals considered are employed by definition – otherwise they
could not be afraid of losing their jobs. Nevertheless, males might be the main in-
come earners in dual-income households – in our sample, conditioning on being
employed, women earn significantly lower wages than men do on average (e 1752
vs. e 3465). For the partner’s fear of unemployment, the point estimates show the
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expected pattern between the different subsamples. That is, the effect for women
is larger than for men. Although the point estimate for the male subsample is not
statistically significant anymore, overall there is still a considerable reaction to the
partner’s fear of unemployment to be seen.
While the FE specification accounts for possible bias due to assortative mating and
the incomparability of subjective health measures between persons, there might
still be a problem with reverse causality. Therefore, including the lagged depen-
dent variable in the regressions could help to minimize reverse causality problems
(Gupta and Kristensen, 2008). However, including a lagged dependent variable
into a fixed effects model may raise issues concerning the consistency of estimates.
We therefore exploit the bracketing property of fixed effects and lagged dependent
variable models to confirm our results (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). Following
this approach, estimates of the lagged dependent variable model and fixed effects
model should bound the true effect. This property is particularly helpful if the
range between estimates of both models is not large. The results of the OLS model
including the lagged dependent variable is shown in table 4.4. The coefficients
for partner’s fear of unemployment are highly significant and show the identi-
cal pattern as in previous models. Though, they are slightly larger. Comparing
the estimates to the original coefficients from the fixed effects model in table 4.3
gives a further hint that the negative effect of partner’s fear of unemployment on
own mental health is reasonable, as the bounding range between both estimates
is rather small. Own fear of unemployment still has a large and highly significant
Table 4.4: OLS - Controlling for Lagged Dependent Variable
OLS Pooled OLS Female OLS Male
Fear of UE Y/N -1.960∗∗∗ -1.831∗∗∗ -2.083∗∗∗
(0.125) (0.188) (0.174)
Partner: Fear of UE Y/N -0.554∗∗∗ -0.631∗∗∗ -0.463∗∗∗
(0.124) (0.190) (0.172)
MCSt−2 0.478∗∗∗ 0.473∗∗∗ 0.482∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.012) (0.012)
SC Yes Yes Yes
SC Partner Yes Yes Yes
SC Household Yes Yes Yes
Years Yes Yes Yes
N 18191 9046 9145
Note: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP for the years 2002, 2004, 2008, 2010 and 2012. ∗∗∗
p<0.01; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗ p<0.1. Standard errors (clustered on household-level) in parentheses. Full
regression output is presented in Table A4.3.
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coefficient. The main conclusion remains unchanged. Individuals are affected by
their partner’s fear of unemployment – although not as strong as they are affected
by their own fear.
4.4.2 Including Single-Income Households
So far, the analysis has entirely focused on a selected group of households: Dual-
income households. As we controlled not only for one’s partner’s job insecurity
but also for the own one, the sample had to consist of dual-earner households
by definition. However, there might be concerns related to own fear of unem-
ployment as a relevant confounder. Concentrating on a sample solely consisting
of dual-earner households by the inclusion of own job insecurity might not be
appropriate to answer our research questions – and especially to disentangle non-
monetary from monetary effects for different reasons. As descriptives on income
differences between men and women show, it is likely the case that in dual-income
households, one household member is the main income earner and the financial
situation of this household heavily depends on this person. However, this situ-
ation is far more distinct in single-earner households. Therefore, it can well be
assumed that not considering these households underestimates the total effect
because those households that are most strongly threatened by financial cuts if
one member loses her job are not even considered. Therefore, we include single-
income households in this part of the analysis.
To do so, own job insecurity cannot be controlled for. However, if an evaluation of
own situation is not included in the regression analysis, results are likely subject to
an omitted variable bias. We therefore include a different measure in the analysis:
A subjective evaluation of the own economic situation. In the SOEP, the sorrows
about the own economic situation are evaluated using the same scale used for
the evaluation of job insecurity. While it obviously has a different focus than the
question for the own job security, it still grabs financial concerns and can there-
fore prevent an omitted variable bias – and at the same time allows us to include
individuals that have no job insecurity as they are not active in the labor market.
Table 4.5 shows the results for the estimations including own economic worries
instead of own fear of job loss.
The coefficients are largely in line with the regressions controlling for the own
fear of unemployment. For the pooled sample, it is roughly 5 times (10 times)
smaller than having some (big) economic worries, but still considerable in size
and significant on the 5% level.
The subsample analysis shows, that the point estimate for partners’ job insecurity
is largest in the female sample, and statistically significant on the 5% level, while it
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Table 4.5: Fixed Effects - Controlling for Economic Worries
FE Pooled FE Female FE Male
Partner: Fear of UE Y/N -0.370∗∗ -0.502∗∗ -0.236
(0.154) (0.220) (0.208)
Big Econ. Worries -3.413∗∗∗ -3.099∗∗∗ -3.793∗∗∗
(0.253) (0.337) (0.353)
Some Econ. Worries -1.659∗∗∗ -1.639∗∗∗ -1.667∗∗∗
(0.172) (0.241) (0.236)
SC Yes Yes Yes
SC Partner Yes Yes Yes
SC Household Yes Yes Yes
Years Yes Yes Yes
N 38865 20890 17975
Note: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP for the years 2002, 2004, 2008, 2010 and 2012. ∗∗∗
p<0.01; ∗∗ p<0.5; ∗ p<0.1. Standard errors (clustered on household-level) in parentheses. Full
regression output is presented in Table A4.4.
is only half as large in the male sample and insignificant. While the coefficients for
males and females cannot be told apart statistically, they give a hint at differences
in the perception of spousal worries concerning the labor market.
It does not come as a surprise that the coefficient for spousal job insecurity is by far
smaller than the coefficients for own financial worries – financial stability is the ba-
sis of individual’s way of life. Nonetheless, spouses’ worries concerning the labor
market play a role even above financial worries. The coefficients of partner’s fear
of unemployment can mainly be interpreted as an emotional channel. When con-
trolling for worries concerning the own economic situation, fear of financial losses
does not have an effect over this channel. It is rather that individuals feel with their
partners and their sorrows that has an effect here. A careful attempt to disentangle
monetary from non-monetary channels is done by rerunning the regressions nei-
ther including the own fear of job loss nor the own economic worries. Results are
shown in table A4.6. The coefficients for partner’s fear of unemployment sharply
increase. While perfectly disentangling monetary and non-monetary channels is
hardly possible in this setting, the difference can be carefully interpreted as the
fear of monetary losses.
4.4.3 Proxy-Variable Approach
The previous steps of the analysis have shown that results are qualitatively robust
over different specifications. Still, there might be a further problem: Subjective in-
formation are used as dependent variable as well as independent variable of main
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Table 4.6: MCS Regressions - Proxy: Staff Reductions
FE Pooled FE Female FE Male
Partner: Staff Reduction Y/N -0.279 -0.291 -0.252
(0.181) (0.245) (0.256)
Big Econ. Worries -3.475∗∗∗ -3.306∗∗∗ -3.687∗∗∗
(0.300) (0.404) (0.411)
Some Econ. Worries -1.641∗∗∗ -1.634∗∗∗ -1.643∗∗∗
(0.204) (0.288) (0.275)
SC Yes Yes Yes
SC Partner Yes Yes Yes
SC Household Yes Yes Yes
Years Yes Yes Yes
N 32254 17299 14955
Note: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP for the years 2002, 2004, 2008, 2010 and 2012. ∗∗∗
p<0.01; ∗∗ p<0.5; ∗ p<0.1. Standard errors (clustered on household-level) in parentheses. Full
regression output is presented in Table A4.5.
interest. The independent variable of main interest – the fear of unemployment of
partner 2 – and the dependent variable – the MCS of partner 1 – are taken from
two different individual questionnaires. Hence, common source bias is not sup-
posed to be a major concern. Furthermore, using individual fixed effects ensures
that only intra-individual differences are exploited and not inter-person differ-
ences. Still, we apply a further step in the analysis to make sure that results are
not systematically distorted by the subjectivity of information.
As a final robustness check, we use staff reductions in the previous year as a proxy
for spousal job insecurity. Obviously, the measures differ from each other: It is
well possible that individuals are afraid of losing their jobs although no one was
laid off in the previous year and others might be in secure jobs although others lost
their jobs in the same company. Still, these two variables are sufficiently correlated
to each other.9
As table 4.6 shows, using staff reduction as a proxy for subjective job insecurity
does not change the direction of results. While the point estimates for staff re-
duction are slightly smaller than for subjective job insecurity used in previous
regressions, the difference is not statistically significant. The point estimates in
subsamples are statistically insignificant, however, the signs of the point estimates
support the direction of results.
9Reichert and Tauchmann (2011) show that staff reductions are a strong instrument for fear of
unemployment.
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4.5 Conclusion
This paper investigates the influence of the fear of unemployment on the men-
tal health of spouses. In an empirical analysis on data from the German Socio-
Economic Panel, it can be shown that fear of unemployment has considerable and
statistically significant effects on partners’ mental health. Results are robust over
different samples and using the objective variable staff reduction as proxy for fear
of unemployment. While effects can be found for men whose partner is afraid of
losing her job as well as for females, whose partner is afraid of losing his job, there
is some indication that effects on the mental health of women are larger. This can
be explained by the male breadwinner model, which still plays an important role
in Germany, hence, males are the main income earner in the majority of house-
holds. Nevertheless, controlling for the own economic worries in addition to the
partner’s fear of unemployment shows that the male breadwinner model is not
the only explanation for stronger effects on female mental health but that women
also seem to be more susceptible to non-monetary influences.
All in all, results show a relevant, not yet studied facet of the adverse effects of un-
employment. That the negative consequences of unemployment are by far larger
than the financial loss – and not only affect the unemployed themselves but also
spill over to their families and partners – is well-known in the economic literature.
This paper, however, shows that even worries about the future possibility of losing
one’s job can have negative effects on spouses, which adds another dimension to
the unemployment discussion. This means that although a wide range of unem-
ployment consequences has been revealed, the full effect is still underestimated.
This finding is relevant for several reasons. First, and most obvious, it shows se-
rious negative health consequences, even for people who are not directly affected
by a negative treatment. To be precise, the effect is an indirect one for two reasons:
First, the analyzed treatment is not the loss of the job but only the fear of a possible
job loss. Second, it is not only the person afraid of losing their job who is directly
affected but also their partner. Furthermore, from a financial point of view, the
treatment of mental illnesses is one of the large components of health care costs in
Germany. While not any slight loss in mental wellbeing as reported by the MCS
will translate in rising health costs, as an overall driver of mental health it will in
sum lead to rising health care costs. Then, long-run effects on productivity can be
assumed. As results show, the effects of the fear of unemployment on partner’s
mental health do not only run over the channel of financial worries but also over
non-monetary channels.
A further possible channel that is beyond the scope of this analysis is the question
in how far children are also affected by the spillover effects shown here. As our
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results show, not only individuals affected by job insecurity suffer from this but
also their partners, it seems likely that their children are not fully detached.
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4.6 Appendix
Table A4.1: MCS Regressions - Baseline OLS
OLS Pooled OLS Female OLS Male
Fear of UE Y/N -2.873∗∗∗ -2.715∗∗∗ -3.031∗∗∗
(0.133) (0.200) (0.187)
Partner: Fear of UE Y/N -1.029∗∗∗ -0.970∗∗∗ -1.051∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.205) (0.184)
Female -1.880∗∗∗ – –
(0.179)
Age 0.007 -0.040 0.037
(0.018) (0.029) (0.035)
Education in Years -0.009 0.029 -0.015
(0.035) (0.060) (0.052)
Gross Income 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Partner: Age 0.005 0.043 -0.042
(0.019) (0.039) (0.027)
Partner: Education in Years -0.075∗∗ -0.050 -0.093∗
(0.034) (0.058) (0.053)
Partner: Gross Income 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Fulltime Y/N -0.832∗∗∗ -0.862∗∗∗ -0.760∗∗
(0.191) (0.250) (0.305)
Fulltime Experience 0.039∗∗∗ 0.031∗ 0.059∗∗
(0.014) (0.017) (0.029)
Tenure -0.018∗∗ -0.016 -0.022∗
(0.009) (0.015) (0.012)
Partner: Fulltime Y/N 0.085 0.899∗∗∗ -0.174
(0.189) (0.344) (0.228)
Partner: Fulltime Experience 0.019 0.026 0.024
(0.013) (0.031) (0.016)
Partner: Tenure -0.005 0.002 -0.018
(0.009) (0.013) (0.013)
Children in HH Y/N -0.286 -0.558∗∗ -0.139
(0.226) (0.280) (0.268)
# Persons in HH -0.100 -0.058 -0.181
(0.109) (0.138) (0.127)
Couple married Y/N 0.875∗∗∗ 0.914∗∗∗ 0.774∗∗
(0.252) (0.313) (0.305)
East Germany -0.348 -0.513∗ -0.074
(0.231) (0.284) (0.272)
Years Yes Yes Yes
N 27081 13473 13608
Note: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP for the years 2002, 2004,
2008, 2010 and 2012. ∗∗∗ p<0.01; ∗∗ p<0.5; ∗ p<0.1. Standard errors
(clustered on household-level) in parentheses.
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Table A4.2: Fixed Effects - Controlling for Own Fear of UE
FE Pooled FE Female FE Male
Fear of UE Y/N -1.145∗∗∗ -0.965∗∗∗ -1.351∗∗∗
(0.185) (0.260) (0.256)
Partner: Fear of UE Y/N -0.360∗∗ -0.463∗ -0.265
(0.183) (0.279) (0.242)
Age -0.130 -0.279 -0.154
(0.153) (0.187) (0.259)
Education in Years 0.744∗∗ 0.360 1.063∗∗
(0.345) (0.512) (0.450)
Gross Income 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Partner: Age 0.215 0.237 0.106
(0.147) (0.247) (0.211)
Partner: Education in Years 0.093 0.081 0.201
(0.266) (0.410) (0.343)
Partner: Gross Income 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Fulltime Y/N -0.781∗∗∗ -1.014∗∗∗ -0.370
(0.267) (0.348) (0.440)
Fulltime Experience -0.106∗ -0.100 0.029
(0.063) (0.078) (0.176)
Tenure -0.045∗ -0.062 -0.038
(0.027) (0.042) (0.035)
Partner: Fulltime Y/N 0.047 0.086 -0.001
(0.253) (0.463) (0.313)
Partner: Fulltime Experience -0.066 0.105 -0.118∗
(0.058) (0.169) (0.069)
Partner: Tenure -0.000 -0.011 0.008
(0.023) (0.030) (0.037)
Children in HH Y/N 0.128 -0.002 0.275
(0.324) (0.415) (0.403)
# Persons in HH -0.331∗ -0.119 -0.565∗∗
(0.200) (0.257) (0.241)
Couple married Y/N 0.436 0.554 0.406
(0.482) (0.670) (0.573)
East Germany 0.498 1.539 -0.412
(2.095) (2.400) (2.576)
Years Yes Yes Yes
N 27081 13473 13608
Note: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP for the years 2002, 2004,
2008, 2010 and 2012. ∗∗∗ p<0.01; ∗∗ p<0.5; ∗ p<0.1. Standard errors
(clustered on household-level) in parentheses.
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Table A4.3: OLS - Controlling for Lagged Dependent Variable
OLS Pooled OLS Female OLS Male
Fear of UE Y/N -1.960∗∗∗ -1.831∗∗∗ -2.083∗∗∗
(0.125) (0.188) (0.174)
Partner: Fear of UE Y/N -0.554∗∗∗ -0.631∗∗∗ -0.463∗∗∗
(0.124) (0.190) (0.172)
Female -0.957∗∗∗ – –
(0.156)
MCSt−2 0.478∗∗∗ 0.473∗∗∗ 0.482∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.012) (0.012)
Age -0.004 -0.033 0.018
(0.015) (0.023) (0.029)
Education in Years -0.008 0.039 -0.033
(0.028) (0.046) (0.042)
Gross Income 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Partner: Age 0.004 0.025 -0.022
(0.015) (0.032) (0.022)
Partner: Education in Years -0.057∗∗ -0.095∗∗ -0.013
(0.028) (0.046) (0.041)
Partner: Gross Income 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Partner: Fulltime Y/N -0.024 0.432 -0.123
(0.176) (0.330) (0.213)
Partner: Fulltime Experience 0.008 0.014 0.011
(0.011) (0.025) (0.012)
Partner: Tenure -0.005 -0.001 -0.014
(0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
Fulltime Y/N -0.897∗∗∗ -0.986∗∗∗ -0.796∗∗∗
(0.176) (0.230) (0.301)
Fulltime Experience 0.035∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗ 0.044∗
(0.011) (0.014) (0.023)
Tenure -0.021∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗ -0.019∗
(0.007) (0.011) (0.010)
Children in HH Y/N -0.237 -0.532∗∗ -0.044
(0.187) (0.244) (0.231)
# Persons in HH -0.037 0.059 -0.156
(0.086) (0.115) (0.105)
Couple married Y/N 0.393∗ 0.340 0.424
(0.212) (0.276) (0.271)
East Germany -0.011 -0.165 0.217
(0.172) (0.219) (0.210)
Years Yes Yes Yes
N 18191 9046 9145
Note: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP for the years 2002, 2004,
2008, 2010 and 2012. ∗∗∗ p<0.01; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗ p<0.1. Standard errors
(clustered on household-level) in parentheses.
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Table A4.4: Fixed Effects - Controlling for Economic Worries
FE Pooled FE Female FE Male
Partner: Fear of UE Y/N -0.370∗∗ -0.502∗∗ -0.236
(0.154) (0.220) (0.208)
Big Econ. Worries -3.413∗∗∗ -3.099∗∗∗ -3.793∗∗∗
(0.253) (0.337) (0.353)
Some Econ. Worries -1.659∗∗∗ -1.639∗∗∗ -1.667∗∗∗
(0.172) (0.241) (0.236)
Employed Y/N 0.009 -0.063 0.211
(0.262) (0.315) (0.495)
Age -0.111 -0.143 -0.107
(0.133) (0.198) (0.178)
Education in Years 0.610∗∗∗ 0.590∗∗ 0.630∗
(0.224) (0.288) (0.348)
Gross Income -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Partner: Age 0.080 -0.015 0.084
(0.135) (0.251) (0.177)
Partner: Education in Years 0.029 0.128 0.008
(0.216) (0.312) (0.284)
Partner: Gross Income 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Partner: Fulltime Y/N -0.079 -0.256 -0.019
(0.209) (0.353) (0.265)
Partner: Fulltime Experience -0.020 0.134 -0.092
(0.041) (0.143) (0.057)
Partner: Tenure 0.010 0.012 0.003
(0.019) (0.024) (0.031)
Children in HH Y/N 0.424∗ 0.390 0.495
(0.255) (0.321) (0.346)
# Persons in HH -0.346∗∗ -0.154 -0.656∗∗∗
(0.143) (0.177) (0.196)
Couple married Y/N 0.213 0.328 0.176
(0.391) (0.529) (0.500)
East Germany 1.004 1.246 0.715
(1.445) (1.680) (2.130)
Years Yes Yes Yes
N 38865 20890 17975
Note: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP for the years 2002, 2004,
2008, 2010 and 2012. ∗∗∗ p<0.01; ∗∗ p<0.5; ∗ p<0.1. Standard errors
(clustered on household-level) in parentheses.
91
Chapter 4: Fear of Unemployment
Table A4.5: MCS Regressions - Proxy: Staff Reductions
FE Pooled FE Female FE Male
Partner: Staff Reduction Y/N -0.279 -0.291 -0.252
(0.181) (0.245) (0.256)
Big Econ. Worries -3.475∗∗∗ -3.306∗∗∗ -3.687∗∗∗
(0.300) (0.404) (0.411)
Some Econ. Worries -1.641∗∗∗ -1.634∗∗∗ -1.643∗∗∗
(0.204) (0.288) (0.275)
Employed Y/N 0.051 -0.040 0.263
(0.315) (0.378) (0.591)
Age -0.129 -0.089 -0.162
(0.142) (0.207) (0.194)
Education in Years 0.569∗∗ 0.635∗ 0.469
(0.278) (0.338) (0.474)
Gross Income -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Partner: Age 0.096 -0.090 0.141
(0.148) (0.271) (0.196)
Partner: Education in Years 0.103 0.178 0.147
(0.242) (0.361) (0.315)
Partner: Gross Income 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Partner: Fulltime Y/N 0.104 0.018 0.082
(0.246) (0.422) (0.311)
Partner: Fulltime Experience -0.002 0.172 -0.065
(0.044) (0.145) (0.060)
Partner: Tenure 0.000 0.004 -0.015
(0.022) (0.027) (0.036)
Children in HH Y/N 0.245 0.346 0.143
(0.291) (0.370) (0.401)
# Persons in HH -0.265 -0.109 -0.535∗∗
(0.161) (0.201) (0.227)
Couple married Y/N 0.257 0.204 0.354
(0.471) (0.632) (0.586)
East Germany 0.658 0.981 0.211
(1.476) (1.668) (2.141)
Years Yes Yes Yes
N 32254 17299 14955
Note: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP for the years 2002, 2004,
2008, 2010 and 2012. ∗∗∗ p<0.01; ∗∗ p<0.5; ∗ p<0.1. Standard errors
(clustered on household-level) in parentheses.
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Table A4.6: Basic Fixed Effects Regressions
FE Pooled FE Female FE Male
Partner: Fear of UE Y/N -0.571∗∗∗ -0.714∗∗∗ -0.422∗∗
(0.154) (0.220) (0.209)
Employed Y/N 0.029 -0.068 0.296
(0.265) (0.318) (0.497)
Age -0.101 -0.137 -0.094
(0.137) (0.203) (0.184)
Education in Years 0.598∗∗∗ 0.573∗∗ 0.609∗
(0.223) (0.285) (0.351)
Gross Income -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Partner: Age 0.073 -0.023 0.074
(0.139) (0.256) (0.183)
Partner: Education in Years 0.068 0.154 0.070
(0.219) (0.316) (0.292)
Partner: Gross Income 0.000∗ 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Partner: Fulltime Y/N -0.039 -0.193 -0.008
(0.208) (0.352) (0.265)
Partner: Fulltime Experience -0.023 0.134 -0.085
(0.041) (0.144) (0.058)
Partner: Tenure 0.009 0.009 0.003
(0.019) (0.024) (0.032)
Children in HH Y/N 0.406 0.407 0.424
(0.256) (0.322) (0.348)
# Persons in HH -0.369∗∗ -0.181 -0.666∗∗∗
(0.144) (0.179) (0.198)
Couple married Y/N 0.236 0.438 0.064
(0.395) (0.535) (0.504)
East Germany 0.701 1.046 0.295
(1.453) (1.701) (2.114)
Years Yes Yes Yes
N 38940 20936 18004
Note: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP for the years 2002, 2004,
2008, 2010 and 2012. ∗∗∗ p<0.01; ∗∗ p<0.5; ∗ p<0.1. Standard errors
(clustered on household-level) in parentheses.
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Table A4.7: Fixed Effects - Controlling for Own Fear of UE
FE Pooled FE Female FE Male
Big Fear UE -2.188∗∗∗ -1.681∗∗∗ -2.703∗∗∗
(0.305) (0.443) (0.408)
Some Fear UE -0.984∗∗∗ -0.838∗∗∗ -1.166∗∗∗
(0.184) (0.260) (0.256)
Partner: Big Fear UE -0.265 -0.607 0.083
(0.283) (0.428) (0.385)
Partner: Some Fear UE -0.344∗ -0.428 -0.272
(0.185) (0.281) (0.245)
Age -0.136 -0.277 -0.190
(0.151) (0.188) (0.255)
Education in Years 0.750∗∗ 0.350 1.104∗∗
(0.345) (0.510) (0.455)
Gross Income 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Partner: Age 0.214 0.232 0.114
(0.145) (0.249) (0.207)
Partner: Education in Years 0.083 0.074 0.187
(0.262) (0.407) (0.337)
Partner: Gross Income 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Partner: Fulltime Y/N 0.038 0.050 0.015
(0.252) (0.463) (0.312)
Partner: Fulltime Experience -0.066 0.102 -0.116∗
(0.058) (0.170) (0.068)
Partner: Tenure -0.001 -0.011 0.006
(0.023) (0.030) (0.037)
Fulltime Y/N -0.809∗∗∗ -1.022∗∗∗ -0.443
(0.267) (0.348) (0.438)
Fulltime Experience -0.107∗ -0.102 0.049
(0.063) (0.078) (0.175)
Tenure -0.039 -0.057 -0.032
(0.026) (0.042) (0.034)
Children in HH Y/N 0.116 -0.018 0.287
(0.325) (0.415) (0.403)
# Persons in HH -0.337∗ -0.122 -0.575∗∗
(0.200) (0.257) (0.242)
Couple married Y/N 0.441 0.545 0.463
(0.480) (0.668) (0.571)
East Germany 0.582 1.635 -0.348
(2.099) (2.389) (2.569)
Years Yes Yes Yes
N 27081 13473 13608
Note: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP for the years 2002, 2004,
2008, 2010 and 2012. ∗∗∗ p<0.01; ∗∗ p<0.5; ∗ p<0.1. Standard errors
(clustered on household-level) in parentheses.
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5 How Do Consumers Choose Health
Insurance? An Experiment on
Heterogeneity in Attribute Tastes
and Risk Preferences
5.1 Introduction
Recent policy reforms in the U.S. and in Europe have been directed towards more
consumer choice (Cronqvist and Thaler, 2004; Coughlin et al., 2008; Thomson
et al., 2013). The underlying reason is that consumers can best express their needs
and preferences via their own choices. In the market for health insurance, effec-
tive consumer choice is supposed to stimulate price competition among health
insurers leading to lower prices and reduced health care expenditure as well as
to improved quality. A current example for stimulating consumer choice is the
mandatory introduction of health insurance exchanges at state level in the U.S. as
a consequence of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010. In these
health insurance exchanges individual consumers and small employers are given
the opportunity to compare various different plans on an online insurance market
platform. It is expected that 13 million people will use the exchanges for choosing
health insurance by 2015.1 Such a reform towards more consumer choice relies on
the fact that consumers choose health insurance efficiently.
A similar and well-studied reform is the Medicare Part D Prescription Drug plan
within the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 in the U.S. Having started in
2006, it gives seniors eligible to this plan access to a federally subsidized market
for private insurance contracts covering non-mandatory drug prescription. Re-
This paper is joint work with Nadja Kairies-Schwarz, Johanna Kokot and Markus Vomhof. We
thank William Greene, Jeannette Brosig-Koch, Erwin Amann, Jan Kleibrink, Franziska Brendel,
and Lisa Einhaus for valuable comments. All remaining errors are our own. Financial support
provided by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Research Foundation FOR-655)
and the Federal Ministry of Education and Research is gratefully acknowledged.
1Congressional Budget Office: Insurance Coverage Provisions of the Affordable Care Act - CBO’s
April 2014 Baseline.
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sults on the quality of choice from Medicare Part D show that many consumers
seem to make suboptimal choices (Abaluck and Gruber, 2011; McWilliams et al.,
2011; Heiss et al., 2013). This evidence is in contrast to the standard economic
theory where offering more contracts and full information should not make con-
sumers worse off. This distortion can be explained by the fact that health insur-
ance choices are complex due to the variety of different contracts available. Ev-
idence from laboratory experiments shows a negative relationship between the
number of contracts offered and decision quality. Schram and Sonnemans (2011)
and Besedeš et al. (2012a,b), for instance, show that the quality of choice decreases
with an increasing number of health insurance contracts available. Similar results
are found in other complex decision scenarios in the field (Iyengar and Kamenica,
2010; Sinaiko and Hirth, 2011). Nevertheless, simply reducing the number of con-
tracts would possibly neglect the fact that consumers differ in their preferences
for contract attributes (Besedeš et al., 2012c). In addition, suboptimal choices may
also arise from contract attributes, which are difficult to assess. The latter may be
deductibles and complementary insurance. Johnson et al. (2013) show for health
insurance exchanges that suboptimal choices even persist in a simplified scenario
and consequently find that deviations from the optimal contract cannot solely de-
pend on lacking financial literacy. However, the authors pay little attention to
explaining this, e.g. by individual risk preferences.
First attempts to reduce complexity while accounting for heterogeneity in prefer-
ences have been made in the health insurance exchanges in the U.S. Here, con-
sumers are first asked for individual characteristics and preferences for contract
attributes like deductibles. Then they are presented an individual selection of
contracts. Evidence from the laboratory and the field supports this approach by
demonstrating that individuals themselves use tastes in attributes to reduce com-
plexity. Besedeš et al. (2012a,b) and Ericson and Starc (2012) show that in com-
plex health insurance choices, consumers focus on salient contract attributes and
make use of heuristics like choosing the cheapest plan. This finding is in line with
a growing body of theoretical and empirical research from behavioral economics,
which proposes that when making complex decisions people act on heuristics (see,
e.g., Gilovich et al. (2002) or Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011) for overviews).
Asking consumers for preferences in attributes might thus be a good way to guide
them in reducing complexity while accounting for individual preferences. How-
ever, the existing evidence cannot make statements about whether using these
heuristics to reduce complexity actually helps people to find contracts which are
in line with their individual risk preferences and thus cannot make statements
about individual decision quality. While Ericson and Starc (2012) use field data
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from the Massachusetts health insurance exchanges and cannot account for in-
dividual risk preferences, Besedeš et al. (2012a,b) use a laboratory experiment,
but do not elicit them. To make statements about the success of individual pre-
selection mechanisms based on contract attributes, it is important to understand
how well heuristics actually match individual preferences.
Our objective is to analyze individual behavior in complex health insurance choice
decisions and to investigate its relationship with individual risk preferences. For
this, we use a controlled laboratory experiment with a sequential design. In the
first part of the experiment, similar to Schram and Sonnemans (2011), subjects
have to choose insurance in 14 different decision scenarios varying in the num-
ber of contracts available. Contracts mirror classic features of health insurance,
such as deductibles and complementary insurance. Similar to Abdellaoui et al.
(2007); Abdellaoui (2000), and Wakker and Deneffe (1996), we elicit individual
choice preferences according to Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) in the second
part of the experiment. In contrast to previous experimental studies, underlying
assumptions of standard Expected Utility Theory (EUT) risk preferences (Schram
and Sonnemans, 2011; Besedeš et al., 2012a), we explicitly elicit CPT preferences
as they have shown to explain heterogeneity in decisions under risk particularly
well. Bruhin et al. (2010), for example, demonstrate that only 20% of the popu-
lation shows EUT preferences, while the majority demonstrates significant devi-
ations from linear probability weighting which differ in strength and can be ex-
plained by Prospect Theory.2
Estimating a latent class model to account for heterogeneity in individual tastes
for contract attributes reveals five classes. Based on this, we infer distinct behav-
ioral strategies. Most subjects do not evaluate probabilities according to expected
payoff maximization (EPM) but assume the worst case and then minimize their
costs, i.e., they make use of minimax heuristics. Across classes, we find variations
of this strategy differing in the evaluation of certain contract attributes, which are
either important to the class members or which they neglect. We can thus give
valuable insights into the heterogeneity of tastes in contract attributes. Investi-
gating the relationship between the strategies and individual risk preferences, we
find that strategies seem to help consumers to choose contracts, which approxi-
mate individual risk preferences.3 Our results reveal valuable insights for policy
makers of how to achieve efficient consumer choice.
The proceedings of the paper are as follows. In Section 5.2, we describe the exper-
2See also Conte et al. (2011) finding heterogeneity in risk-aversion parameter and weighting func-
tion parameter for choices under risk. They also identify only 20% of the observations being
EUT types, while 80% can be captured by Rank Dependent EUT.
3This complementary relationship between CPT and decision rules is also found by Suter et al.
(2013).
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imental design. Section 5.3 describes the procedure. In section 5.4, we report our
results before we conclude in section 5.5.
5.2 Experimental Design
The experiment consists of two parts without any interaction between subjects.
The first part of the experiment captures subjects’ insurance choices in 14 individ-
ual decision situations varying in the degree of complexity. The second part serves
to determine risk preferences according to CPT for each subject. It contains 72 lot-
tery choices. The sequential design allows for two things. First, we can analyze
health insurance choice behavior with a special focus on underlying heterogeneity
in attribute tastes. Second, we can investigate the predictive power of individual
CPT preferences for health insurance choices and the relationship to behavioral
strategies.
5.2.1 Experimental Conditions
Health Insurance Choices
In each decision, subjects have to buy a health insurance contract. The decision
framework and contract attributes are modeled similarly to Schram and Sonne-
mans (2011). Decisions vary in the complexity, that is the number of contracts
available to choose from, ranging from 2 to 12. They occur in a sequence that is
randomly determined and the same across all sessions. To buy a health insurance
contract, subjects have to bear costs in form of a premium. In addition, depend-
ing on the characteristics of the chosen contract, treatment costs in case of illness
are either paid by the subject, the health insurance or a combination of both. We
abstract from other monetary and non-monetary costs that may go along with an
illness, such as missing wages or pain. Contracts vary in their attributes, i.e., their
premium, complementary insurance for certain illnesses, and deductibles. In to-
tal, there are 5 illnesses A, B, C, D, and E, each of which can occur with a certain
probability that remains unchanged across all decisions. Thus, individuals face
risky decisions with potential losses.
Each health insurance contract consists of a basic and a complementary health in-
surance. While the basic insurance always covers treatment costs of illnesses A,
B, and C, the complementary insurance can additionally cover treatment costs of
illnesses D and E. Table 5.1 illustrates the contract attributes: the diseases covered
by basic and complementary insurance, their probabilities of occurrence and their
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Table 5.1: Basic Decision Situation
Disease Probability Treatment Costs
of Occurrence without Insurance
Basic Insurance
A 5 % 60
B 20 % 40
C 50 % 20
Complementary Insurance
D 1 % 2000
E 20 % 50
treatment costs without insurance.4 Moreover, we introduce deductibles of 0, 10,
or 30. In our scenario, a deductible refers to the three illnesses associated with the
basic insurance. In case of occurrence of illness A, B, C, or a combination of them, a
subject has to pay the accruing treatment costs up to the amount of the deductible;
the health insurance pays the amount in excess. Depending on the contract, a sub-
ject has to pay the premium, the potential treatment costs up to the amount of
the deductible under the basic insurance and the costs for the illnesses D and E if
not covered by complementary insurance. For the full set of the instructions, see
Appendix II.
By combining all attributes except for the premium, we obtain 12 unique health
insurance contracts. For each of these 12 contracts, we calculate the fair premium.
To induce a rank-ordering with respect to subjects’ expected payoff value - for ex-
pected payoff maximizing (EPM) decision makers some contracts are preferred to
others - we add a margin to the fair premium. We increase the variation in con-
tracts by reproducing the 12 unique contracts to 48 contracts and add a different
margin to each contract’s fair premium. This way, we obtain a different rank or-
dering in each of the four sets and a total number of 48 distinct contracts. The
contracts offered in a decision are randomly chosen from one of these four differ-
ent sets. Contracts that are dominated in their cumulative prospect value and the
EPM value are excluded.5
4Values of contract attributes are measured in Taler, our laboratory currency.
5To calculate ex-ante CPT values, we use the parameters from Tversky and Kahneman (1992). For
a detailed explanation of the contract design, see Appendix I.
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Lotteries
In the second part of the experiment, subjects face 72 lottery decisions modeled
according to Abdellaoui et al. (2007); Abdellaoui (2000), and Wakker and Deneffe
(1996). In each of the decisions, subjects are presented with two alternatives from
which they have to choose one. The two alternatives can either be two lotteries, or
one lottery and one fixed payoff. The values of the payoffs can be either positive
or negative. The first 24 payoffs are positive, the following 6 are mixed, and the
last 42 are negative. This composition of lotteries allows us to determine individ-
ual parameters for the value and weighting function.6
Robustness Check
To make sure that results are not driven by framing effects, we also design a neu-
tral experimental condition for the first part. The decision rounds are identical
except for the wording. While the health framing condition contains health insur-
ance contracts and treatment costs, the neutrally framed condition contains insur-
ance contracts and costs in case of damage. Although framing should not make a
difference for a rational decision maker, previous evidence has shown that there
may be context dependency.
5.2.2 Payment
All monetary amounts in the experiment are indicated in the experimental cur-
rency Taler. 1 Taler equals Euro 0.50. In order to avoid wealth or averaging effects,
we follow the standard of applying the random payment technique at the end of
the experiment.7
Similar to previous studies dealing with losses, we endow each participant with
an initial amount of money for each part. In experiments, this is a common ap-
proach to model losses. Etchart-Vincent and l’Haridon (2011) show that results do
not differ essentially between bearing losses from an endowment and real losses.
In particular, this means that participants integrate their endowment and evaluate
costs as losses.
For the first part, one health insurance decision is randomly chosen to be payment-
relevant. For each illness within this decision, it is then randomly determined
whether a subject suffers from it or not. Subjects’ total costs in this part are de-
tracted from the initial endowment of 2200 Taler. Afterwards, three decisions of
6Note that as we aim at analyzing decisions over losses, we focus on the negative lotteries to
benefit from more accuracy in the negative domain.
7Various research studies confirm that the random payment technique does not dilute the power
of the monetary incentives for non-complex choice tasks (Starmer and Sugden, 1991; Cubitt
et al., 1998; Laury, 2005; Baltussen et al., 2012).
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the second part are randomly chosen to be payment-relevant. One of these is
drawn from the positive, one from the mixed, and one from the negative lotteries.
Realized losses from the lotteries are subtracted from the sum of realized gains
and the initial endowment of 3500 Taler. Total earnings comprise subjects’ final
payments for the randomly determined decisions in both parts of the experiment.
5.3 Experimental Procedure
The computerized experiment was programmed with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007)
and conducted at elfe, the Essen Laboratory for Experimental Economics at the
University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany in 2014. Overall 113 students from the
University of Duisburg-Essen participated in five sessions (56 participants in the
health treatment, 57 participants in the general treatment. Participants were re-
cruited by the online recruiting system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).
The procedure was as follows: Upon arrival, subjects were randomly allocated to
their seats in the laboratory. They were given the corresponding instructions pre-
vious to each part of the experiment and were given time to read the instructions
and to ask comprehension questions. The latter were answered in private by the
same one experimenter across all treatments. To assure subjects’ understanding of
the decision task in each part, they had to answer a set of control questions. The
experiment did not start unless all subjects had answered the control questions
correctly. At the end of the experiment, subjects were asked to answer a short
questionnaire including demographics and questions directly linked to their be-
havior in the previous decisions. In both parts subjects had access to calculators.
In order to control for the use of them within the experiment, we asked about
whether they had utilized them in the subsequent questionnaire. Sessions lasted
for about 90 minutes. Subjects earned, on average, Euro 25.62.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Insurance Choice Behavior
Aggregate Behavior
To begin with, we show descriptive statistics for health insurance choice behavior
using the aggregated data. Specifically, we are interested in the contract attributes
that are important for consumers when choosing health insurance. For this, we
examine the potential losses of 2000 and 50 (illness D and E) as well as the de-
ductibles of 0, 10, and 30 as representative of the basic insurance (illness A, B,
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Table 5.2: Attribute Means for Actual Choices and Expected EPM Contracts
Mean
Conditional Decisions
Premium
Premium 83.35
(34.52)
Complementary Insurance
Loss of 2000 [1%] 0.66
(0.47)
Loss of 50 [20%] 0.75
(0.43)
Deductibles
Deductible 0 0.26
(0.44)
Deductible 10 0.21
(0.41)
Deductible 30 0.52
(0.50)
Note: Standard deviations are provided in parentheses. Probability of occur-
rence in square brackets.
and C). Table 5.2 summarizes the mean premium and shares of how often subjects
choose these attributes across all decisions. Note that due to our contract design, in
some decision rounds all contracts are equal regarding a specific attribute. There-
fore, we exclude these decisions and calculate means and standard deviations,
provided that subjects were given the opportunity to decide on whether or not an
attribute should be covered.
We observe that the coverage of the complementary insurance is high in actual
chosen contracts and thus appears to be important for consumers; the attributes
connected to the potential loss of 2000 and the potential loss of 50 are covered in
66% and 75% of all choices. Furthermore, we find a large percentage of actual
choices including a deductible of 30 (52%). Fewer choices contain contracts in-
cluding no deductible (26%) and a deductible of 10 (21%). However, the analysis
based on averages of actual chosen attributes is rather limited since we expect het-
erogeneity in attribute tastes.
Latent Class Logit Model (LC-logit)
To investigate individual choice behavior and to assess heterogeneity in attribute
tastes, we apply a model that is capable of providing insights in the underlying
preference structure in our sample. The latent class logit (LC-logit) model al-
lows us to identify differences in tastes across individuals. It is widely used in
health economics applications to identify heterogeneity (Deb and Trivedi, 2002;
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Bago d’Uva, 2005, 2006; Bago d’Uva and Jones, 2009; Greene et al., 2014; Lagarde,
2013). The model estimates a probability of belonging to some (homogenous) class
in the sample. These classes are generated endogenously based on underlying in-
dividual characteristics with the aim of achieving within-class homogeneity. In
our case, the tastes in contract attributes - premium, insurance of the possible
losses of 2000 and 50, and deductibles - are considered. Furthermore, we con-
trol for possible treatment effects by using a binary indicator of treatment.
Following Pacifico and Yoo (2012), we use the stata routine LC-logit to estimate
the model. In this model, each of N respondents in the experiment faces J alter-
natives (contracts) in each of the D health insurance choice decisions. A binary
choice indicator, ynjd is created, which becomes 1 if the respondent n chooses j in
decision d. xnjd contains the contract specific attributes. Furthermore, respondents
are characterized by zn, which includes a constant and variables that are invariant
across decisions for the respondents, e.g. the binary indicator for treatment.
As indicated, the model assumes that there is a number of classes C of different at-
tribute tastes, β = β1, β2, . . . βC. Under the condition that respondent n is in class
c, the probability of n′s choice sequence can be written as a product of conditional
logit formulas.
Pn(βc) =
D
∏
d=1
J
∏
j=1
(
exp(βcxnjd)
∑Jk=1 exp(βcxnkd)
)ynjd
(5.1)
As we do not know which class a respondent belongs to, we must specify the un-
conditional likelihood of respondent n’s choices, i.e. the weighted average of the
previous equation over all classes. The weight for a specific class c is the fraction
of the population and modeled as fractional multinomial logit:
picn(θ) =
exp(θczn)
1 +∑C−1l=1 exp(θlzn)
(5.2)
where θ = (θ1, θ2, . . . , θ(C−1)) are class membership model parameters.8 Summing
up the log unconditional likelihood of each respondent yields the sample log like-
lihood.
ln L(β, θ) =
N
∑
n=1
ln
C
∑
c=1
picn(θ)Pn(βc) (5.3)
The optimal number of homogenous classes is identified by applying the Bayesian
Information Criterion (BIC). In our analysis, the BIC suggests to define five groups.
The LC-logit model estimates coefficients for each of the five classes. The coeffi-
8θC is normalized to zero for identification.
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cients can then be used to determine the average in-class willingness to pay (WTP)
for certain attributes. Thus, the model allows us to analyze heterogeneity by con-
sidering distinct WTP-values for each single class, and hence to infer different
behavioral types on basis of their attribute preferences, while not neglecting the
complexity of the task itself.
Heterogeneity in Individual Insurance Choice Behavior
As previously indicated, classes are built based on underlying parameters. We
include contract attributes and control for framing effects. Table 5.3 presents the
estimation results.
Table 5.3: Latent Class Logit Model - Results
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Class 5
Premium 0.134∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.011)
Potential loss of 2000 −0.573 −3.905∗∗∗ −2.177∗∗∗ −2.645∗∗∗ −1.681∗∗∗
(0.412) (0.344) (0.239) (0.224) (0.366)
Potential loss of 50 −4.654∗∗∗ −4.068∗∗∗ −2.590∗∗∗ −1.140∗∗∗ −0.683∗∗
(0.705) (0.570) (0.257) (0.268) (0.345)
Deductible of 10 −2.307∗∗∗ −0.436∗∗ −0.680∗∗∗ 0.049 −0.883∗∗∗
(0.462) (0.204) (0.228) (0.204) (0.340)
Deductible of 30 −4.771∗∗∗ −1.226∗∗∗ −1.766∗∗∗ −0.517∗∗ −2.086∗∗∗
(0.870) (0.224) (0.366) (0.232) (0.437)
Health Framing −0.104 −0.233 0.597 −0.534
(0.892) (0.682) (0.795) (0.783)
Class share 0.097 0.361 0.196 0.231 0.116
Note: Latent class logit model estimated using Stata’s lclogit command. N= 10.170. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *
p < 0.1. Standard errors calculated by gllamm and provided in parentheses.
The coefficients of health framing are not significantly different from zero. The
LC-logit identifies five classes with different class sizes. Class 1 makes up 9.7% of
all subjects, classes 2 to 5 include 36.1%, 19.6%, 23.1%, and 11.6% of all subjects, re-
spectively. However, interpreting the results from the LC-logit model is tedious as
we cannot directly quantify effects. Hence, we calculate the WTP, i.e. the amount
(in Taler) a subject is willing to forgo to insure a certain attribute. In particular, the
WTP is calculated for the attributes within each class by dividing each attribute’s
coefficient by the coefficient of the premium, i.e. ŴTPi = βˆi/βˆpremium. We find a con-
siderable degree of heterogeneity as the WTP differs substantially across the five
classes. Moreover, we observe that while some WTP values exceed the WTP value
of a risk-neutral expected payoff maximizing decision maker (certainty equiva-
lent, CE), others are substantially lower.
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Exploiting heterogeneity in tastes for contract attributes, we investigate health in-
surance choice behavior on class level. For this, we account for the fact that health
insurance choices in our scenario are difficult with respect to evaluating attributes
like complementary insurance covering large losses occurring with small proba-
bilities, or deductibles implying conditional probabilities. As previous evidence
suggests that people use simplifying strategies, or heuristics, in such complex de-
cision scenarios we account for behavioral strategies.9
For decisions under risk, two types of strategies seem reasonable, expected payoff
maximization (EPM) and minimax. To distinguish between EPM and minimax we
compare the WTP values with the certainty equivalent (CE). WTP values for each
class and the CE are provided in Table 5.4. Individuals following EPM integrate
probabilities and choose the contract that provides the highest expected payoff.
WTP values for a class that behave according the EPM strategy should not sub-
stantially differ from the CE. Quite differently, the pure minimax players ignore
information on all probabilities and choose a contract that induces the highest
outcome in the worst situation, i.e. the lowest treatment costs in case of suffering
from all illnesses. This strategy is widely found in the literature and is similar to
the priority heuristic (Brandstätter et al., 2006) as well as to the minimax regret
theory (Savage, 1954; Braun and Muermann, 2004; Hayashi, 2008).10 Comparing
WTP values with the CE reveals that there is only a small difference for class 5.11
Thus, class 5 seems to integrate probabilities and can be classified as using an EPM
strategy. All other classes differ in their WTP values from the CE for a majority of
attributes and seem not to integrate probabilities.
Moreover, previous literature has shown that people focus on salient attributes
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1973; Hensher, 2006). In our scenario, especially the
attribute of potential loss of 2000 occurring with a 1% probability is a salient at-
tribute, as it is by far the biggest stake. This might affect the minimax strategy in
three ways. First, the combination of the potential loss of 2000 and the simplicity to
evaluate it with 1% probability may make it more prone to being evaluated prop-
erly compared to other attributes. We might thus expect a minimax strategy where
the 2000 is highly integrated. Furthermore, concerning this attribute, Tversky and
Kahneman (1992) note that “... the (weighting) function is not well-behaved near
the endpoints, and very small probabilities can be either greatly overweighted or
neglected altogether” (p. 303). According to this, one could find WTP values for
this attribute to be either extremely high, or extremely low. Extremely high WTP
9See, e.g. Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011) for an overview.
10In general, the priority heuristic simplifies to minimax if no aspiration level is assumed and the
preliminary step is omitted, where differences in the expected values are observed.
11The CE values are within the 5% confidence interval.
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Table 5.4: Willingness to Pay for Attributes by Class
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Class 5 CE
N = 11 N = 44 N = 21 N = 24 N = 13 (EPM)
Complement. Ins.
Loss of 2000
(1%)
4.27 89.55 35.16 89.79 17.07 20
[-1.58, 10.13] [78.14, 100.97] [26.16, 44.16] [68.92, 110.67] [11.22, 22.92]
Loss of 50 (20%) 34.73 93.29 41.82 38.69 6.93 10[29.38, 40.09] [73.84, 112.73] [32.50, 51.15] [21.41, 55.98] [0.79, 13.08]
Deductibles
Deductible 10 17.22 9.99 10.98 -1.67 8.96 6.2[10.78, 23.66] [0.59, 19.39] [3.16, 18.80] [-15.27, 11.94] [2.27, 15.65]
Deductible 30 35.60 28.11 28.52 17.55 21.17 14.8[28.60, 42.60] [20.07, 36.15] [20.72, 36.32] [4.24, 30.87] [14.32, 28.03]
Note: 5% confidence intervals are provided in square brackets.
values would correspond to the pure minimax strategy where the probability of
1% is greatly overweighted and thus, the attribute is covered in any case. The im-
portance of this strategy is also underlined by the fact that on aggregate, 66% of
subjects choose contracts covering the potential loss of 2000. In contrast, extremely
low WTP values of the salient attribute would indicate that the probability of 1% is
greatly underweighted and thus, the attribute is ignored and not part of outcome
calculation. In a theoretical approach by Etner and Jeleva (2014) these types are
called fatalists, as they would invest less in insurance than EPM types.
For class 1, we find that subjects do not integrate probabilities and ignore the
salient attribute of potential loss of 2000 as the WTP is small and insignificant.
Thus, class 1 follows a minimax strategy ignoring the potential loss of 2000 - the
fatalist minimax strategy. This strategy highly relates to observations made by Kun-
reuther and Pauly (2014), who stress the tendency to ignore low-probability events
with high-consequences in health insurance markets. We also find the opposite,
respondents who overweight this small probability in classes 2 and 4, where the
WTP values substantially exceed the CE. For class 2 all WTP values exceed the CE
as participants use a minimax strategy that covers the potential loss of 2000 - pure
minimax strategy. Class 4 differs from class 2 by ignoring the deductible of 10 -the
minimax ignoring deductible 10 strategy. Class 3 seems to be a hybrid class in the
sense that participants seem to evaluate the salient attribute of 2000 properly but
ignore all other probabilities - the moderate minimax strategy.
To quantify the predictive power of the five behavioral strategies, Table 5.5 shows
the average fraction of observed choices in accordance with the strategies for the
corresponding class over all decisions. Note that in some decisions, one contract
may be favored by several strategies.12 Table 5.5 shows that strategies have a high
12Double counting cannot be totally avoided a priori since strategies are inferred endogenously.
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Table 5.5: Percentages of Choices in Accordance with Behavioral Strategies
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Class 5
N = 11 N = 44 N = 21 N = 24 N = 13
Fatalist
minimax
Pure
minimax
Moderate
minimax
Minimax
ignoring
deductible
10
EPM
Fatalist
minimax 0.75 0.24 0.50 0.19 0.40
Pure minimax 0.16 0.79 0.42 0.54 0.08
Moderate
minimax 0.67 0.48 0.62 0.34 0.42
Minimax
ignoring
deductible 10
0.16 0.77 0.40 0.57 0.08
EPM 0.57 0.16 0.39 0.23 0.79
explanation power within their respective class.13
As types of minimax strategies are closely interrelated, we find similar fractions
for some of them across the respective classes. In particular, following minimax
or minimax ignoring deductible 10 are closely related. Also, fatalist minimax and
moderate minimax are related to each other and to the EPM strategy to some ex-
tent. Considering the whole sample, 53% of all choices can be explained by mini-
max heuristics. In comparison, 42% of all actual choices are in line with expected
payoff maximization behavior.
5.4.2 Individual Choice Behavior and CPT-Risk Preferences
We now turn to investigating the relationship between individual choice behavior
and Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT). For this, we use the individual CPT risk
preferences elicited in the lottery part of the experiment to calculate subjects’ indi-
vidual weighting and value functions. Based on these functions, we compute the
individual CPT values for each available contract in the health insurance choice
part. This allows an individual rank ordering of contracts with respect to each
subject’s CPT-values, whereby the individual contract with the highest CPT-value
is captured by rank 1. This rank order serves as a quality benchmark. The contract
13In the vast majority off all decisions, a behavioral strategy predicts a unique contract. Just in two
decisions, two strategies, moderate minimax and EPM, predict more than one single contract.
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Table 5.6: Fixed Effects Regression Model - Behavioral Strategies and Complexity
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Class 5
N = 11 N = 44 N = 21 N = 24 N = 13
Number of contracts 0.206
∗∗∗
(0.0546)
0.129∗∗∗
(0.0108)
0.168∗∗∗
(0.0278)
0.186∗∗∗
(0.0286)
0.101∗∗∗
(0.0325)
Fatalist minimax 0.576(0.421)
Pure minimax -0.919
∗∗∗
(0.202)
Moderate minimax -0.358(0.214)
Minimax ignoring
deductible 10
-0.645∗∗∗
(0.174)
EPM -0.721
∗∗∗
(0.216)
N 154 616 294 336 182
R2 0.166 0.252 0.116 0.230 0.096
Note: Standard errors (clustered on individual level) in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
expected by CPT (rank 1) is chosen in 41.7% of all decisions. Participants opt for
the best or the second best rank in the majority of all choices (71.9%). Thus, CPT
preferences can explain individual health insurance choices to a substantial extent.
While CPT apparently has considerable predictive power for health insurance
choices on its own, we aim at investigating the relationship between CPT-preferences,
behavioral strategies, and complexity. Therefore, we use panel regression tech-
niques to explain the rank of the chosen contract by the assigned behavioral strate-
gies and the number of contracts on class level. We interpret the decision rounds
as quasi panel and use individual fixed effects to account for decision-invariant
individual heterogeneity. The strategies assigned to each class enter as dummy
variable that equals 1 if the respondent chooses the contract expected by the as-
signed strategy. Table 5.6 reports the coefficients on the rank according to CPT.
We find that increasing the number of contracts has a highly significant positive ef-
fect on the rank across all classes, i.e., it increases deviation from the contract with
the highest CPT value. This result confirms the expected negative relationship be-
tween number of contracts and decision quality. Acting on the assigned strategy
has a negative coefficient, which translates into a decrease in deviation, except for
class 1. For class 3, the point estimate is negative and insignificant. That is, acting
in line with strategies predominantly enables individuals to come closer to their
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CPT-optimal contract. Thus, behavioral strategies serve well as approximations
of CPT behavior (or vice versa) in decision situations where certain attributes are
difficult to evaluate.
5.4.3 Robustness Checks
Finally, we control for the robustness of our results with respect to the framing,
gender and the use of a calculator using two-sided Mann Whitney tests. First,
we test for differences in the distribution of actual choices between the health and
the neutral experimental condition. In 12 of 14 decisions, we do not find any sig-
nificant difference in choice making behavior (p = 0.128). In 2 decisions a weak
significant difference is observed (p = 0.077). Furthermore, we control for differ-
ences in choice making behavior by gender and find no significant difference (p
= 0.157). Last, we control for using a calculator. A two-sided Mann Whitney test
reveals only in 2 of 14 decisions significant differences in choice making between
subjects using a calculator and subjects that do not use one (p = 0.03).
5.5 Conclusion
In this study, we conduct a laboratory experiment with a sequential design to
investigate the relationship between behavioral strategies and CPT risk prefer-
ences. Using a latent class model, we identify five classes demonstrating sub-
stantial heterogeneity in subjects’ preferences for contract attributes. From this,
we infer distinct behavioral strategies. In line with Bruhin et al. (2010), we find
that a minority of subjects of about 15% are rational EPM decision makers while
the majority show variations of minimax heuristics. Investigating the relation-
ship of insurance choice behavior and CPT risk preferences, we find that indi-
vidual CPT risk preferences perform well in predicting health insurance choices.
In particular, CPT predicts the chosen contract for roughly 40%; considering first
and second best contracts, CPT’s predictive power even accounts to 70%. Ana-
lyzing the relationship between strategies and individual risk preferences shows
that when increasing complexity, strategies help individuals to approximate their
individual CPT preferences. Thus, we provide novel evidence to the strand of
research of investigating individual health insurance choice behavior and heuris-
tics, such as Ericson and Starc (2012) and Besedeš et al. (2012a,b). However, we
cannot say whether subjects were not able to optimize by maximizing expected
payoffs due to a lack of knowledge, or whether they were simply unwilling to do
so as they prefer heuristics. Future research should asses this. Our results also
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give insights to policy makers for how to achieve efficient consumer choice. In the
light of substantial heterogeneity in tastes for attributes, market places should ac-
knowledge offering various contract options. While previous evidence has shown
that increasing the number of health insurance contracts offered leads to worse
decision quality (Schram and Sonnemans, 2011; Besedeš et al., 2012a,b), we find
that individuals are heterogeneous in their tastes for contract attributes and ap-
ply simplifying strategies helping them to approximate their individual CPT risk
preferences. Our results suggest that when setting rules in the insurance sector
to decrease complexity, one should be careful not to restrict the number of con-
tracts too much in order to account for the heterogeneity in tastes for contract
attributes. Moreover, our results shed light on contract pre-selection mechanisms
based on individual preferences for contract attributes as in the U.S. health in-
surance exchanges. According to our results, asking for preferences in certain
contract attributes first, and then only showing an individual pre-selection, might
be a successful way to balance complexity and heterogeneity in preferences and
thus achieve efficient consumer choice. The latter can then stimulate competition
among health insurance providers and reduce costs in the health care market.
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5.6 Appendix
5.6.1 Appendix I: Design of Contracts and Decisions
We generate four different sets of contracts (I, II, III, IV) which differ in rank or-
dering according to expected payoff maximization (EPM). This gives 48 possible
contracts in total. Table A5.1 provides an overview of all possible contracts orga-
nized in the four sets. Set IV serves as control and is designed to have identical
EPM values for each of the 12 contracts under consideration.14 To avoid partici-
pants to remember contracts from the previous decision, all contracts offered in a
decision round are selected from one of these sets; the actual set alternates between
the decision rounds. Table A5.2 provides an overview of all 14 decision situations
ordered according to the number of available contracts to choose from. The ta-
ble provides information about the contract characteristics of a decision situation.
In addition, contracts predicted by the behavioral strategies and most frequently
chosen contracts are provided. Furthermore, the most frequently predicted con-
tracts based on individual Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) values elicited in
the lottery part are presented. For a comparison CPT values from Tversky and
Kahneman (1992) are given. Note that the labels of contracts refer to the columns
in Table A5.1. For example, the most frequent chosen contract in the decision of-
fering 9 available options refers to column 4 in Table A5.1.
5.6.2 Appendix II: Instructions and Comprehension Questions
Note that instructions for the first part of the experiment are provided jointly for
the non-health and the health framing. Words that differ in the health framing
instructions are indicated in brackets.
Welcome to the Experiment!
Preliminary Remarks
You are participating in a study of choice behavior for the purposes of experimen-
tal economic research. During the experiment you and the other participants are
asked to take decisions. In doing so, you can earn money. The resulting amount
is depending on your decisions. After finishing the experiment, your total earn-
ings will be converted into Euro and paid cash. For this experiment all amounts
are designated as Taler, the laboratory currency, where 100 Taler translate to 0.50
14The EPM values are not strictly equal, since we round the premiums in order to generate inte-
gers.
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Euro. The experiment will take around 135 minutes and consists of two parts. Be-
fore each of the two parts, you will receive detailed instructions. Note, that neither
your decisions made in part one nor the decisions made in part two will have an
influence for the respective other part. Moreover, there are neither right nor wrong
answers in any of the two parts.
Part I
Please read the following instructions carefully. Approximately five minutes after
handing out the instructions, we will approach you to answer any unresolved is-
sues. In case you have any questions along the experiment, please feel free to call
attention for yourself by raising your hand. We will come to your seat to answer
open questions. For this part you will be endowed with 2200 Taler.
Description of Decision-Rounds
As a [health] insurance holder, you have to choose one [health] insurance contract
in each of the 14 decision rounds. Depending on the round, the number of of-
fered contracts may vary between 2 and 12. By purchasing a [health] insurance
contract you have to pay a premium, for which you are entitled to receive [health]
insurance benefits in case of [illness] damage. Further, [treatment] costs may be
occasioned in case of [illness] damage. Depending on the benefits of the chosen
contract, [treatment] costs are borne by either your [health] insurance or yourself.
[Health] Insurance Contracts
The [health] insurance contracts may differ in both, the height of the premium
and the benefits, which you are entitled to receive from your insurance in case of
[illness] damage. Thereby the premium corresponds to the price you pay for the
respective [health] insurance contract. Each contract offers specific benefits, i.e.
coverage of certain [treatment-] damage-costs in case of [illness] damage. The dif-
ferent [health] insurance contracts from which you can choose are displayed in a
table on your screen. The premiums for the particular contracts can be seen from
the identically named row. An exemplary decision screen, without any entries, is
depicted on the next page.
[Illnesses] Damages
In total [you can catch five illnesses] there are five possible damages, denoted A, B,
C, D, and E. Each [disease] damage occurs with a probability, which is unchanged
along the decision rounds. Whether [you catch the disease] a damage occurs in
a round depends on these probabilities. From the respective columns on your
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screen, you can see both, the [illness] damage as well as the associated probability.
It is possible [to catch] that none or even more than one [disease] damage occurs
in a round. After finishing the experiment one decision round is determined as be-
ing relevant for payment. Subsequently, a random number generator determines
for each [disease] damage whether [you fall ill] it occurs in the round, which has
been ascertained as being payment relevant priory. Therefore, the random num-
ber generator draws an equally probable number between 1 and 100 for each of
the five [diseases] damages. If the drawn number is smaller or equal to the as-
sociated probability of [catching the disease] occurrence, [you fall ill] the damage
occurs in this round. If the drawn number is larger than the associated probability
of the [disease] damage, [you will not fall ill] it does not occur. Whether or not
[you caught a disease] a damage occurs in the round, which is relevant for pay-
ment will be displayed on your screen after the second part of the experiment.
Benefits in Case of Damage [Illness]
When [you catch a disease] a damage occurs, it occasions [treatment] costs. As
shown in the exemplary decision screen, [treatment] costs of the [diseases] dam-
ages in case of [illness] damage can be read off the column titled “Costs without
Insurance”. By paying your premium you are entitled to receive [health] insur-
ance benefits in case of [illness] damage. Each [health] insurance contract consists
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of a basic and a complementary insurance: [Diseases] Damages A, B and C are
covered by basic insurance in all contracts. That is, [treatment] costs in case of
[illness] damage are incurred by the health insurance. As complementary insur-
ance, some contracts offer coverage of [treatment] costs for [diseases] damages D
and E. Additionally, some [health] insurance contracts include deductibles for the
[treatment] costs from the [diseases] damages covered by basic insurance. A de-
ductible means that you as an insurance holder have to bear the [treatment] costs
for the basically insured [diseases] damages A, B and C up to the amount of the
deductible in case of [illness] damage. If the sum of [treatment] costs for [diseases]
damages A, B and C is larger than the amount of the deductible, you only have to
pay treatment costs up to the amount of the deductible. If the sum of [treatment]
costs is smaller than the deductible, you bear the complete costs. You find the de-
ductible corresponding to the [health] insurance contract in the identically named
row. The total costs that you have to bear per decision round is determined as
the sum of the premium of your chosen contract, possible deductibles and [treat-
ment] costs for non-insured [diseases] damages in case of [illness] damage. The
total costs for the round which is relevant for payment will be displayed on your
screen after the second part of the experiment.
Earnings
After the experiment a random number generator draws one from the 14 deci-
sion rounds, which is relevant for payment. For this decision round you have
to pay for the premium of your chosen contract, possible deductibles and [treat-
ment] costs for non-insured [diseases] damages using your 2200 Taler. That is, all
occurring costs of your chosen [health] insurance contract and [possibly caught
diseases] possible damages of this round are added up. These total costs are then
subtracted from your 2200 Taler. The residual will be paid to you cash after the
experiment together with your earnings from the second part of the experiment.
Comprehension Questions
Prior to the decision rounds, we would like to ask you to answer six compre-
hension questions. These comprehension questions are intended to facilitate your
familiarization with the decision situation. Please note that comprehension ques-
tions do not serve as guidance for the experiment. They are solely intended to
sharpen your mind with respect to the decision situations which come up along
the experiment. The entries that appear in the comprehensive questions are dif-
ferent from those in the experiment.
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Part II
Please read the following instructions carefully. Approximately five minutes after
handing out the instructions, we will approach you to answer any unresolved is-
sues. In case you have any questions along the experiment, please feel free to call
attention for yourself by raising your hand. We will come to your seat to answer
open questions. For this part you will be endowed with 3500 Taler.
Description of Decision Rounds
In this part of the experiment, we ask you to participate in 72 decision rounds. In
each of the 72 round, you will be shown two alternatives on your screen, alterna-
tive L on the left-hand side and alternative R on the right-hand side. Each time
you must choose the one alternative that you prefer. There are two possibilities of
how the alternatives are designed:
• First, both alternatives are lotteries. A lottery consists of two payoffs, whereat
one payoff is shaded red and the other payoff is shaded blue. Which one of
the two payoffs is drawn depends on probabilities of occurrence, which are
displayed on your screen.
• Second, one lottery and one safe payoff. A safe payoff is a single value,
which occurs with 100% probability and is shaded gray.
The payoff values may be positive or negative for both, lotteries and safe pay-
offs. The first 24 decision rounds include only positive payoff values. The sub-
sequent six decision rounds are mixed, i.e. they feature positive as well as neg-
ative payoff values. Afterwards, 42 decision rounds with only negative payoff
values are shown. Positive values translate to gains while negative values stand
for losses. The payoffs as well as the probabilities of occurrence may change along
the rounds.
Probabilities of Occurrence
To convey a sense of the probabilities of occurrence, they are illustrated as pie
chart between alternative L and alternative R on your screen. Thereby, the red
area corresponds to the probability that the red payoff is drawn. Analogous, the
probability for the blue payoff is depicted in the blue area. Additionally, the prob-
abilities are given as number on the lines of the respective payoffs. Safe payoffs
are safe and as such have a probability of 100%, if you choose this option.
Earnings
Subsequently to part two and after the draw for the payoffs in part I, a random
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number generator draws three of your chosen lotteries. These are relevant for
payment. Thereby, one lottery is randomly drawn from the 24 positive decision
rounds, one from the six mixed rounds and another one from the 42 negative de-
cision rounds. If the drawn lottery is not a safe payoff, another random number
generator determines for each lottery whether the red or the blue payoff occurs.
These ascertained payoffs are subtracted from your 3500 Taler, if negative and
added if positive. The result is your earning from part two. Your total earnings
from part one and part two of the experiment is the sum of your earnings from
both parts and is paid to you in cash after the second part of the experiment.
Comprehension Questions
Prior to the decision rounds, we would like to ask you to answer two compre-
hension questions. These comprehension questions are intended to facilitate your
familiarization with the decision situation. Please note that comprehension ques-
tions do not serve as a guidance for the experiment. They are solely intended to
sharpen your mind with respect to the decision situations which come up along
the experiment. The entries that appear in the comprehensive questions are dif-
ferent from those in the experiment.
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6 Conclusion
Rising health expenditure is a challenge for social insurance systems in many in-
dustrialized countries. This dissertation analyzes factors that all contribute to the
trend of increasing health expenditure but work over different channels. Chapters
2 and 4 investigate negative health effects of common personal circumstances in
industrialized societies. It is shown that the double burden of informal caregiving
and full-time work deteriorates both, mental and physical health. The reason may
lie in pressure imposed on caregivers that arises from two sides: (i) the pressure
to provide informal care and (ii) the pressure to offer full-time work on the labor
market to maintain financial stability. The conditions on labor markets also play a
decisive roll when analyzing spillover effects of the fear of becoming unemployed
in chapter 4. Both of these mechanisms do not only have in common that they
are not easily detected as they are hidden consequences of different underlying
conditions but also that there may be ways to prevent such adverse health effects
once they are detected. With respect to the labor market, one may think of poten-
tial measures that may help to counteract adverse effects found in chapters 2 and
4. For example, more flexible work arrangements may have the potential to de-
crease worries about job security since threatening unemployment spells might be
shortened. Further, it could improve possibilities to reconcile work and caregiving
by allowing flexible arrangements. Reforms in the care sector that try to mitigate
pressure on caregivers have already entered political debates in Germany during
the final phase of writing chapter 2. The ’First Act to Strengthen Long-term Care’
(Pflegestärkungsgesetz I) introduced short-time earnings-replacements to orga-
nize care and also increased benefits for care recipients. While these efforts may be
a first step, they are presumably not capable of mitigating pressure for providers
of informal long-term care. Hence, there may still be room for improvement with
respect to long-term caregivers. However, benefits of intended reform outcomes
must be carefully counted against their cost. Therefore, developing further cost
intensive measures to prevent adverse health effects need to be well considered.
In Chapter 3, I investigate hidden factors for rising health expenditure from a dif-
ferent perspective using a stated choice method. The option value induced by
technological progress is found to increase preferences for marginally effective
treatments in terminal situations. This hidden factor is different from the afore-
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mentioned health effects as it cannot be prevented by political adjustments but
calls for ex post measures. Certainly, priority setting or rationing may be possible
solutions to contain such costs. However, not only do these measures have very
bad reputation in society and are therefore politically not easily feasible1 but they
are connected to welfare losses as well. As long as the expenditure for such treat-
ments reflects preferences, i.e. as long as society is willing and able to spend an
increasing share of its GDP on such services, there is no need to intervene polit-
ically. The underlying utility of such treatments, even if the medical outcome is
negligible, may be high in terminal situations. Therefore, analyzing preferences
is crucial in order to carefully and deliberately apply direct measures of cost con-
tainment such as explicit rationing.
In chapter 5, the focus lies on analyzing hidden cost that arise due to inefficien-
cies on health insurance markets using a laboratory experiment. In contrast to
treatment demand that may reflect preferences, inefficiencies on health insurance
markets do certainly not reflect preferences of consumers. Hence, there is potential
to reallocate resources in order to increase welfare. By encouraging competition
on health insurance markets, inefficiencies can be tackled. Finding measures that
acknowledge heterogeneity of preferences and the resulting complexity, which de-
creases the quality of health insurance choice, is crucial to help constructing more
efficient health insurance markets. By controlling complexity, e.g. by employing
preselection mechanisms, one may solve the trade-off problem between complex-
ity and acknowledgment of heterogeneity in order to increase efficiency and to
arrive at contracts that better reflect preferences of consumers.
1At least in an explicit sense.
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